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From an esteemed military historian, a sweeping history of the revolutions in war-fighting that have shaped the modern world Heraclitus wrote that “war is the father of all,” and it has formed much of the modern world. Although the fundamental nature of war has not altered over the centuries, constant change, innovation, and adaptation have repeatedly reshaped how wars are fought in the West. Revolutions in military practice cannot be separated from larger social developments in areas like logistics, finance and economics, and the culture of military organizations. In The Dark Path, Williamson Murray argues that the history of warfare in the West hinged on five revolutions, which both reflected the social, political, and economic conditions that produced them and in turn influenced how those conditions evolved. These five key turning points are the advent of the modern state, which formed bureaucracies and professional militaries; the Industrial Revolution, which produced the financial and industrial means to sustain and equip large armies; the French Revolution, which provided the ideological basis needed to sustain armies through continent-sized wars; the merging of the Industrial and French Revolutions in the U.S. Civil War; and the accelerating integration of technological advancement, financial capacity, ideology, and government that unleashed the modern capacity for total warfare. An ambitious work of synthesis, this book shows how the world continually re-creates war—and how war, in turn, continually re-creates the world.

A classic study of military leadership uncovering why generals fail The Crimea, the Boer War, the Somme, Tobruk, Pearl Harbor, the Bay of Pigs: these are just some of the milestones in a century of military incompetence, of costly mishaps and tragic blunders. Are these simple accidents—as the'bloody fool'theory has it—or are they inevitable? The psychologist Norman F. Dixon argues that there is a pattern to inept generalship, and he locates this pattern within the very act of creating armies in the first place, which in his view produces a levelling down of human capability that encourages the mediocre and limits the gifted. In this light, successful generals achieve what they do despite the stultifying features of the organization to which they belong.On the Psychology of Military Incompetence is at once an original exploration of the battles that have defined the last two centuries of human civilization and an essential guide for the next generation of military leaders.

This collection of essays examines the development of Churchill and Hitler as strategic leaders and analyses in particular the impact of their formative years on their leadership styles, operational codes', views on civilmilitary relations, and approaches to the conduct of war at strategic, operational and tactical levels. Ultimately, victory depended on the calculated use of all the means of national power military, political, psychological and economic to achieve the national end. These essays demonstrate it was Churchill who best understood that calculation.