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Ce livre illustre tout d'abord le réalisme de la pensée d'Edgar Morin à travers trois exemples concrets très significatifs. Il ancre ensuite ce réalisme tout à fait opérationnel dans la philosophie que représente la pensée complexe, que l'auteur examine à travers l'étude des rapports entre analyse, holisme et globalisme, situant Morin entre Descartes et Hegel. Enfin, l'accent est mis sur les spécificités de la pensée complexe comme philosophie originale, caractéristique de l'œuvre du grand Morin, président d'honneur du Collège international des séniors. Harmattan.

This book brings together the work of Wilfrid Sellars with work in 20th century phenomenology and 21st century speculative realism in order to think through one of the most important predicaments of contemporary philosophy. As a result of the disenchantment of nature in late modernity, philosophy has struggled to account for the place of persons, construed as loci of normative authority and responsibility, within a scientifically, naturalistically described world, bereft of values and norms. The book argues that Sellars takes both the framework of persons and science seriously and thinks that this implies the need not just for reconciling the manifest and scientific images but for fusing them into one stereoscopic vision of reality and our place in it. One of the main aims of this book is to address the issue of the form which a non-alienated experience of ourselves-in-the-world would take in the Sellarsian cryptic stereoscopic fusion of the manifest and the scientificimage. Through an extended discussion of Sellars'relevance for contemporary continental philosophy and phenomenology, in which his views on perception, the commonsense ‘lifeworld', science, normativity, personhood, morality and process metaphysics are presented and extended, the book sketches a novel view about what a stereoscopic fusion of the manifest and the scientific image would amount to at the level of our lifeworld experience.

Without God or His Doubles offers a sympathetic, but critical interpretation of the philosophy of Richard Rorty. Rorty is one of the most widely discussed of contemporary philosophers, but there exist few attempts to deal with the full scope of Rorty's writings in a systematic fashion. This book shows that the unifying theme that runs through Rorty's writings on epistemology, the philosophy of science, the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, and political philosophy is a quasi-religious conception of human creativity and human freedom. In other words, Rorty's attempt to avoid both realism and relativism is best understood in relationship to his claim that traditional philosophy has been god-obsessed. The animating spirit of Rorty's philosophy is to complete the Enlightenment project, to completely wean philosophy away from both God and the various god-doubles (Reason, Nature, Mind, Man, Science, Art). Rorty believes that a radical secularity will result in a kind of human emancipation and a heightened sense of human freedom. The book concludes with a critique of Rorty's proposal for philosophy and culture after the final departure of all the gods.

Comme la plupart des erreurs d'interprétation de la pensée de Putnam proviennent de l'influence de l'interprétation reçue de son itinéraire philosophique, l'objectif de cet ouvrage n'est pas uniquement de remettre en question cette dernière, mais aussi, chemin faisant, de jeter un nouvel éclairage sur quelques-unes des thèses clés du philosophe qui jouent encore un rôle significatif dans divers domaines de la philosophie.

Perhaps the most significant development in American philosophy in recent times has been the extraordinary renaissance of Pragmatism, marked most notably by the reformulations of the so-called'Neopragmatists'Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam. With Pragmatism offering the allure of potentially resolving the impasse between epistemological realists and antirealists, analytic and continental philosophers, as well as thinkers across the disciplines, have been energized and engaged by this movement. In Beyond Realism and Antirealism: John Dewey and the Neopragmatists, David L. Hildebrand asks two important questions: first, how faithful are the Neopragmatists'reformulations of Classical Pragmatism (particularly Deweyan Pragmatism)? Second, and more significantly, can their Neopragmatisms work? In assessing Neopragmatism, Hildebrand advances a number of historical and critical points: • Current debates between realists and antirealists (as well as objectivists and relativists) are similar to early twentieth-century debates between realists and idealists that Pragmatism addressed extensively. • Despite their debts to Dewey, the Neopragmatists are reenacting realist and idealist stands in their debate over realism, thus giving life to something shown fruitless by earlier Pragmatists. • What is absent from the Neopragmatist's position is precisely what makes Pragmatism enduring: namely, its metaphysical conception of experience and a practical starting point for philosophical inquiry that such experience dictates. • Pragmatism cannot take the'linguistic turn'insofar as that turn mandates a theoretical starting point. • While Pragmatism's view of truth is perspectival, it is nevertheless not a relativism. • Pace Rorty, Pragmatism need not be hostile to metaphysics; indeed, it demonstrates how pragmatic instrumentalism and metaphysics are complementary. In examining these and other difficulties in Neopragmatism, Hildebrand is able to propose some distinct directions for Pragmatism. Beyond Realism and Antirealism will provoke specialists and non-specialists alike to rethink not only the definition of Pragmatism, but its very purpose.

Natürliche, ökonomische und soziokulturelle Bedingungen bestimmen das Leben menschlicher Individuen und Gruppen, die verschiedene Einstellungen gegenüber dem, was es gibt, entwickeln können und immer wieder lernen, mit dem Bestehenden auf unterschiedliche Weise umzugehen.

This book celebrates the research career of Lynne Rudder Baker by presenting sixteen new and critical essays from admiring students, colleagues, interlocutors, and friends. Baker was a trenchant critic of physicalist conceptions of the universe. She was a staunch defender of a kind of practical realism, what she sometimes called a metaphysics of everyday life. It was this general “common sense” philosophical outlook that underwrote her famous constitution view of reality. Whereas most of her contemporaries were in general given to metaphysical reductionism and eliminativism, Baker was unapologetic and philosophically deft in her defense of ontological pluralism. The essays in this book engage with all aspects of her unique and influential work: practical realism about the mind; the constitution view of human persons; the first-person perspective; and God, Christianity, and naturalism.Common Sense Metaphysics will be of interest to scholars of Baker's work, as well as scholars and advanced students engaged in research on various topics in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and philosophy of religion.

Scientific realism is at the core of the contemporary philosophical debate on science. This book analyzes new versions of scientific realism. It makes explicit the advantages of scientific realism over alternatives and antagonists, contributes to deciding which of the new approaches better meets the descriptive and the prescriptive criteria, and expands the philosophico-methodological field to take in new topics and disciplines.

Knowledge of facts is essential for the management of life. Most studies of the subject examine how we go about trying to obtain it; they describe the processes and proceedings of rational inquiry. The present work steps back from this to inquire into the limits and limitations of such processes and to identify the assets and the limitabilities of what they are able to supply for us. It examines how knowledge of facts is secured and consolidated as such, and what the resulting information can and cannot provide. It argues that the unavoidable incompleteness of our factual information also endows it with an element of incorrectness. By looking also at the negative side of human inquiry the book's perspective clarifies the nature of our grip on the facts that constitute our view of the reality of things.

Idealismen und Realismen als europäischen Konstrukten des Denkens ist die Voraussetzung gemeinsam, dass der Zugang zum Realen ein erkennender ist und sein soll, wobei gemeinhin nicht zwischen dem Realen und der Realität unterschieden wird. Das Reale zum Thema zu machen, bedeutet folglich, diese Voraussetzung infrage zu stellen und nach der Zugangsweise zu fragen, in der so etwas wie ‚das Reale‘ begegnet. Mit der Fixierung dieser Zugangsweise wird es auch möglich, das Reale in einen Bezug zu einem weiteren Begriff, nämlich den der Welt, zu bringen und die Frage zu stellen, inwiefern auf diesen Grundlagen einer Bestimmung des Realen, der Welt und der Realität ein Denken des ‚Ganzen‘ möglich wird, also das, was man traditionellerweise als Metaphysik bezeichnet. Hans Rainer Sepp

This unique collection of essays has two main purposes. The first is to honour the pioneering work of Cora Diamond, one of the most important living moral philosophers and certainly the most important working in the tradition inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein. The second is to develop and deepen a picture of moral philosophy by carrying out new work in what Diamond has called the realistic spirit.The contributors in this book advance a first-order moral attitude that pays close attention to actual moral life and experience. Their essays, inspired by Diamond's work, take up pressing challenges in Anglo-American moral philosophy, including Diamond's defence of the concept ‘human being'in ethics, her defence of literature as a source of moral thought that does not require external sanction from philosophy, her challenge to the standard ‘fact/value'dichotomy, and her exploration of non-argumentative forms of legitimate moral persuasion. There are also essays that apply this framework to new issues such as the nature of love, the connections of ethics to theology, and the implications of Wittgenstein's thought for political philosophy.Finally, the book features a new paper by Diamond in which she contests deep-rooted philosophical assumptions about language that severely limit what philosophers see as the possibilities in ethics. Morality in a Realistic Spirit offers a tribute to a great moral philosopher in the best way possible—by taking up the living ideas in her work and taking them in original and interesting directions.

Chiedersi se libertà e metafisica siano compatibili è interrogarsi sul rapporto tra Verità e libertà. La risposta teoretica dell'Assoluto Realismo di Vincenzo La Via è l'affermazione della relazione ontologica in atto, escludente ogni presupposizione analogica della Verità e della libertà. Ma quale libertà è mai questa che è posta con la Verità e rende in atto effi cace la Verità? È la libertà ontologica in atto, l'«Io» concreto (persona è libertà) posto dal trascendentale, dall'idea dell'Essere rosminiana depurata da ogni apriori. La Verità deambula solo con questa libertà unica e in atto, non analogica. È una libertà che ha portata metapolitica perché pone sempre, in quanto ontologica, una situazione in una struttura di potere in atto. È, dunque, un dispositivo metapolitico, una crasi di metafisica e politica: metafisica nell'azione.

First published in 1999, this epistemological volume takes Searle's ‘simple theory'and ‘common sense'realism and builds it from the ground up, applying it to some of the most contentious issues in the philosophy of science. Garry Potter shall also attempt to extent his notions of science and realism beyond the subject boundaries to demonstrate the applicability of both scientificity and realism where such a possibility is perhaps most counter-intuitive: literary criticism. Potter thus presents a unified theory of knowledge.

First published in 1999, this volume focuses on the relation of supervenience which plays a crucial role in contemporary philosophical discussions in diverse fields including the philosophy of mind, ethics and aesthetics. Contrasting the material and conceptual worlds, Dalia Drai questions what we are committed to when we adopt a position affirming determination but denying reduction. The answer Drai develops is that in both cases this position commits us to an anti-realist approach with regard to the supervenient domains.

On April 27, 2007, the first Speculative Realism (SR) workshop was held at Goldsmiths, University of London, featuring four young philosophers whose ideas were loosely allied. Over the ensuing decade, the ideas of SR spread from philosophy to the arts, architecture, and numerous disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. SR has been arguably the most influential new current in continental philosophy since the works of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari found their second wind in the 1990s. But what is SR? This book is the first general overview by one of its original members, focusing on the aesthetic, ethical, ontological, and political themes of greatest importance to the movement. Graham Harman provides a balanced but critical assessment of his original SR colleagues – Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton Grant, and Quentin Meillassoux – along with a clear summary of his own Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO). A number of central philosophical questions tie the four chapters together: What exactly is'correlationism,'the chief enemy of SR? What are the stakes of philosophical realism, and is such realism better served by mathematics and the natural sciences, or by a broader model of cognitive activity that includes aesthetics? This book covers both the historical and conceptual development of the movement, providing a first-rate introduction for students, aided by helpful end-of-chapter study questions chosen by Harman himself. SR, Harman shows, is a vital and fast-developing field in contemporary philosophy.

This title was first published in 2003:This book explores the problem of realism, both metaphysical and scientific. Renowned specialists in the field - including Michael Devitt, David Papineau, Mark Sainsbury and Wesley Salmon - contribute new essays that shed new light on the main topics in the current realism/antirealism debate. Discussing a wide range of issues related to realism, both in metaphysics and in the philosophy of science, they address more specific questions including those concerning metaphysical realism, scientific realism, the relations between epistemology and ontology, causation, dispositions and personal identity, and the relations between science and common sense. Presenting a comprehensive overview of the problem of realism, as well as in-depth discussion of particular topics, this book offers valuable insights for both students and researchers in the field. It can also be used in undergraduate and graduate courses of philosophy.

Faire valoir un réalisme minimal c'est faire tenir ensemble deux exigences : celle d'un réalisme qui cherche à montrer que les relations exprimées par le langage n'existent pas seulement dans le langage, ni seulement dans l'esprit, mais qu'elles nous font connaître quelque chose du monde ; celle d'un nominalisme qui applique le rasoir d'Occam avec vigilance et refuse, non seulement de poser l'existence d'universels qui seraient des essences ou des propriétés, mais même de concevoir les relations elles-mêmes comme des réalités existant dans un autre monde que celui des individus liés par elles.

In this short text, a distinguished philosopher turns his attention to one of the oldest and most fundamental philosophical problems of all: How it is that we are able to sort and classify different things as being of the same natural class? Professor Armstrong carefully sets out six major theories,ancient, modern, and contemporary,and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of each. Recognizing that there are no final victories or defeats in metaphysics, Armstrong nonetheless defends a traditional account of universals as the most satisfactory theory we have.This study is written for advanced students, but as Armstrong goes considerably beyond his earlier work on this topic, it will interest professional scholars as well. Carefully plotted and clearly written, Universals is both a paradigm of exposition and a case study on the value of careful analysis of fundamental issues in philosophy.

Was ist Wirklichkeit? Welchen Zugang haben wir zu ihr in einer zunehmend medialen und digitalisierten Gesellschaft? Oder befinden wir uns mit diesen Fragen vielleicht selbst schon in einem illusionären oder imaginären Zusammenhang, weil die Realität jedem Verstehen zuvorkommt? Und: Was heißt es, mit diesen Fragen philosophisch und theologisch im gegenwärtigen Realismus-Streit angemessen umzugehen? Diesen Problemen wenden sich Markus Gabriel und Malte Dominik Krüger zu, die jeweils aus der Sicht des Neuen Realismus und der (Bild-) Hermeneutischen Theologie argumentieren und auch aufeinander Bezug nehmen. Dabei werden alte Grundfragen des philosophischen und theologischen Wirklichkeitsverständnisses neu verhandelt und in aktuellen Konzepten greifbar. Dokumentiert werden damit - einschließlich der Grußworte - die Vorträge der 1. Internationalen Bultmann-Lecture 2017 in Marburg.

In The Logic of Being, Paul Livingston examines the relationship of truth and time from a perspective that draws on Martin Heidegger's thought and twentieth-century analytic philosophy. In his influential earlier work The Politics of Logic, Livingston elaborated an innovative “formal” or “metaformal'realism. Here he extends this concept into a “temporal realism” that accounts for the reality of temporal change and becoming while also preserving realism about logic and truth. Livingston's formal and phenomenological analysis articulates and defends a realist position about being, time, and their relationship that understands that all of these are structured and constituted in a way that does not depend on the human mind, consciousness, or subjectivity. This approach provides a basis for new logically and phenomenologically based accounts of the structure of linguistic truth in relation to the appearance of objects and of the formal structure of time as given. Livingston draws on philosophers from Plato and Aristotle to Davidson and Heidegger in this exploration. In it, readers and scholars will discover innovative connections between continental and analytic philosophy.

Die Suche nach der `wirklichen´ Wirklichkeit bleibt bis heute weitestgehend intellektuelle Spekulation und/oder gläubiges Bekenntnis. Insbesondere der damit einhergehende Anspruch auf absolute Wahrheit überfordert Denkfiguren, die Dasein von Sein, Möglichkeit von Notwendigkeit und Realität von Idealismus unterscheiden. So offeriert uns die Ideengeschichte einen äußerst pluralen Begriff mit zum Teil konträren Bedeutungen, der aktuell als Schlagwort vor allem für positivistische und materialistische Strömungen Tatsächlichkeit und Objektivität einfordert, sich gleichzeitig aber als Spielwiese von Subjektivismus und Irrationalität präsentiert. Der hier vorliegende Band 4 der Reihe `Edition Freiheit´ limitiert Wirklichkeit auf erscheinungsgebundenes (Handlungs)Geschehen in Empfindung, betont dabei die Rolle von Freiheit, thematisiert Wahrnehmungsgehalte von Nicht-Wirklichkeit und enthebt ihr die auferlegte Bürde der Wahrheit. Gleichzeitig skizziert er eine phänoreale Entgrenzung von WirklichkeitsBildung in Raum und Zeit, in der Idee und Wahl als immer währende Bestandteile einer kategorialen Wirklichkeit menschwerdender Natur anzusehen sind, die immer nur im Jetzt geschieht – als GEGENWART!

The aim of this work is to respond to the following question: how did Charles S. Peirce find unity for his pragmatist philosophy through the formulation of Scholastic Realism? The author proposes the said doctrine to be a reading guide, leading us through the different stages of Peirce's work as a philosopher. By understanding his realist doctrine, we can see why he believed it was a viable theory for understanding the problem of Universals. This book demonstrates why, in Peirce's mind, such a problem has pervaded the history of philosophy. The author's line of argument reveals that Scholastic Realism is crucial to the understanding of his philosophy, which is a new approach in Peirce scholarship. It provides a useful framework for asking questions about reality in the same way that Peirce himself did. As a result, the author shows that Peirce's realism addresses different yet related philosophical problems, leading Peirce to brand the final version of his philosophy as «Scientific Metaphysics». The conclusion offers an interpretation of the Scholastic Realism principle as a solution to Peirce's concerns – a useful idea to achieve a better theory of reality in his struggle to realize metaphysics a posteriori. Peirce's doctrine is presented alongside some of its uses, especially in the fields of abstraction theory, and also in the fundamental principles of mathematics. This work should advance our comprehension of the problems related to Peirce's philosophy as well as shedding light on pragmatism and its origins as well as the battle between realism and nominalism.

Scientific realism is a central, long-standing, and hotly debated topic in philosophy of science. Debates about scientific realism concern the very nature and extent of scientific knowledge and progress. Scientific realists defend a positive epistemic attitude towards our best theories and models regarding how they represent the world that is unobservable to our naked senses. Various realist theses are under sceptical fire from scientific antirealists, e.g. empiricists and instrumentalists. The different dimensions of the ensuing debate centrally connect to numerous other topics in philosophy of science and beyond. The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism is an outstanding reference source – the first collection of its kind – to the key issues, positions, and arguments in this important topic. Its thirty-four chapters, written by a team of international experts, are divided into five parts: Historical development of the realist stance Classic debate: core issues and positions Perspectives on contemporary debates The realism debate in disciplinary context Broader reflections In these sections, the core issues and debates presented, analysed, and set into broader historical and disciplinary contexts. The central issues covered include motivations and arguments for realism; challenges to realism from underdetermination and history of science; different variants of realism; the connection of realism to relativism and perspectivism; and the relationship between realism, metaphysics, and epistemology.The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism is essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy of science. It will also be very useful for anyone interested in the nature and extent of scientific knowledge.

Anton Friedrich Koch begründet und entwickelt in diesem Werk mit Mitteln der analytischen Philosophie einen hermeneutischen Realismus: die philosophische Lehre, dass das Reale zwar von einzelnen Meinungen und Wahrnehmungen unabhängig ist, nicht aber davon, dass es überhaupt Meinungen und Wahrnehmungen gibt. Wir, die endlichen, raumzeitlich verkörperten Subjekte, sind also kein Zufall, sondern notwendig für die Existenz des materiellen Raum-Zeit-Systems, das uns andererseits weiträumig umgibt und keineswegs unsere Konstruktion oder Fiktion ist ( Subjektivitätsthese). Hermeneutisch ist dieser Realismus, weil er das Erkennen als einen Sonderfall des Lesens und Übersetzens - der Dinge in Wortsprache - begreift ( Lesbarkeitsthese) und weil er der Entdeckung Raum gibt, dass Vollständigkeit und Widerspruchsfreiheit, wie in der Mathematik, so auch in der Weltbeschreibung unverträglich sind ( Antinomiethese).

In today's fast-paced world, it's tough to find the time to read. But with Joosr guides, you can get the key insights from bestselling non-fiction titles in less than 20 minutes. Whether you want to gain knowledge on the go or find the books you'll love, Joosr's brief and accessible eBook summaries fit into your life. Find out more at joosr.com. Unfortunately, it's quite unlikely that you're going to find happiness in the pages of a self-help book. Besides, it would appear that finding'happiness'really isn't as valid a goal as we have been led to believe. What if there is another way to experience life, one that is ultimately more fulfilling and more profound? The Antidote explores an alternative angle, one where we allow ourselves to experience more negativity in our lives in surprising and satisfyingly challenging ways. Learning from those who have committed their lives to Buddhism and Stoicism, to celebrating failure and making friends with death, we too can gain the advantages of choosing the'Negative Path.'You will learn: · Why self-help books aren't actually making us any happier · How to conquer our fear of death · How embracing negativity and worst-case scenarios can help us live a richer, more fulfilling life.

David Malet Armstrong (8 July 1926–13 May 2014) has been one of the most influential contemporary metaphysicians working in the analytic tradition and surely the greatest 20th century Australian philosopher. His main merit is to have reestablished metaphysics as a respectable branch of philosophy placing it at the centre of the philosophical debate, and giving it the status of an authoritative and competent interlocutor of both rational and empirical sciences. By means of a rigorously argumentative approach and a sharp prose, Armstrong has built a whole metaphysical system, that is, a comprehensive and unified picture of the fundamental structure of the world. The various chapters of the book address the key issues concerning Armstrong'view about the problem of universals, the nature of states of affairs, the ontological ground of possibility, nomic necessity, and dispositions, the truthmaker theory, and the theory of mind. This volume aims to celebrate Armstrong's memory bringing new understanding, and hopefully stimulating more work, on his philosophy, with the conviction that it constitutes an invaluable heritage for contemporary research in metaphysics.

Il volume vuole essere una occasione di riflessione sulle principali aree di ricerca di Maurizio Ferraris, legate a temi classici dell'ermeneutica, dell'estetica e dell'ontologia. Si tratta di argomenti centrali nel dibattito filosofico contemporaneo, sui quali il filosofo torinese ha offerto una messe di contributi innovativi. Il libro è rivolto non solo agli studiosi di filosofia, ma a chiunque intenda confrontarsi criticamente con il pensiero del nostro tempo. Scritti di: T. Andina, M. Andronico, A. Arbo, C. Barbero, G. Borradori, R. Casati, P. D'Angelo, M. De Caro, P. Engel, P. Kobau, M. Gabriel, P. Legrenzi, D. Marconi, M. Mori, K. Mulligan, L. Perissinotto, S. Poggi, M. Santambrogio, B. Smith e A. Voltolini.

The authors outline the topic of visuality in the 21st century in a trans- and interdisciplinary theoretical frame from philosophy through communication theory, rhetoric and linguistics to pedagogy. As some scholars of visual communication state, there is a significant link between the downgrading of visual sense making and a dominantly linguistic view of cognition. According to the concept of linguistic turn, everything has its meaning because we attribute meaning to it through language. Our entire world is set in language, and language is the model of human activities. This volume questions the approach in the imagery debate.

The common feature of many present-day “new realisms” is a general diagnosis according to which, with Kant, Western philosophy lost any contact with the outside world. In The Untruth of Reality, Jure Simoniti, in contrast, points out the necessary realist side of modern philosophy, arguing that the possibility of realism has always been there. The epistemological self-inauguration of the subject goes hand in hand with his anthropological dethronement, the god-like centrality of the “ego” is constantly counterbalanced with his creatural marginality, the activity of the constitutive subject is juxtaposed with the growing indifference of the world, and the linguistic appropriation of the world simultaneously performs operations of the de-symbolization of reality. However, with these precarious equilibria, the conditions of possibility of realism have become more complex and intricate. It is therefore the goal of this book to demonstrate how the paradigms of consciousness and language are not necessarily incompatible with realism, but rather open new and broader possibilities for the world behind and beyond consciousness and language to disclose itself.This book will be of interest to graduate students and scholars in the fields of German idealism, continental philosophy, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science.

Is contemporary continental philosophy making a break with Kant? The structures of knowledge, taken for granted since Kant�s Critique of Pure Reason, are now being called into question: the finitude of the subject, the phenomenal given, a priori synthesis. Relinquish the transcendental: such is the imperative of postcritical thinking in the 21st century. Questions that we no longer thought it possible to ask now reemerge with renewed vigor: can Kant really maintain the difference between a priori and innate? Can he deduce, rather than impose, the categories, or justify the necessity of nature? Recent research into brain development aggravates these suspicions, which measure transcendental idealism against the thesis of a biological origin for cognitive processes. In her important new book Catherine Malabou lays out Kant�s response to his posterity. True to its subject, the book evolves as an epigenesis – the differentiated growth of the embryo – for, as those who know how to read critical philosophy affirm, this is the very life of the transcendental and contains the promise of its transformation.

Ces réflexions sont un geste inaugural pour aller au fondement de l'empirique, ce que l'auteur nomme la pensée empiricale. Et, a contrario, on peut constater que l'attitude transcendantale, omniprésente, est-elle à bout de souffle, dans son obstination à être la seule approche du réel. L'ouvrage montre donc qu'il est possible de se dégager de cette impasse philosophique.

Positive Realism could be seen as the'sequel'to Maurizio Ferraris'Manifesto of New Realism and Introduction to New Realism. The focus here is the other side of unamendability: a notion, described in his previous books, according to which reality is'unamendable', it cannot be corrected at will. This'resistance'of the real is what ultimately tells us that, in opposition to the claims of post-Kantian philosophy, the world is not a result of our conceptual work: if it were so, our power over reality would be much greater. Now, the often disappointing limits that the real sets against our expectations are also a resource: and this is the key point of the present book. Things exist, and therefore undoubtedly resist us, but in doing so they offer affordances, resources, opportunities. And that the greatest opportunity, which underlies all the other ones, is the fact that we share a world that is far from liquid: on the contrary, it provides the solid ground on which everything rests, starting from our happiness or unhappiness.

Ellis shows that realistic theories of quantum mechanics, time, causality and human freedom - all problematic areas for the acceptance of scientific realism - can be developed satisfactorily. In particular, he shows how moral theory can be recast to fit within this comprehensive metaphysical framework by developing a radical moral theory that conceives morals to be social ideals and has implications for key ethical concepts such as moral responsibility, moral powers, moral rights, and moral obligations. The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism is a bold and original development of the scientific characterization of reality by one of the world's leading metaphysicians of science. It marks a significant contribution not only to philosophy of science and metaphysics but also to the search for a first philosophy.

Philosophical realism has taken a number of different forms, each applied to different topics and set against different forms of idealism and subjectivism. Maurizio Ferraris's Manifesto of New Realism takes aim at postmodernism and hermeneutics, arguing against their emphasis on reality as constructed and interpreted. While acknowledging the value of these criticisms of traditional, dogmatic realism, Ferraris insists that the insights of postmodernism have reached a dead end. Calling for the discipline to turn its focus back to truth and the external world, Ferraris's manifesto—which sparked lively debate in Italy and beyond—offers a wiser realism with social and political relevance.

From the rediscovery of Alfred North Whitehead's work to the rise of new materialist thought, including object-oriented ontology, there has been a rapid turn toward speculation in philosophy as a way of moving beyond solely human perceptions of nature and existence. Now Steven Shaviro maps this quickly emerging speculative realism, which is already dramatically influencing how we interpret reality and our place in a universe in which humans are not the measure of all things. The Universe of Things explores the common insistence of speculative realism on a noncorrelationist thought: that things or objects exist apart from how our own human minds relate to and comprehend them. Shaviro focuses on how Whitehead both anticipates and offers challenges to prevailing speculative realist thought, moving between Whitehead's own panpsychism, Harman's object-oriented ontology, and the reductionist eliminativism of Quentin Meillassoux and Ray Brassier.The stakes of this recent speculative realist thought—of the effort to develop new ways of grasping the world—are enormous as it becomes clear that our inherited assumptions are no longer adequate to describe, much less understand, the reality we experience around us. As Shaviro acknowledges, speculative realist thought has its dangers, but it also, like the best speculative fiction, holds the potential to liberate us from confining views of what is outside ourselves and, he believes, to reclaim aesthetics and beauty as a principle of life itself. Bringing together a wide array of contemporary thought, and evenhandedly assessing its current debates, The Universe of Things is an invaluable guide to the evolution of speculative realism and the provocation of Alfred North Whitehead's pathbreaking work.

Was ist das Wesen religiöser Wirklichkeiten und wie zeigt es sich in religiöser Sprache? Diese Frage wird beantwortet durch eine logisch-semantische Analyse verschiedener Bedeutungstheorien der religiösen Sprache. Grundlage dafür ist Michael Dummetts semantische Theorie des Realismus: Was Realität bedeutet, lässt sich erklären, indem wir erklären, was wir unter Wahrheit und Bedeutung verstehen, wenn wir über diese Realität sprechen. Diese Theorie wird ausführlich dargestellt, kritisiert und weiterentwickelt. Das Ergebnis dieser Auseinandersetzung wird dann auf das Problem der religiösen Sprache angewandt. Diverse antirealistische Ansätze, die ein alternatives Verständnis religiöser Wirklichkeit und Sprache entwerfen, werden klassifiziert und kritisiert. Die Argumente in der Debatte werden herausgearbeitet und kritisch beleuchtet, um dann im Anschluss auf Basis der semantischen Theorie eine Reihe neuer Argumente zu entwickeln. Diese Argumente zeigen unter Berufung auf die bedeutungstheoretischen Grundlagen die Unhaltbarkeit des religiösen Antirealismus. Die Idee einer religiösen Wirklichkeit muss als solche ernst genommen werden.

This collection of original essays aims to reinvigorate the debate surrounding philosophical realism in relation to philosophy of science, pragmatism, epistemology, and theory of perception. Questions concerning realism are as current and as ancient as philosophy itself; this volume explores relations between different positions designated as ‘realism'by examining specific cases in point, drawn from a broad range of systematic problems and historical views, from ancient Greek philosophy through the present. The first section examines the context of the project; contributions systematically engage the historical background of philosophical realism, re-examining key works of Aristotle, Descartes, Quine, and others. The following two sections epitomize the central tension within current debates: scientific realism and pragmatism. These contributions address contemporary questions of scientific realism and the reality of the objects of science, and consider whether, how or the extent to which realism and pragmatism are compatible. With an editorial introduction by Kenneth R. Westphal, these fourteen original essays provide wide-ranging, salient insights into the status of realism today.

Tim Button explores the relationship between words and world; between semantics and scepticism. A certain kind of philosopherthe external realistworries that appearances might be radically deceptive; we might all, for example, be brains in vats, stimulated by an infernal machine. But anyone who entertains the possibility of radical deception must also entertain a further worry: that all of our thoughts are totally contentless. That worry is just incoherent. We cannot, then, be external realists, who worry about the possibility of radical deception. Equally, though, we cannot be internal realists, who reject all possibility of deception. We must position ourselves somewhere between internal realism and external realism, but we cannot hope to say exactly where. We must be realists, for what that is worth, and realists within limits. In establishing these claims, Button critically explores and develops several themes from Hilary Putnam's work: the model-theoretic arguments; the connection between truth and justification; the brain-in-vat argument; semantic externalism; and conceptual relativity. The Limits of Realism establishes the continued significance of these topics for all philosophers interested in mind, logic, language, or the possibility of metaphysics.

Now in paperback, Sandra Laugier's reconsideration of analytic philosophy and ordinary language. Sandra Laugier has long been a key liaison between American and European philosophical thought, responsible for bringing American philosophers such as Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, and Stanley Cavell to French readers—but until now her books have never been published in English. Why We Need Ordinary Language Philosophy rights that wrong with a topic perfect for English-language readers: the idea of analytic philosophy. Focused on clarity and logical argument, analytic philosophy has dominated the discipline in the United States, Australia, and Britain over the past one hundred years, and it is often seen as a unified, coherent, and inevitable advancement. Laugier questions this assumption, rethinking the very grounds that drove analytic philosophy to develop and uncovering its inherent tensions and confusions. Drawing on J. L. Austin and the later works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, she argues for the solution provided by ordinary language philosophy—a philosophy that trusts and utilizes the everyday use of language and the clarity of meaning it provides—and in doing so offers a major contribution to the philosophy of language and twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophy as a whole.

While the phrase'metaphysics of science'has been used from time to time, it has only recently begun to denote a specific research area where metaphysics meets philosophy of science—and the sciences themselves. The essays in this volume demonstrate that metaphysics of science is an innovative field of research in its own right. The principle areas covered are: The modal metaphysics of properties: What is the essential nature of natural properties? Are all properties essentially categorical? Are they all essentially dispositions, or are some categorical and others dispositional? Realism in mathematics and its relation to science: What does a naturalistic commitment of scientific realism tell us about our commitments to mathematical entities? Can this question be framed in something other than a Quinean philosophy? Dispositions and their relation to causation: Can we generate an account of causation that takes dispositionality as fundamental? And if we take dispositions as fundamental (and hence not having a categorical causal basis), what is the ontological ground of dispositions? Pandispositionalism: Could all properties be dispositional in nature? Natural kinds: Are there natural kinds, and if so what account of their nature should we give? For example, do they have essences? Here we consider how these issues may be illuminated by considering examples from reals science, in particular biochemistry and neurobiology.

Michel Houellebecq, author of five novels including Atomised and Platform, has become possibly the world's most famous literary pessimist. His work declares that life is painful and disappointing, death is terrifying, and the human condition is a nasty sort of joke. He has been wildly successful – translated into over 25 different languages and hailed as the voice of a generation. Beginning with Houellebecq's novels, this book explores the concept of ‘Depressive Realism'in literature and philosophy – the proposition that the facts of life are bleak and unkind. Ranging over work by David Foster Wallace, Susan Sontag, Fredric Jameson and Margaret Atwood, Anti-Matter surveys the case for pessimism, asks how a mass culture rooted in sentimentality and trivialisation manages to produce so much cynicism and apathy, and hunts for the space that remains for serious, life-affirming art.

Subject of this book is an epistemological consideration concerning the nature of knowledge. But other than the most essays on the subject of knowledge, here I am going to deal with a largely overlooked account to try to find an answer to the question of knowledge. This is the mental state account of knowledge. Or to put it into the main question: is knowledge a mental state? Now, the question is: Why is the epistemic thinking of Cook Wilson, Prichard and Austin afflicted with such ignorance in contemporary epistemic discussions? The answer is: an unreflected Platonian heritage during 2000 years of epistemic thinking -- a notion which is similar to a point Hetherington has called ``epistemic absolutism''. So my main conclusion here is: the JTB thesis (knowledge is some aspect of justified true belief) is insufficient in order to give an account of the nature of knowledge. A consequence from this is: all the epistemic theories which are dealing with the JTB thesis are based on deficient assumptions. Hence their results -- notably the well-known externalism/internalism debate - are insufficient, too. So, there is a need for a new theory of knowledge based on the MS thesis.

Jacques Derrida's writings often embed the key themes of deconstruction in a notion of the thing. The Event of the Thing is the most complete examination to date of Derrida's understanding of thinghood and its crucial role in psychoanalysis, ethics, literary theory, aesthetics, and Marxism. Arguing that the thing, as a figure of otherness, destabilizes the metaphysical edifice it underlies, Michael Marder reveals the contributions it makes to critiques of humanism and idealism. Subsequently, the new realism that emerges from deconstruction holds the possibility of an event that problematizes all attempts to objectify the thing. An illuminating analysis of Derrida and phenomenology, The Event of the Thing is an innovative and compelling study of a crucial aspect of one of the twentieth century's greatest thinkers.

This book presents a major statement on the dominant philosophy of science by one of the world's leading metaphysicians. Brian Ellis's new book develops the metaphysics of scientific realism to the point where it begins to take on the characteristics of a first philosophy. As most people understand it, scientific realism is not yet such a theory. It is not sufficiently general, and has no plausible applications in fields other than the well-established sciences. Nevertheless, Ellis demonstrates that the original arguments that led to scientific realism may be deployed more widely than they originally were to fill out a more complete picture of what there is. Ellis shows that realistic theories of quantum mechanics, time, causality and human freedom can all be developed satisfactorily, and moral theory can be recast to fit within this comprehensive metaphysical framework.

The first systematic examination of Hilary Putnam's arguments against computational functionalism challenges each of Putnam's main arguments.With mind-brain identity theories no longer dominant in philosophy of mind in the late 1950s, scientific materialists turned to functionalism, the view that the identity of any mental state depends on its function in the cognitive system of which it is a part. The philosopher Hilary Putnam was one of the primary architects of functionalism and was the first to propose computational functionalism, which views the human mind as a computer or an information processor. But, in the early 1970s, Putnam began to have doubts about functionalism, and in his masterwork Representation and Reality (MIT Press, 1988), he advanced four powerful arguments against his own doctrine of computational functionalism. In Gödel, Putnam, and Functionalism, Jeff Buechner systematically examines Putnam's arguments against functionalism and contends that they are unsuccessful. Putnam's first argument uses Gödel's incompleteness theorem to refute the view that there is a computational description of human reasoning and rationality; his second, the “triviality argument,” demonstrates that any computational description can be attributed to any physical system; his third, the multirealization argument, shows that there are infinitely many computational realizations of an arbitrary intentional state; his fourth argument buttresses this assertion by showing that there cannot be local computational reductions because there is no computable partitioning of the infinity of computational realizations of an arbitrary intentional state into a single package or small set of packages (equivalence classes). Buechner analyzes these arguments and the important inferential connections among them—for example, the use of both the Gödel and triviality arguments in the argument against local computational reductions—and argues that none of Putnam's four arguments succeeds in refuting functionalism. Gödel, Putnam, and Functionalism will inspire renewed discussion of Putnam's influential book and will confirm Representation and Reality as a major work by a major philosopher.

Scientific realism is the position that the aim of science is to advance on truth and increase knowledge about observable and unobservable aspects of the mind-independent world which we inhabit. This book articulates and defends that position. In presenting a clear formulation and addressing the major arguments for scientific realism Sankey appeals to philosophers beyond the community of, typically Anglo-American, analytic philosophers of science to appreciate and understand the doctrine. The book emphasizes the epistemological aspects of scientific realism and contains an original solution to the problem of induction that rests on an appeal to the principle of uniformity of nature.

A provocative ontological-cum-semantic position asserting that the right ontology is austere in its exclusion of numerous common-sense and scientific posits and that many statements employing such posits are nonetheless true.The authors of Austere Realism describe and defend a provocative ontological-cum-semantic position, asserting that the right ontology is minimal or austere, in that it excludes numerous common-sense posits, and that statements employing such posits are nonetheless true, when truth is understood to be semantic correctness under contextually operative semantic standards. Terence Horgan and Matjaz Potrc argue that austere realism emerges naturally from consideration of the deep problems within the naive common-sense approach to truth and ontology. They offer an account of truth that confronts these deep internal problems and is independently plausible: contextual semantics, which asserts that truth is semantically correct affirmability. Under contextual semantics, much ordinary and scientific thought and discourse is true because its truth is indirect correspondence to the world. After offering further arguments for austere realism and addressing objections to it, Horgan and Potrc consider various alternative austere ontologies. They advance a specific version they call “blobjectivism”—the view that the right ontology includes only one concrete particular, the entire cosmos (“the blobject”), which, although it has enormous local spatiotemporal variability, does not have any proper parts. The arguments in Austere Realism are powerfully made and concisely and lucidly set out. The authors'contentions and their methodological approach—products of a decade-long collaboration—will generate lively debate among scholars in metaphysics, ontology, and philosophy.

In this remarkable book, Joseph Margolis, one of America's leading and most celebrated philosophers, examines the relationship between two apparently contradictory philosophical tendencies - realism and relativism. In order to examine the relationship between the two, Margolis establishes a taxomony of different kinds of realism and different kinds of relativism. Drawing on both the analytic and Continental traditions, he examines (from a pragmatic point of view) the various relationships between these two tendencies in the light of two major developments in modern philosophy - the concern for praxis and the concern for historicity.Twenty years after it was first published to great acclaim, Margolis has updated Pragmatism Without Foundations in the light of his most recent work and the development of pragmatism in the intellectual world. This second edition includes an updated preface and a brand new epilogue addressing these developments and their implications for his earlier work.

Metaphysics, with which, as fate would have it, I have fallen in love but from which I can boast of only a few favours, o?ers two kinds of advantage. The?rst is this: it can solve the problems thrown up by the enquiry of mind, when it uses reason to spy after the more hidden properties of things. But hope is here all too often disappointed by the outcome. And, on this occasion, too, satisfaction has escaped our eager grasp. [...] The second advantage of metaphysics is more consonant with the nature of the human understanding. It consists [...] in knowing what relation the question has to empirical concepts, upon which all our judgements must at all times be based. To that extent metaphysics is a science of the limits of human reason.[...] Thus, the second advantage of metaphysics is at once the least known and the most important, although it is also an advantage which is only attained at a fairly late stage and after long experience. 1 Immanuel Kant The tradition of the particle concept goes back to traditional metaphysics and ancient philosophy. The idea that matter is made up of microscopic constituent parts stems from ancient atomism. At the very beginnings of modern physics, it was taken up by Galileo, Descartes, and Newton. Newton thought that there are atoms of matter and light, but with the methods of Newtonian mechanics and optics they were beyond the reach of experiments.