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Unifying metaphysics by treating it as the science of being as being, this book illuminates questions in metaphysics by treating them as debates about the nature of various kinds of being. Aristotle's positions on metaphysical topics provide a starting point for the chapters as author George Couvalis explains, critiques, and builds on each with knowledge of modern science and its implications for metaphysics. Couvalis begins by explaining the claim that metaphysics is the science of being as being by contrasting beings with hallucinations. He then turns to a range of questions, including whether being is primarily to be understood as essence, whether laws of nature are to be understood to be about powers or about relations between universals, whether relations exist in addition to relata, whether empty space exists as a thing separate from relations, whether space is constituted by points, whether God or gods exist, and whether there are exceptions to the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle. As a comprehensive exploration of metaphysics from foundational historical arguments to the most contemporary intersections of philosophy and science, The Science of Being as Being is an accessible yet thorough and sophisticated treatise for scholars and students.

This book provides a general framework for understanding nature to revive the philosophical study of nature as a complementary research project to the empirical exploration of nature. It demonstrates that the a priori research of nature is a viable science, by articulating its principles and demonstrating their effectiveness in explaining the most fundamental features of nature – time, space, and its laws. The original contribution of this book is twofold. Firstly, it introduces a unique method for undertaking conceptual analysis. The effectiveness of these tools is demonstrated in exploring the most general and fundamental features of nature. Secondly, it introduces a novel conception of nature –'internal relationalism'– that offers an insight into the structure of nature and its most fundamental features. Thus, it offers answers to some of the most fundamental questions that have plagued philosophers and scientists for millennia, concluding with the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” This book is of interest to metaphysics, philosophers of science who focus on the foundations of physics, and philosophically-minded physicists, especially those whose research interests include the nature of time and space.

This text explores how phenomenology might lead to monadological metaphysics, and conversely, how monadology might be helpful to nonmetaphysical thinking. Little has been published (especially in English) on the connections between these two fields and this edited volume is an invitation to assess the similarities and differences between Husserl's philosophical projects and Leibniz's metaphysics. Many Leibniz scholars have contributed to this volume. Phenomenologists covered include Stumpf, Brentano, Heidegger, Reinach, and Gurwitsch. This book appeals to scholars and advanced students working in the field.

This book addresses the issue of natural simultaneity of relatives, discussed by Aristotle in Categories 7, 7b15– 8a12. Natural simultaneity is a form of symmetrical ontological dependence that holds between items that are not causally linked. In this section of the Categories, Aristotle introduces this topic in his analysis of relatives and maintains that although relatives seem to be for the most part simultaneous by nature, there seem to be some exceptions. He mentions two pairs of relatives as exceptions, namely the pairs knowledge/knowable and perception/perceptible, and argues at length for the priority of the second relative over the first one in each case. Through a close reading of this text, the author analyses Aristotle's arguments for the thesis of the exceptional character of these pairs and shows that all of them are unsuccessful in supporting the thesis. In order to draw this conclusion, the author highlights and carefully considers the properties that Aristotle is committed to attributing to relatives, taking into account the metaphysical framework of the Categories as well as their specificities within the set of nonsubstantial categories. Then, he shows that Aristotle's mature views on relatives in the Metaphysics can be construed as committing him to the rejection of such a thesis.Although the issue of natural simultaneity is just one of several that Aristotle considers in his discussion of relatives throughout Categories 7, it is a particularly relevant issue, since it involves a number of puzzles whose analysis allows for a better understanding of the very notion of relativity in Aristotle. This is the first book to explore this issue from the perspective of illuminating the Aristotelian views on relatives.Aristotle on Natural Simultaneity of Relatives in the Categories will appeal to scholars and graduate students working on Aristotle, ancient philosophy in general, and metaphysics.

Ist Natur eine Norm der Praxis? Mit anderen Worten gefragt: Weist seine Natur dem Menschen einen Weg zum rechten – gar zu einem gebotenen – Handeln? Seit Aristoteles wurde diese für die menschliche Lebensform gewichtige Frage mit einem unmissverständlichen ‚Ja‘ beantwortet. Die Neuzeit neigt überwiegend zu einer gegenteiligen Antwort. Denn, so wird jetzt gefragt: Was ist eigentlich Natur? Ist sie dem Menschen gleichsam als Mitgift in die Wiege gelegt, also seinem Lebensvollzug und seinen Handlungsentscheidungen mit verbindlichem Anspruch vorgegeben? Oder ist Natur – das Sein des Menschen – allein das, was der Mensch zwischen Geburt und Tod aus sich selbst macht, also bloß ein So-und-Jetzt-Sein? Ist der Mensch im Sinne normativer Natürlichkeit möglicherweise ganz und gar unbestimmt? Kurzum: Wie steht es um die Natur des Menschen und deren Anspruch auf Normativität? Dieser Streitfrage, die heute im Für und Wider – nicht zuletzt im Blick auf die sich zunehmend verschärfende Herausforderung einer Selbstbehauptung des Humanen angesichts einer immer mächtiger werdenden Bevormundung unserer Lebensvollzüge durch Algorithmen – auf das Heftigste in Philosophie wie in Politik verhandelt wird, gehen die Beiträge dieses Buches, das viele inzwischen maßgeblich gewordene Wortmeldungen zur Sache versammelt, nach.

Calling for a revival of intellectual intuition in metaphysics long after its banning by Kant, Kenneth Rose overcomes the forgetfulness of being through contemplative ontology. Rose argues for the reinstatement of intellectual intuition in metaphysics long after its banning by Kant. His claim is not merely the conclusion of a thought-experiment or of an exercise in conceptual analysis. It is the result of the contemplative recognition of being with a meditatively concentrated intellect: nous in Greek and buddhi in Sanskrit. Recognizing intellectual intuition as a long-neglected faculty of philosophical insight, Rose shows how it can result in an immediate, intuitive discerning of being. He discusses how being parcels itself out into the intellectual forms providing the underlying nonphysical arrangement of the physical and mental worlds. By reviving the use of intellectual intuition in metaphysics, Rose draws upon historical sources across multiple Asian and Anglo-European philosophical schools. This is a work of contemplative constructive philosophy that breaks down divisions between science, philosophy, and religion and between diverse cultures and divergent worldviews.

Barry Loewer presents a novel account of the metaphysics of law of nature, chances, fundamental ontology, and the space-time arena they occupy. He calls this the Package Deal Account. This aims to answer Stephen Hawking's question'What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?'Loewer's account stands on the shoulders of David Lewis's Humean Best Systems Account of laws and chances, but rejects Lewis'Humean ontology of natural properties, and instead lets the criteria that physicists employ for evaluating candidate fundamental theories of everything, together with reality, determine the universe's fundamental ontology. The Package Deal Account thus advances the project of naturalizing metaphysics. Loewer discusses the history of the concept of laws of nature, current philosophical accounts of the metaphysics of laws, and arguments for and against each of these. He then shows how the Package Deal Account overcomes objections to each, and how, unlike Lewis's Humean account and its non-Humean rivals, it is able to accommodate recent developments in physics, including proposals for theories of quantum gravity that reject the fundamentality of space-time. Loewer provides in addition an account of the laws and chances that occur in non-fundamental special sciences and how they are related to those of fundamental physics.

In how many ways can things be said to be one, how is oneness itself to be defined, and what is its relation to essence and existence? This book engages with these core questions by examining the works of Avicenna (d. 1037 CE), who is widely regarded as the most important philosopher of the Arabic tradition. In this monograph - the first that is exclusively devoted to Avicenna's henology and to Arabic henology in general - the author analyzes the place and meaning of oneness in Avicenna's general metaphysics and theology and devotes particular attention to how this notion relates to Avicenna's theory of quiddity. He contextualizes Avicenna's doctrines in light of three major intellectual currents (ancient Greek philosophy, early Arabic philosophy, and Islamic theology or kalām) and also offers the first detailed analysis of oneness in the Bahshamite tradition. The book challenges the prevailing interpretation of Avicenna's henology and adduces new textual evidence to show that Avicenna developed an innovative theory of oneness that expresses the essential reality and self-identity of a thing. This foundational sense of oneness is applied to all the pure quiddities and, in an eminent and prior way, to God.

This book challenges the prevailing, though often unacknowledged, view among most practicing scientists and philosophers that human free will is incompatible with the natural causality that is the basic presupposition of modern science. That position is essentially based on the reductionist view of modern physics that all complex phenomena are thought to be ultimately causally explainable solely as a function of the action of their elemental constituents. The book argues that this mainstream opinion is the appropriate logical result of an inadequate conception of the way nature works. To show this the book first details the fundamental philosophical incoherence in the prevailing scientific world view. It then justifies the critique by outlining and re-describing some key findings of modern science, and presents three related alternative aspects by which we can understand the occurrence of natural emergence. In so doing it is suggested that emergence is a pervasive phenomenon in the natural world, and that human free will is an entirely understandable development of these natural processes, when properly understood, in which humanity is appropriately seen as a natural emergent within the evolutionary processes operating in accord with natural selection. Human Emergence and Our Place in the Natural World is essential reading for all philosophers of metaphysics and of science.

A Contemporary Introduction to Thomistic Metaphysics provides the reader with an introductory presentation of key themes in Thomistic metaphysics. There are many such books, but this one is, to use a phrase Michael Gorman has adopted, “analytic-facing,” i.e., it presents things in dialogue with analytic philosophy. Sometimes that means disagreeing with analytic proposals (for example, possible worlds), and sometimes it means agreeing with them (for instance, making ample use of Ryle's notion of “systematically misleading expressions”). What's more, it (gently) takes a somewhat deflationary attitude towards many things metaphysicians like to talk about, such as accidents, universals, and the like. By “deflationary” Gorman means that such items are taken seriously, but their ontological status is taken down a notch: features, universals, possible worlds, and other such things are understood in terms of what substances are and what substances are. Substances are ”basic beings,” and other things are what they are only in relation to substances. Of course this is Aristotle 101, but metaphysicians, Aristotelians included, often slip into treating non-substances as mini-substances, and Gorman pushes back against this throughout. A Contemporary Introduction to Thomistic Metaphysics begins by explaining what philosophy is, what metaphysics is, and how these relate to other kinds of thinking. It then moves through a series of topics, ending with a brief look at applications of metaphysical thinking in theology.

In seiner berühmten Logikvorlesung stellt Immanuel Kant die berühmten Leitfragen der Philosophie'Was kann ich wissen?','Was soll ich tun?'und'Was darf ich hoffen?'. Dem fügt er dann die Frage'Was ist der Mensch?'an und schreibt, all das, was in den ersten Fragen behandelt würde, könne man zur vierten zählen. Dieses Buch fragt demnach nach dem anthropologischen Subtext der drei ersten Fragen, also: Was erfahren wir über die vierte Frage, wenn Kant sich der Wissens-, Sollens- und Hoffensfrage zuwendet?

This book addresses death and immortality by paralleling Plato's philosophy of ‘becoming like God'through exercising one's intellect and virtues, with the Greek archaic and heroic way of gaining immortal glory through remarkable deeds. In doing so, this study focuses on the explicit and implicit references to earthly immortality and heroism in Plato's dialogues, arguing for a distinction between the Time-bound ontology of the glory-seeking individual and the Being-centered ontology of the philosopher. Such an underlining of the ontological discrepancy between the ways of the hero and those of the philosopher makes this book a novel academic contribution. The dual focus discloses the clash of ontologies yet also reveals an implicit existential turmoil in Ancient Greek culture as to the anxieties surrounding one's potential immortality. This title appeals to students and researchers working in Ancient philosophy and existentialism.

This book explores and develops a new philosophical argument for the existence of God from metaphysics. It focuses on exploring the pressing questions of God's existence, the truth of theistic belief, and its relevance in modern philosophy. In doing so, it bridges the discussions and debates in the field of contemporary metaphysics with that of analytic philosophy of religion.At its core, metaphysics is dedicated to unveiling the fundamental structure of reality, playing a critical role in any intellectual endeavour in the quest for truth. However, a noticeable gap has persisted between today's metaphysical conversations and the debates in analytic philosophy of religion, especially regarding the topic of God's existence. In this book, the author embarks on a rigorous exploration, presenting an innovative a posteriori argument for theism, rooted in the latest evidence and theories from contemporary metaphysics. The first part of the book details the explanatory framework of the analysis, which is focused on introducing a new abductive methodology within metaphysics that provides a way for assessing the veracity of theism and the leading fundamental theories in contemporary metaphysics. The second part of the book then focuses on demonstrating how the central concepts and theories within contemporary metaphysics—such as quantum foundations, four-dimensionalism, formal ontology, essentialism, grounding, powerful causation, mereology, free will, personhood, and the reality of suffering—are best explained by the existence of God, and thus justify theism, over that of the competing theories within contemporary metaphysics. Theism is thus the best working metaphysical theory and should take a central place in fundamental enquiries within the field of contemporary metaphysics and beyond.Analytic Theism: A Philosophical Investigation is a must-read for scholars and advanced students venturing into philosophy of religion and metaphysics. Beyond its appeal to those in analytic philosophy of religion and metaphysics, this work also resonates with those immersed in contemporary philosophy on a whole and related fields of inquiry, serving as a pivotal read for anyone keen on the intersections of philosophy, theology, and science.

In Pascal's God and the Fragments of the World, Martin Nemoianu offers a new interpretation of the thought of Blaise Pascal, drawn from the Pensées and beyond. The book takes Pascal's central theme to be the distinction - Infini rien - between the transcendent God and the created world, which, without God, would be nothing. Nemoianu identifies the distinction in Pascal, articulates it, and works through the difficulties attending the distinction's disclosure. He then considers the implications of the distinction for the nature of nature and the nature of the human being, culminating in the ideal of martyrdom. The book closes with treatment of a closely related theme: the relation between human freedom and divine grace, in the context of the vexed question of Pascal's Jansenism.

What is at stake in that form of inquiry that the western philosophical tradition has called “first philosophy” or “metaphysics”? Is it an abstract, now outmoded branch of philosophy, or does it address a problem that is still of great interest – namely the unity of western knowledge? In fact, metaphysics is “first” only in relation to the other two sciences that Aristotle called “theoretical”: the study of nature (phusikē) and mathematics. It is the strategic sense of this “primacy” that needs to be examined, because what is at issue here is nothing less than the relationship – of domination or subservience, conflict or harmony – between philosophy and science. The hypothesis of this book is that philosophy's attempt to use metaphysics as a way of securing primacy among the sciences has resulted instead in its subservience: philosophy, once handmaiden to theology (ancilla theologiae), has now become more or less consciously handmaiden to the sciences (ancilla scientiarum). So it is all the more urgent to explore the nature and limits of this primacy and subservience, which is what the present book does through an archaeological investigation of metaphysics. This important rereading of the western philosophical tradition by a leading thinker will be of interest to students and scholars in philosophy, critical theory and the humanities more generally, and to anyone interested in contemporary philosophy and European thought.

Dispositionalism, perhaps the most popular variant of non-Humean metaphysics, submits that dispositions, powers, or capacities, are part of the furniture of the world. In this book I advance an original approach to dispositionalism revolving around the notion of Dispositional Reality; the novelty lies in the fact that the account, unlike most alternatives on the market, does not require the reification of objects, facts, properties, nor their dispositional essences – and is in fact compatible with a far more deflationary approach to dispositions, while still being true to the non-Humean spirit of the proposal. This power metaphysics without powers allows one to dispel several puzzles in recent literature, or recast them under a new light. Albeit with its own peculiarities, this proposal constitutes a variant of explanatory dispositionalism, according to which realism about dispositions ought not to be understood as an ontological inflation, but as an explanatory inversion within thenomic and modal family. Some of these explanations are hereby attempted, and a study of various types of non-causal explanation will be provided.

Wie verrückt, dass überhaupt etwas existiert – und man selbst steckt für ein paar Jahrzehnte mittendrin! Die befremdliche Existenz der Wirklichkeit ist höchst erstaunlich. Es mag in der Natur mit rechten Dingen und im weitesten Sinne rational zugehen. Doch dass überhaupt etwas existiert, bleibt unbegreiflich. Am Fels der Existenz prallt jeder Erklärungsversuch ab! Dieses Wunder der Existenz ist nicht nur aufregenden Erkenntnissen, sondern auch faszinierenden Erlebnissen zugänglich. Es führt zur intensivsten Erfahrung der Wirklichkeit überhaupt. Staunen ist das größte Kompliment, das wir der Wirklichkeit machen können!

This book addresses central issues in the philosophy and metaphysics of science, namely the nature of scientific theories, their partial truth, and the necessity of scientific laws within a moderate realist and empiricist perspective. Accordingly, good arguments in favour of the existence of unobservable entities postulated by our best theories, such as electrons, must be inductively grounded on perceptual experience and not their explanatory power as most defenders of scientific realism claim. Similarly, belief in the reality of dispositions such as causal powers which ground the natural necessity of scientific laws must be based on experience. Hence, this book offers a synthetic presentation of an original metaphysics of science, namely a metaphysics of properties, both categorical and dispositional, while at the same time opposing strong versions of necessitarism according to which laws are true in all possible worlds.The main theses and arguments are clearly presentedin a non-technical way. Thus, on top of being of interest to the specialists of the topics discussed, it is also useful as a textbook in courses for third year and more advanced university students.

A mind-bending invitation to experience the impossible as fundamentally human. From precognitive dreams and telepathic visions to near-death experiences, UFO encounters, and beyond, so-called impossible phenomena are not supposed to happen. But they do happen—all the time. Jeffrey J. Kripal asserts that the impossible is a function not of reality but of our everchanging assumptions about what is real. How to Think Impossibly invites us to think about these fantastic (yet commonplace) experiences as an essential part of being human, expressive of a deeply shared reality that is neither mental nor material but gives rise to both. Thinking with specific individuals and their extraordinary experiences in vulnerable, open, and often humorous ways, Kripal interweaves humanistic and scientific inquiry to foster an awareness that the fantastic is real, the supernatural is super natural, and the impossible is possible.

Insofar as Christian theology aims to make truthful claims about the nature of reality, it is necessarily involved in the enterprise of metaphysics. Pentecostals, precisely as Christians, are thus obliged to participate. Through this study it becomes evident that pentecostals aim to participate in the metaphysical discipline in the same way they theologize - that is, informed by the norms, practices, and speech acts that constitute their spirituality. This book aims to construct a Christian metaphysics that is at once attuned to pentecostal spirituality/theology and informed by the classical tradition of Christian metaphysics. Ultimately, this work offers a constructive and critical engagement with pentecostal spirituality, and with pentecostal theology via the larger ecumenical, creedal, and dogmatic metaphysical tradition. Thus, this book is explicitly and intentionally limited to understand metaphysics in conversation with the historical Christian tradition, and to understand a pentecostal vision of it.

Dieser Band versammelt Texte aus dem Nachlass Moritz Schlicks über den Begriff und die Geschichte der Philosophie. Ein großer Teil davon gehört zum Spätwerk Schlicks, und er plante selbst, sie zu publizieren. Diese Edition macht darum erstmals und im Zusammenhang Texte zugänglich, die noch weitgehend unbekannt sind. Schlick zeichnete darin die Philosophiegeschichte als Geschichte eines Irrtums. Dieser Irrtum wurde von den Eleaten zuerst begangen, indem sie Schein und Sein unterschieden, und wird seither in wechselnder Terminologie wiederholt. Durch die moderne Logik kann dieser Irrtum nach Schlicks Ansicht beseitigt werden.

This book tells the story of how the Platonic vision of Michael Polanyi – the Hungarian-British chemist and philosopher – bridges the gap between speculative metaphysics and scientific practice, thus making sense of the broad swathe of human experience in a phenomenologically satisfying fashion. The central proposal is that Polanyi is a Platonist due to his affirmation of the ontological status of abstract objects, with particular focus placed on the question of uninstantiated universals. The book engages contemporary, speculative realists from both continental and analytic traditions as it introduces Polanyi's influential epistemology and unpacks the fascinating metaphysics implied thereby. It then proceeds to develop Polanyi's rather unsystematic metaphysics into a coherent, post-critical Platonism which incorporates his well-known theory of tacit knowledge, thus achieving something akin to the ancient Neoplatonic synthesis of Plato and Aristotle in our contemporary, scientificcontext.

We inhabit a world not only full of natural dispositions independent of human design, but also artificial dispositions created by our technological prowess. How do these dispositions, found in automation, computation, and artificial intelligence applications, differ metaphysically from their natural counterparts? This collection investigates artificial dispositions: what they are, the roles they play in artificial systems, and how they impact our understanding of the nature of reality, the structure of minds, and the ethics of emerging technologies. It is divided into four parts covering the following interconnected themes: (i) Artificial and Natural Dispositions, (ii) Artificial Systems and Their Dispositions, (iii) Agency, Mind, and Artificial Dispositions, and (iv) Artificial Moral Dispositions. This is a groundbreaking and thought-provoking resource for any student or scholar of philosophy of science, contemporary metaphysics, applied ethics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of technology.

This volume is dedicated to questions about the nature and method of metaphysics in Classical German Philosophy. Its chapters offer original investigations into the metaphysical projects of many of the major figures in German philosophy between Wolff and Hegel.The period of Classical German Philosophy was an extraordinarily rich one in the history of philosophy, especially for metaphysics. It includes some of the highest achievements of early modern rationalism, Kant's critical revolution, and the various significant works of German Idealism that followed in Kant's wake. The contributions to this volume critically examine certain common themes among metaphysical projects across this period, for example, the demand that metaphysics amount to a science, that it should be presented in the form of a system, or that it should proceed by means of demonstration from certain key first principles. This volume also includes material on influential criticisms of metaphysical projects of this kind.Metaphysics as a Science in Classical German Philosophy is a useful resource for contemporary metaphysicians and historians of philosophy interested in engaging with the history of the methodology and epistemology of metaphysics.

This is a book about everything. Literally. It is also a book about how anything whatsoever happens. By answering the question what is a thing?, philosopher M. Oreste Fiocco reveals what it is to exist, what a being, any being at all, is. In this way, he illuminates reality as a whole and what it is to be real. Such profound matters require a special method of inquiry, which Fiocco introduces and elaborates. Any assumption about the world or anything in it might distort the correct answer to a question as general as what it is to exist. Thus, the method employed herein -- original inquiry -- begins with no assumptions about reality. It is, then, a method independent of any figure, trend, or tradition in the history of philosophy. Via this method, one simply confronts all this, the world, an all-encompassing diverse array of whatnot, and on this basis can come to a secure account of what it is to be. In simply confronting the world, however, one's experience shifts, is transient: all this goes from one way--with, say, a cat here--to some other way--the cat being over there. This manifest inconstancy must be accounted for in any comprehensive account of the world. Yet so must a manifest constancy. If the cat is now, at this moment, over there, that the cat is now, at this moment, over there is forever true. These seemingly contradictory phenomena, inconstancy and constancy, demonstrate the importance of time to understanding the world. Since any legitimate inquiry is directed at something or other and since many objects of inquiry (including inquiry itself) occur over time, correct accounts of temporal reality and of being - of time and the world - provide insight into all inquiry. These accounts provide constraints on and, hence, guidelines for investigating any subject matter in any field. Therefore, this is a book for anyone curious about such grand, abstruse matters as the nature of reality or of time itself, as well as a book for someone curious about any thing at all.

Dieses Buch bietet einen systematischen Überblick zum Zeitbegriff aus der Sicht der Philosophie, der Naturwissenschaft und der Alltagspsychologie.​

This book shows, for the first time in its full spectrum, the interconnectedness and topicality of two historically and philosophically significant developments of philosophical theories of the study of mind: that of phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and phaneroscopy of Charles S. Peirce. The chapters in this book put the two thinkers in a novel discourse while engaging in mutual scholarship on the large overlaps between the historically two largely independently developed but converging ideas of mind, cognition, consciousness, being, and experience. It is the second volume in a projected series of three, the first of which is Peirce and Husserl: Mutual Insights on Logic, Mathematics, and Cognition (2019). This book consists of three parts. Part I contains studies on the basic elements and the methodological themes of both “phenomenologies” vis-à-vis each other. Part II of the book is dedicated to metaphysical and existential themes. Finally, this book contains a hitherto unpublished selection of connected texts from Charles Peirce concerning phaneroscopy, the theory of definitions, and other related historical, philosophical, and religious themes from 1910, transcribed and introduced by one of the editors of the volume. This book is of interest to scholars in phenomenology, phaneroscopy, and the history of ideas.

​„Mein Thema ist eigentlich Metaphysik in der weitesten Bedeutung“ bemerkt Kant im Jahr 1794. Die Probleme der Metaphysik, ihre Methode, ja die Frage nach ihrer Möglichkeit und deren Bedingungen bleiben ein konstantes Thema seiner Veröffentlichungen und Forschungen. Die in diesem Band vereinigten Aufsätze beleuchten unterschiedliche Aspekte dieses Lebensthemas: eine Rekonstruktion zentraler Etappen auf dem Weg hin zu einer sogenannten ‚Ideenmetaphysik‘, so wie sie ihre erste Form in der 1781 erschienenen Kritik der reinen Vernunft gefunden hat; sodann eine Untersuchung zum'Transzendentalen Ideal'als der höchsten metaphysischen Idee. Weiterhin wird Kants Ideenmetaphysik im Hinblick auf die Sinnfrage gedeutet, und unter dem Stichwort des'doktrinalen Glaubens'die Frage nach der spezifischen Modalität des metaphysischen Diskurses behandelt. Schließlich münden diese Untersuchungen in die Erörterung der Idee einer praktisch-orientierten Metaphysik als Antwort auf die Fragen nach Gott und zukünftigem Leben – Antworten, die Ausdruck letzter Gedanken sind.

This book examines the metaphysical issues regarding the powerful qualities view in all its various forms. The author also develops and defends his own version of the powerful qualities view, which he calls powerful categoricalism.In recent years, the powerful qualities view about the nature of properties has received considerable attention in the philosophical literature. The core tenet of the powerful qualities view is that properties are both dispositional and categorical/qualitative. Despite the increased popularity of the powerful qualities view, there is no book-length presentation of the view in its distinct versions. The first part of this book analyses the advantages and drawbacks of each version of the theory, paying special attention to those difficulties that make it unstable and perhaps incomprehensible. In the second part, the author shows how a developed version of a dualist model for the origin of natural modality—according to which the specific behaviour of things in the world is the outcome of both the thin power properties have to be nomically relatable and certain nomic relations that determine properties'nomological role—can support an alternative understanding of the main tenet of the powerful qualities view. This part, in combination with the discussion of the difficulties of the other versions, not only defends the tenability of powerful categoricalism but also its superiority over the other extant versions.The Metaphysics of Powerful Qualities makes an original contribution to an ongoing debate in contemporary metaphysics.

Dieser Band versammelt Texte aus dem Nachlass Moritz Schlicks über den Begriff und die Geschichte der Philosophie. Ein großer Teil davon gehört zum Spätwerk Schlicks, und er plante selbst, sie zu publizieren. Diese Edition macht darum erstmals und im Zusammenhang Texte zugänglich, die noch weitgehend unbekannt sind. Schlick zeichnete darin die Philosophiegeschichte als Geschichte eines Irrtums. Dieser Irrtum wurde von den Eleaten zuerst begangen, indem sie Schein und Sein unterschieden, und wird seither in wechselnder Terminologie wiederholt. Durch die moderne Logik kann dieser Irrtum nach Schlicks Ansicht beseitigt werden.

La métaphysique forestienne de l'être est une métaphysique de la présence. Être est plus qu'exister et c'est mieux qu'un simple fait, c'est un acte, c'est-à-dire une présence. Forest pense l'être dans sa corrélation à l'esprit qui le pense, comme une présence qui l'enveloppe et le constitue, plus encore qu'une substance que l'on infère à partir de ses propriétés. L'esprit révèle sans constituer, il manifeste ce qui est. L'être est plus intérieur à l'esprit que constitué par le sujet qui le pense. C'est dans et par le consentement, comme disposition radicale de l'âme et pure activité spirituelle, au-delà de toute détermination mesurable, que se révèle l'être comme pure présence. L'itinéraire réflexif de l'être à l'absolu qui le fonde est corrélativement révélation de l'intériorité de l'esprit. Aimé Forest propose une philosophie méditante, une métaphysique de l'expérience intérieure, au-delà des clivages scolaires, parfois simplistes, du réalisme et de l'idéalisme.

This book argues that our current best theories of fundamental physics are best interpreted as positing spacetime as non-fundamental. It is written in accessible language and largely avoids mathematical technicalities by instead focusing on the key metaphysical and foundational lessons for the fundamentality of spacetime.According to orthodoxy, spacetime and spatiotemporal properties are regarded as fundamental structures of our world. Spacetime fundamentalism, however, faces challenges from speculative theories of quantum gravity – roughly speaking, the project of applying the lessons of quantum mechanics to gravitation and spacetime. This book demonstrates that the non-fundamentality of spacetime does not rely on speculative physics alone. Rather, one can give an interpretation of general relativity that supports some form of spacetime non-fundamentalism. The author makes the case for spacetime non-fundamentalism in three steps. First, he confronts the standard geometrical interpretation of general relativity with Brown and Pooley's dynamical approach to relativity theory. Second, he considers an alternative derivation of the Einstein field equations, namely the classical spin-2 approach, and argues that it paves the way for a refined dynamical approach to general relativity. Finally, he argues that particle physics can serve as a continuity condition for the metaphysics of spacetime.The Non-Fundamentality of Spacetime will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of physics, philosophy of science, and metaphysics.

African metaphysics question a variety of issues, ranging from the nature of fundamental reality to the meaning of human existence. African philosophers have introduced groundbreaking metaphysical theories in response to these metaphysical issues and questions. These theories provide uniquely African perspectives that challenge philosophers to look inwards and produce globally competitive ideas instead of exoticising traditional African worldviews for the intellectual entertainment of a non-African audience. This volume advances the field of African metaphysics by critically engaging with key metaphysical ideas and concepts developed by African metaphysical thinkers. The chapters contributed in this volume by established researchers and promising young scholars challenge and modify existing metaphysical theories while proposing novel theories that shape debates in the field.

This is the first volume focused on Markus Gabriel's version of New Realism, which spans the fields of metaphysics/ontology, philosophy of mind, epistemology, philosophy of science, and meta-philosophy. Most of the selected contributions are directly or indirectly concerned with Gabriel's fields of sense-ontology, his version of a thoroughly realistic pluralism. While some take up criticisms from previous debates surrounding Gabriel's philosophy and New Realism in general, others advance completely new and innovative challenges for this highly systematic thinker. Overall, the contributions provide both a substantive commentary on Gabriel's work and a multifaceted, critical assessment of its underlying ideas. The book is not only an essential addition to the debate surrounding New Realism, but also furthers the discussions about naturalism, deflationist ontologies, contextualism and mereological arguments to which Gabriel's work has contributed in recent years.

Heidegger's Metaphysics explores how Heidegger continued the project of Being and Time, developing a new kind of metaphysics through a critique of Kantian transcendental philosophy. Drawing on Heidegger's published work, lecture courses, drafts, and correspondence from the late 1920s, it reconstructs the philosophical justification for this project, its implications for Heidegger's phenomenology of time, and his understanding of philosophical concept formation.Daly proposes that Heidegger's project neither failed nor remained indebted to a Kantian transcendental framework, and challenges the widespread interpretation of Heidegger as a critic of metaphysics. This work examines a wide range of themes that have been largely neglected in discussions of Heidegger's work, including a phenomenology of the mythical world (in dialogue with Ernst Cassirer's work), the origin of religious concepts, the development of a temporality of thrownness, and Heidegger's critique of Kantian transcendentalism. It finishes by challenging the separation of Heidegger's philosophy from his politics and asks what we can retrieve from his project today.

This book approaches the subject of African metaphysics historically as it connects Ancient Egypt to Yorùbá. It provides a history of African metaphysics from ancient Egypt or Kemet down to John Boakye Danquah and Placide Tempels in the 20th century and then Innocent Asouzu, Ada Agada, and Aribiah David Attoe, in the 21st century. As it surpasses the deductions of these previous works, it moves further to showcase African originality and approaches to studying reality, whilst resisting the temptation to deduce conclusions from Western philosophy. It is the first book in the history of African philosophy to use a process-relational approach to interrogate African metaphysics. It also serves to harmonize and engage prominent African scholars who have written on the subject of African metaphysics. The general scope of this book centers on engaging the history of distortion and misunderstanding of African metaphysics by providing a relevant and reliable process-relational background as well as an alternative trivalent logic system. Unless African metaphysical theories are understood from this perspective, they will remain powerless to overcome these misrepresentations. It appeals to students and researchers internationally actively working in the fields of African philosophy, Intercultural African studies as well as process studies. ______________________________ “This book is one of the valuable contributions to the emerging field of African philosophy, after decades (1970s–1990s) of rather fruitless debates on the status of the discipline. Like many others, the book side-tracks the seemingly unending controversy of whether or not there is such a thing as African philosophy.” – Godwin Sogolo, Emerittus Professor of Philosophy, National Open University of Nigeria (NOUN). “In the opening lines of the introduction of this monumental book, Dr. Ofuasia announces: “As you read these lines, the earth in which you live in, as an ontological entity is spinning at an estimate estimated speed of 67, 000 mph. This indicates that the perspective that a thing is not in motion or is at rest is one of the fallacies ever fed to humanity. Nothing rests!” I was awe struck by how this revelation from physics extends to metaphysics. This book is a welcoming addition to African metaphysical scholarship as the process-relational approach used to explore Egyptian and ancient Yorùbá thought system in this work creatively intersects emerging discourses on agency both at the animate and what humans call inanimate, ontology, plant sentience, African medicine, cosmogony, the physical sciences, neutral nihilism and other related metaphysical topics. The eclectic interrogation of classical concepts of Ìwà and Nun from the Yoruba and Egyptian intellectual traditions, respectively, is a trail-blazing contribution. Congratulations on this feat, Dr Ofuasia!” – Ademola Kazeem Fayemi, Queensland Bioethics Center, Australian Catholic University, Brisbane. “Dr Ofuasia's book marries aspects of Egyptian philosophy with ancient Yorùbá metaphysics and process metaphysics, all under the framework of Ezumezu logic, and it works. What has emerged from this marriage is a new and contemporary theory in African metaphysics – Ìwà ontology which is strongly grounded on African thought. This book is recommended for anyone interested in (African) metaphysics.” Aribiah David Attoe, University of the Witwatersrand. “Emmanuel Ofuasia's text is engaged, at times even - rightfully - angry. This makes this a lively, energetic contribution. I appreciate that. This passion is often missing in philosophy, but it is much needed, especially in this area of research.” – Bjoerne Freter, Hagerstown Community College, Maryland. “In this timely work, Emmanuel Ofuasia thro

This volume shows how Nancy was able ‘to deconstruct'the founding sign of all metaphysics and all transcendence by redefining the concepts of existence, corporeality, and community, opening them up to the ‘disclosure'of the outside, to the ‘exception'of the world. It draws on the work of the Italian philosopher, Roberto Esposito and includes a dialogue between Nancy and Esposito. The overcoming of the modern perspective is covered by Descartes and Hegel, who are analyzed in light of Nancy. This text proposes a deconstruction of the Western tradition in its philosophical, aesthetic, and political registers and conveys a new ontology that breaks with the categories of the One and the Multiple, the Universal and the Particular, in order to identify the relationship between the plural and the singular and understand what it means to be together, to be in common, to be in the world. It is suitable for scholars, researchers, and students of philosophy and comparative literature.

Numerous thinkers have considered the Principle of Non-Contradiction, but none has clearly identified its inherent limitation: that it is itself only a formal principle. This book shows that negation plays a fundamental role both in the constitution of the principle and in the affirmation of its value, which consists in its undeniability. Since it is a formal negation, it is extrinsic to the negated in such a way that it is configured as a negation only insofar as it is applied to something. On the basis of this analysis, it is shown that it is possible to reverse the usual philosophical perspective: it makes no sense to speak of proof of the principle, but only of proof by virtue of the principle. This book is essential reading for all scholars and researchers of theoretical philosophy and Aristotle.

In Hegel's aesthetics, the element of speculative philosophy is always a notorious aspect that attracts the most complaints from modern art criticism. The book, however, justifies the intelligibility in art in light of Hegel's philosophy of metaphysics.The author explores the philosophical motivations of Hegelian aesthetics, its underlying logic, the relationship between metaphysical core and artistic expression, as well as the contemporary significance and value of metaphysicalised theories of art exemplified by Hegelian aesthetics. Through elucidating the metaphysical core implicit in Hegel's lectures on aesthetics, this book proves that the philosophical considerations of Absolute Idealism bring to art the spiritual seriousness which the Romantics lack. Ultimately, this approach reveals the broad consensus which both Hegel's aesthetics and modern philosophical hermeneutics share, thus bridging the gap between ancient and the modern philosophy of art.The book will appeal to scholars and students studying classical German philosophy, German Romantic literature criticism, and modern art theory.

This volume explores the use of higher-order logics in metaphysics. Higher-order logics are natural extensions of the common systems of predicate logic, with a history going back to the very beginnings of formal logic. Such logics are well suited to formalize metaphysical views and arguments. Over the last decade, there has been a resurgence of interest in higher-order metaphysics. Seventeen original essays are grouped under five headings. Three introductory chapters present higher-order languages and motivate their use in metaphysics. Three chapters on pure higher-order metaphysics discuss different options of higher-order languages and logics which may be used in metaphysics. Three chapters on applied higher-order metaphysics consider the application of higher-order logic to various central topics of metaphysics. Three historical chapters trace the development of higher-order logic as it relates to metaphysics over the last 150 years. The volume concludes with a discussion, containing two chapters criticizing the use of higher-order logic in metaphysics, as well as responses to these criticisms by two authors.

Vom Finden zum Machen bietet die erste ausführliche Diskussion über die Beziehung zwischen Marxismus und Pragmatismus. Diese beiden Philosophien der Praxis sind nicht unvereinbar, und eine Analyse ihrer Beziehung hilft, beide besser zu verstehen. Im Rahmen eines transatlantischen theoretischen Dialogs werden in diesem Buch Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede zwischen diesen Philosophien erörtert. Es handelt sich um eine interdisziplinäre Studie, die Philosophie, amerikanische und europäische Geistesgeschichte und Literaturwissenschaft zusammenführt. Schulenbergs Buch zeigt, dass der Versuch, die Dialektik von Marxismus und Pragmatismus zu erhellen, ein guter Ausgangspunkt ist, wenn wir das unvollendete Projekt der Etablierung einer wirklich postmetaphysischen Kultur weiterführen wollen. Das Buch bietet detaillierte Diskussionen über Sidney Hook, Georg Lukács, Theodor W. Adorno, Fredric Jameson, W.E.B. Du Bois, John Dewey, Richard Rorty und Jacques Rancière.Die Übersetzung wurde mit Hilfe von künstlicher Intelligenz durchgeführt. Eine anschließende menschliche Überarbeitung erfolgte vor allem in Bezug auf den Inhalt.

What is real? How do we determine what the fundamental structures of reality are?In this Questions in Christian Philosophy volume, philosopher Ross Inman offers an introduction to metaphysics. He introduces us to the tradition of metaphysics in Western philosophy, what it means to do metaphysics as a Christian, and considers timeless and universal inquiries into the central topics of metaphysics: identity, necessity and possibility, properties, universals, substances, and parts and wholes.With this academic but accessible primer, readers will be introduced to the key topics explored in contemporary metaphysics.The Questions in Christian Philosophy Series features introductory textbooks that offer students a Christian perspective on the various branches of philosophy, enabling them as they seek to understand all facets of life including existence, knowledge, ethics, art, and more.

Die leitende These der Untersuchung lautet, dass der von Berkeley inaugurierte und uneingeschränkt verteidigte Idealismus bei Kant und Schopenhauer eine spannungsreiche Bewegung der Problematisierung und Kritik freisetzt. In der bisherigen Forschung wurden die Positionen George Berkeleys, Immanuel Kants und Arthur Schopenhauers noch nicht systematisch miteinander verglichen. Die Entwicklungsgeschichte des Idealismus erstmals anhand dieser drei Referenzautoren zu dokumentieren, bildet das zentrale Thema der Untersuchung, das die detaillierten Einzeluntersuchungen organisch verbindet. Darüber hinaus ist es ein eminentes Beweisziel der vorliegenden Monographie, Berkeley als einen beeindruckend konsequenten Denker zu erschließen, dessen Immaterialismus sowohl argumentationstheoretisch wie historisch rekonstruiert wird. Insgesamt möchte die Monographie dazu beitragen, die gängige Oppositionsbildung zwischen dem britischen Empirismus auf der einen Seite und der deutschsprachigen Transzendentalphilosophie auf der anderen Seite zu hinterfragen. Die Relevanz und Originalität des Buches beruht dabei nicht nur in der Zusammenführung dieser bislang separat behandelten Traditionslinien, sondern zugleich in der Profilierung einer idealistischen Metaphysik.

This book evaluates the widespread preference in philosophy of mind for varieties of property dualism over other alternatives to physicalism. It takes the standard motivations for property dualism as a starting point and argues that these lead directly to nonphysical substances resembling the soul of traditional metaphysics.In the first half of the book, the author clarifies what is at issue in the choice between theories that posit nonphysical properties only and those that posit nonphysical substances. The crucial question, he argues, is whether one posits nonphysical things that satisfy an Aristotelian-Cartesian independence definition of substance: nonphysical things that could exist in the absence of anything else. In the second half, the author argues that standard and Russellian monist forms of property dualism are far less plausible than we usually suppose. Most significantly, the presuppositions of one of the leading arguments for property dualism, the conceivability argument, lead by parity of reasoning to the view that conscious subjects are nonphysical substances. He concludes that if you posit nonphysical properties in response to the mind-body problem, then you should be prepared to posit nonphysical substances as well. Mainstream philosophy of mind must take nonphysical substances far more seriously than it has done for the best part of a century.The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and the history of philosophy.

This book provides a survey of a number of the major issues in the philosophy of mathematics, such as ontological questions regarding the nature of mathematical objects, epistemic questions about the acquisition of mathematical knowledge, and the intriguing riddle of the applicability of mathematics to the physical world. Some of these issues go back to the nascent years of mathematics itself, others are just beginning to draw the attention of scholars. In addressing these questions, some of the papers in this volume wrestle with them directly, while others use the writings of philosophers such as Hume and Wittgenstein to approach their problems by way of interpretation and critique. The contributors include prominent philosophers of science and mathematics as well as promising younger scholars. The volume seeks to share the concerns of philosophers of mathematics with a wider audience and will be of interest to historians, mathematicians and philosophers alike.

Ayahuasca often yields transformative experiences that merge such familiar categories as the sacred and the secular, transcendence and immanence, subject and object, and the human and the nonhuman. However, such experiences are interpreted differently by Western and indigenous discourses. Using the work of French philosopher Bruno Latour, André van der Braak asks fundamental ontological questions in order to reimagine ayahuasca as liquid divinity, shifting the focus from ayahuasca experiences to ayahuasca-based ritual practices that aim to cultivate relationships with more-than-human powers, described by Latour as'beings of transformation and religion.'Ayahuasca as Liquid Divinity: An Ontological Approach describes Santo Daime practices as a contemporary form of “theurgy” (god-work), as defined by the third-century Platonic philosopher and mystagogue Iamblichus. Theurgical practices aim at drawing down divine action through ritual procedures, using the imagination as an active faculty. Van der Braak argues that ayahuasca religiosity is ultimately not about individual recreation or healing, or even personal visions, but rather about engaging in communal transformative ecodelic practices that let us work as companions of the gods in order to practice solidarity with all sentient beings.

The chapters in this volume clarify the notion of political identity by focusing on the metaphysics of polities. By analysing the notion of political identity, they provide the conceptual resources for a deeper understanding of the theoretical and practical debates on populism, the crisis of sovereignty, the feasibility of a world government, and ethical, religious, and cultural pluralism.What is a political community? Any answer to this question lies at the intersection between three fields: metaphysics, philosophy of action, and political philosophy. The question concerns how and why a plurality of individuals becomes a political unity, what principles or forces keep that unity together, and what threats that unity can encounter. In this volume, the contributors investigate how different metanormative views affect the possible answers to this metaphysical question. They explore the role that the individual identities of agents play in grounding common practices that underpin political life. They investigate the individual identities of agents as the result of the interplay between natural and cultural factors. Finally, they observe the ways in which a political community, as a collection of individuals who hang together in an attempt to reach common purposes, demonstrate a certain metaphysical solidity.Political Identity and the Metaphysics of Polities will appeal to researchers and advanced students working in metaphysics, political philosophy, political theory, and philosophy of action.

The Idea of Beginning in Jules Lequier's Philosophy analyzes the work of an author mostly unknown in Anglophone countries, but who greatly influenced the trajectory of French philosophy over the last two centuries. Jules Lequier, in The Search for a First Truth, argues that beginning such a search is the goal towards which philosophy must tend. To achieve this, Lequier established a postulate, that of freedom against necessity, and set out a program as an inaugural gesture: “TO MAKE, not to become, but to make, and, in making, TO MAKE ONESELF.” By the fertility of possible beginnings, the making in Lequier is always first and radical. As Ghislain Deslandes reveals in this exploration of Lequier's work, that something new is possible in philosophy after all, and that it should even be possible to invent it in other fields, applying the principle that'everything is to be relearned, and started again, but in another truth.'Deslandes explores parallels between the “classical” antiphilosophers Pascal and Kierkegaard and Lequier, whose importance to French philosophy is today better documented and more widely recognized.