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In his ten Beijing lectures, Leonard Talmy represents the range of his work in cognitive semantics. The central concern of this approach is the linguistic representation of conceptual structure, that is, the patterns in which and processes by which conceptual content is organized in language. The lectures examine the semantics of grammar, force dynamics, a typology of how motion events are represented, factive versus fictive motion, a typology of event integration, differences in how spoken and signed language structure space, the attention system of language, introspection as a methodology in linguistics, the relation of language to other cognitive systems, and digitalization in the Evolution of language.

Again firmly rooted in Leonard Talmy's Cognitive Semantics, this new study moves beyond the analysis of single schematic systems in language contributing to the linguistic task of conceptual integration. It investigates for the first time effects of linking up Force Dynamics, a conceptual category generalizing over the traditional notion of the causative, and the Attention system of language, as detailed in Talmy's most recent extended draft version. To accommodate the conceptual and formal complexities involved at the interface of Attention, Force Dynamics, and Cognitive State and to allow for an appropriate degree of fine-grainedness the analytical framework affords, the exposition has been constrained to the golf scenario, where forces are at work in the physical and sociodynamic domains.

Current progress in linguistic theorizing is more and more informed by cross-linguistic (including cross-modal) investigation. Comparison of languages relies crucially on the concepts that can be coded with similar effort in all languages. These concepts are part of every language user's ontology, the network of cross-connected conceptualizations the mind uses in coping with the world. Assuming that language comparability is rooted in the comparability of user ontologies, the idea of the present volume is to further instigate progress in linguistics by looking behind the interface with the conceptual-intentional system and asking a still underexplored question: How are ontological structures reflected in intra- and cross-linguistic regularities? This question defines the research program of ontology based linguistics or ontolinguistics. Recent advances in the theory of language have been characterized by an emphasis on external explanatory adequacy and thus on relating language to other phenomena. The research program introduced in this volume adds a decisively distinct and fresh aspect to this emerging new contextualization of the field by bringing together insights from different areas, mainly linguistics, but also neuroscience, philosophy, and artificial intelligence. In providing these disciplines with a new common task, the exploration of the impact of ontological structures on linguistic regularities, the ontolinguistic approach promises to develop into a vital branch of cognitive science. Documenting the beginnings, the book aims to instigate future interdisciplinary research in this area. It will be of interest to researchers in linguistics, artificial intelligence, philosophy, and cognitive science in general.

This study presents an approach to metaphor that systematically takes contextual factors into account. It analyses how metaphors both depend on, and change, the context in which they are uttered, and specifically, how metaphorical interpretation involves the articulation of asserted, implied and presupposed material. It supplements this semantic analysis with a practice-based account of metaphor at the conceptual level, which stresses the role of sociocultural factors in concept formation.

This study is an attempt to uncover the structure of three emotion concepts: anger, pride and love. The results indicate that the conceptual structure associated with these emotions consists of four parts: (1) a system of metaphors, (2) a system of metonymies, (3) a system of related concepts, and (4) a category of cognitive models, with a prototypical model in the center. This goes against an influential view of the structure of concepts in linguistics, psychology, anthropology, according to which the structure of a concept can be represented by a small number of sense components.