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Taking an innovative look at the origins of economics, this forward-thinking book relocates economics from a materialistic general theory of rational action into an idealistic theory of social organization and individual action. Adding new insightful analytical methods such as complexity theory, graph theory and computational modelling to the original insights of the Scottish Enlightenment, Richard Wagner explores economics in an ever-changing society, looking at the key civilizing processes and the important social questions. Rethinking Economics as Social Theory moves away from the traditional review of analytical exercises and associated data and illustrates an enlightening scheme of thought where human societies are heterogeneous and not homogeneous and where change is continually in motion. Furthermore, Wagner theorises that economizing is a universal form of human action that plays out in numerous substantive directions and shows cooperation and conflict to have a yin-and-yang relationship. This illuminating book will prove an excellent resource for economists interested in working outside of comparative statics as well as social scientists looking for a broader vision of economics. Philosophers and those working in the field of biological sciences will also find this an informative read.

Innovative in its approach, Rethinking Public Choice reviews the concept of public choice since the 1950s post-war period and the application of economics to political practices and institutions, as well as its evolution in recent years attracting contributions from political science and philosophy. Examining the growing variety of theoretical orientations on the topic, such as entangled political economy and additive political economy, the book provides new analytical insights into combining the old and new to establish a more unified political economy. Richard E. Wagner expertly highlights the key issues an entangled economy can bring, including incomplete information and its constant evolution as it reflects ever changing public choice ideas. Wagner seeks to extend the reach of public choice by distinguishing the formal idea of rationality that has dominated public choice from the immensely varied practice of human action that opens up now directions for public choice. This insightful approach will prove an excellent resource for academics and scholars of economics and political science, as well as those within the field of public administration as it offers an excellent blend of all subjects.

The original essays in this book connect the microeconomic and macroeconomic approaches to public debt. Through their thought-provoking views, leading scholars offer insights into the incentives that individuals and governments may have in resorting to public debt, thereby promoting a clearer understanding of its economic consequences. The authors explore public debt along two distinct but complementary analytical paths. One path concerns microeconomic aspects of public debt as it emerges through budgetary processes where individuals respond to the costs and gains of different courses of action. The other concerns the systemic properties of rational individual acting within a democratic system of political economy. Within this scheme of thought, the two levels of analysis are integrated by recognition that efforts to control macro-level outcomes must address the micro-level circumstances and conditions that promote public debt as systemic budgetary outcomes. Scholars and students, as well as policy makers in public debt and political economy, will find this critical resource invaluable to understanding this vital issue.Contributors include: A. Alupoaiei, F. Balassone, G. Brennan, S. Cecchetti, M. Cecioni, M. Cioffi, W. Cornacchia, F. Corneli, F. Dragu, G. Eusepi, E. Longobardi, K. Mause, F. Neagu, A. Pedone, A. Rieck, L. Schuknecht, G. Semeraro, L. Voinea, R.E. Wagner

“A fine collection of essays exploring, and in many cases extending, Jim Buchanan's many contributions and insights to economic, political, and social theory.”–Bruce Caldwell, Professor of Economics, Duke University, USA'The overwhelming impression the reader gets from this very fine collection is the extraordinary expanse of James Buchanan's work. Everyone interested in economics and related fields can profit mightily from this book.'–Mario Rizzo, Professor of Economics, New York University, USAThis book explores the academic contribution of James Buchanan, who received the Nobel Prize for economics in 1986. Buchanan's receipt of the Prize is noteworthy because he was a maverick within the economics profession. In contrast to the preponderance of economists, Buchanan made little use of mathematics and no use of econometrics, preferring to used logic and language to insert his ideas into the scholarlycommunity. Moreover, his ideas extended the domain of economic inquiry along many paths that numerous economists subsequently pursued. Buchanan's scholarship brought economics and political science together under the rubric of public choice. He was also was a prime figure in bringing economic theory into closer contact with moral and social philosophy.This volume includes essays distributed across the extensive domain of Buchanan's scholarly contributions, reflecting the range of his scholarly interests. Chapters will examine Buchanan's scholarly work on public finance, social insurance, public debt, public choice, economic methodology, constitutional political economy, law and economics, and ethics and social theory. The book also examines Buchanan in relation to other prominent economists, both from the distant past and the recent past.

Over the past few decades, economists have witnessed with growing uneasiness their failure to explain the ballooning of public debt in most countries. Using methodological individualism and micro-economics, this book overcomes flaws inherent in the standard macro approach, according to which governments manipulate public debt to promote systemic stability. This unique analysis is grounded in the writings of Antonio de Viti de Marco, injecting current analytical contributions and formulations into the framework to offer a forthright insight into public debt and political economy. Public Debt provides an alternative orientation that explains why concepts of public debt that are relevant for authoritarian regimes are not relevant for democratic regimes. It examines public debt in cooperative and monopolistic democracies as well as the corrupting quality of public debt in democracy. Including topics such as macro guidance within a Machiavellian approach, public debt as systemic lying and as a shell game, economy as an ecology vs. economy as an engine, individual vs. group action and cooperative state as ideal type, this book is a unique and refreshing approach to the material. This comprehensive and cohesive sourcebook will serve as a critical resource for academics interested in public debt and political economy.

This volume contains the papers, along with the discussant's re­ marks, presented at a conference on'Federal Fiscal Responsibility', held at The Homestead, Hot Springs, Virginia, on 26-27 March 1976. Additionally, we, the editors, have included an introductory essay which sets forth some of our background thoughts that in­ formed our organization of the conference and which also de­ scribes some of our reactions to the conference. This conference was sponsored by the Liberty Fund, Inc. of Indianapolis, Indiana, which incorporated this conference into its overall program directed toward the study of the ideals of a free society of responsible individuals. Related to this effort, the Liberty Fund also assisted in supporting research on Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes, by James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner (New York: Academic Press, 1977). Both Democracy in Deficit and the conference were de­ signed to examine one important aspect of the Liberty Fund's general set of concerns, namely the'way in which political con­ siderations influence the macroeconomic aspects of budgetary policy, thereby, in turn, influencing the future of American liberty and prosperity. We are most grateful to the Liberty Fund for their efforts, and we are pleased that Enid Goodrich, William Fletcher, Neil McLeod, and Helen Schultz of the Liberty Fund were able to attend the conference.

Public Interest Institute began operations in 1992 as Iowa's only state-level, independent, research organization. As a public-policy research organization, our four principal goals are to become an information and analysis resource for all Iowans; provide local, state, and national policy-makers with a rigorous, objective, and understandable analysis of specific policy initiatives; identify practical alternatives for action on critical issues; and provide a forum for policy-makers and individuals to share ideas and concerns. The Institute promotes the importance of a free-enterprise economic system and its relationship to a free and democratic society. It seeks to support the proper role of a limited government in a society based upon individual freedom and liberty. Concerned citizens are challenged to become better informed about public issues, for ideas have consequences, and involved individuals can make a difference. Following the general treatment of how to achieve these ideals contained in LIMITING LEVIATHAN, we have continued our series of books designed to examine the topics raised there in greater depth. In FEDERALIST GOVERNMENT IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE we developed the ways in which dividing governmental power between levels such as national and state can help citizens preserve their freedoms. In this volume we develop the ways in which property rights do the same.

Federalism has generally been characterized as a system of government that is friendly to liberty. It is not obvious, though, why this should be so. Federalism is a form of government where citizens simultaneously reside in at least two governments, each of which has independent authority to tax and to regulate. By contrast, in a unitary form of government citizens face only one government with independent authority to tax and regulate. At first glance, it would seem a bit strange to claim that liberty is more secure when citizens are members of two governments with independent authority than when they are members of only one such government. The relationship between federalism and liberty turns out to be a complex one, and one that is capable of working in either direction. Whether federalism supports or erodes liberty depends on importantly on the institutional framework within which federalist governance takes place. The essays in Federalist Government in Principle and Practice examine this institutionalist theme from both theoretical and practical perspectives.

Cigarettes are under political attack at all_levels of government in the United States. From Washington, D. C. to state capitals to local govern­ ments, proposals abound to increase the cigarette excise tax, to impose smoking bans, to prevent cigarette advertising, to restrict the sale of cigarettes through vending machines, to cut off the export of cigarettes, to earmark the cigarette excise tax for health programs, to divest the stock of cigarette companies, and so on. And all of these are purportedly being advocated in the name of health. Undergirding and abetting the health argument is an economic argument that claims to place a value of up to $100 billion per year on the alleged health costs of smoking to the American economy, which is more than $3 per pack of cigarettes smoked. As our title suggests, our interest lies in the economics of smoking and not in the health issues surrounding smoking. We are professional economists and not medical scientists. We will focus on what, if any, economic consequences arise for nonsmokers when smokers smoke. For purposes of our discussion, we simply accept the premise that smoking damages health and proceed with our analysis. Since we have not studied the issue ourselves, we have no way of knowing whether such a premise is true. But it really does not matter for getting the economics of smoking right. The important point resides in who pays for whatever to smoking.

The Handbook of Public Finance provides a definitive source, reference, and text for the field of public finance. In 18 chapters it surveys the state of the art - the tradition and breadth of the field but also its current status and recent developments. The Handbook's intellectual foundation and orientation is truly multidisciplinary. Throughout its examination of the standard material of public finance, it explores the connections between that material and such neighboring fields as political science, sociology, law, and public administration. The editors and contributors to the Handbook are distinguished scholars who write clearly and accessibly about the political economy of government budgets and their policy implications. To address the needs and interests of international scholars, they place European issues next to the American agenda and give attention to the issues of transformation in Central Eastern Europe and elsewhere. General Editors: Jürgen G. Backhaus, University of Erfurt Richard E. Wagner, George Mason UniversityContributors: Andy H. Barnett, Charles B. Blankart, Thomas E. Borcherding, Rainald Borck, Geoffrey Brennan, Giuseppe Eusepi, J. Stephen Ferris, Fred E. Folvary, Andrea Garzoni, Heinz Grossekettaler, Walter Hettich, Scott Hinds, Randall G. Holcombe, Jean-Michel Josselin, Carla Marchese, Alain Marciano, William S. Peirce, Nicholas Sanchez, David Schap, A. Allan Schmid, Russell S. Sobel, Stanley L. Winer, Bruce Yandle.