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‘I pray that words spoken at this conference may carry beyond walls and reach thousands of ears hitherto deaf to warnings of the final catastrophe.'So said Patrick White in June 1983 at an important symposium organised by the Australian National University to examine the whole issue of nuclear war and its implications for Australia.Many prominent Australians – including H. C. Coombs, Senator Susan Ryan, leading academics and medics – attended the conference along with distinguished experts from overseas, and mingled and talked with many representatives of Australian peace movements. In two intense and emotional days they discussed many different aspects of the crisis that threatens the world, from the latest scientific thinking on possible effects on the atmosphere to the increasingly important role of the women's peace movement and the efforts of ordinary people around the world to stop the nuclear arms race.Originally published in 1983, this book presents the upshot of these deliberations, including unforgettable illustrations of some of the consequences of nuclear war. The book does not pretend to provide the answers, nor does it take any political viewpoint. It does present the authoritative opinions of some of the world's leading minds on the extent of the threat that faces Australia alongside powerful statements from committed men and women from around the world – opinions that will inform and disturb all thinking Australians.

Originally published in 1987, The Logic of Nuclear Terror presented a much-needed critical review of the premises, concepts, and policy prescriptions of deterrence theories and doctrines at the time. In particular, authors address: the historical validity, theoretical vitality, and policy-relevance of nuclear deterrence theories and doctrines; the ways in which technological and political change have affected the original concepts of nuclear war and deterrence strategies, and the ways in which such changes have affected policy and doctrine; and realistic alternative ways of thinking about strategy in the changing context of new military technologies and international politics.The outstanding group of international contributors to this volume include both proponents and critics of current doctrine. The result is an unusually well-balanced and unique contribution to our understanding of nuclear deterrence theory and practice. As such, it will be of interest to students, policymakers, and teachers of international relations, defense and foreign policy, US-Soviet relations, and arms control and disarmament.

Europe has everything to lose from nuclear war, and nothing to gain from it. Yet it is nuclear deterrence that we are relying on to shield us from war. More and more people are coming to believe that security under a nuclear shield is an illusion, and that nuclear deterrence embodies a dangerous paradox. It is too close to provocation, it cannot prevent nuclear blackmail, and its short-term success can only lead to proliferation and ultimate instability. In this book, originally published in 1983, philosophers go behind the rhetoric of the nuclear debate and analyse the dangers of deterrence. The contributors all share a concern about the radical confusions that have arisen concerning nuclear deterrence. Showing how unilateral arguments can be developed from hard-headed political and military considerations, they stress their belief that carefully managed unilateralism is the best method for securing the political independence of Western Europe. The doctrine is not founded on sheer moral idealism. This book will be essential reading for anyone engaged in the public discussion of defence policy.

Ideological debate is one component of the intellectual background to Soviet policy-making. Originally published in 1987, this paper explores how Soviet writers wrestle with the challenge to their ideology that is posed by the threat of nuclear war. What, for example, is the relationship between the values of peace and of socialism? What drives the arms race? Is capitalism inherently militaristic, or is a demilitarized capitalism conceivable? Is the outcome of history predetermined or open? It is shown that the range of permissible views is wider than often assumed, and that the constraints of Soviet ideology do not exclude evolution towards a more cooperative approach to international security.

Since the end of World War II, the United States has faced moral and strategic issues in its management of force that are unique in the history of international politics. At the heart of these issues is the heavy reliance of the United States and its allies on the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons and the fact that their use would very likely lea

“The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy quickly established itself as a classic when it first appeared in 1981. This edition makes it even better, incorporating as it does new material about the Cold War and up-dating to include subsequent developments. Filled with insights and penetrating analysis, this volume is truly indispensable.”—Robert Jervis, Author of How Statesmen Think'Freedman and Michaels have written a thorough and thought-provoking guide to nuclear strategy. The authors analyze the causes of both wise and unwise strategic decisions in the past and thereby shine a bright light on dilemmas we face in our common nuclear future.'—Scott Sagan, Stanford University, USA “With its comprehensive coverage, clear and direct language, and judicious summaries of a vast literature, this new and wholly revised edition of The Evolution of Nuclear Strategywill be essential reading for any student of nuclear history, strategic studies, or contemporary international relations.”—Matthew Jones, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK“Sir Lawrence Freedman's The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy has been the first port of call for three generations of academics and policy-makers wanting to familiarize themselves with the subject matter. The success of this book could have led Professor Freedman to satisfy himself with regular updates or afterwords. But the tireless author is now gracing us with an entirely revised edition of his masterpiece nearly forty years after its initial publication, taking into account findings from archives and declassified documents. At the same time, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy remains true to its original purpose and spirit: an easy to read manual, light with footnotes, focusing on policy rather than on theory, and thus the best possible introduction to an arcane subject. In an era when nuclear strategy issues seem to be becoming relevant again, its historical scope and breadth will make its reading or re-reading even more useful – if only because knowing about the absurdity of the Cold war arms race is a prerequisite if one does not want to repeat its mistakes.”—Bruno Tertrais, Deputy Director, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, France“This updated and improved edition of the classic text on the evolution of nuclear strategy is a must read for anyone attempting to understand the nuclear predicament and where it is heading. Impressive in every respect!”—T.V. Paul, James McGill Professor of International Relations, McGill University, Canada, and the author of The Traditon of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons“After the end of the Cold War, we hoped for a world in which nuclear weapons would have ‘low salience', or might even disappear into virtual, non-assembled arsenals. Alas, they are coming to the fore again. With changes in political context and technology, it is thus pressing that ‘the Bible'on the Evolution of Nuclear Strategy should be updated. Lawrence Freedman's great classic has been admirably updated with the help of Jeff Michaels. The work, just as its previous editions, thus remains the definitive and authoritative point of reference on nuclear strategy in the twenty-first century.”—Beatrice Heuser, Chair of International Relations, University of Glasgow, ScotlandFirst published in 1981, Lawrence Freedman's The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy was immediately acclaimed as the standard work on the history of attempts to cope militarily and politically with the terrible destructive power of nuclear weapons. It has now be

This book assesses the current available information concerning the major scientific problems related to environmental consequences of a possible nuclear war. The contributors address a broad range of topics, among them the effects of blast, heat, and local radioactive fallout; the likely dispersal patterns and residence times of radioactive debris in the troposphere and stratosphere; the probable long-term effects on both the local and global biosphere and radiological consequences for humans; the effect on the global environment of widespread fires in urban and industrialized regions; and the likely significant decrease of stratospheric ozone with a resulting long-term increase in harmful UV radiation received at the ground. The authors point to problem areas where current information is inadequate or completely lacking and discuss the role of the scientist in developing such information as a contribution to the elimination of the nuclear war threat.

The development of U.S. Army nuclear doctrine—policies, plans, procedures, tactics, and techniques—since World War II, its impact on Army forces, and its role in future wars is the subject of this policy-oriented analysis. The definition of Army nuclear doctrine advanced by the author clearly implies a distinction between policy for the employment of nuclear weapons as determined by the president and the role adduced by the Army. Dr. Rose suggests that developments—both nuclear and conventional—in U.S. Army tactical doctrine have been more responsive to political preferences held by national authorities than to the real nature of the potential threat and rigors of the nuclear battlefield. Further, he argues that the type of war preparations favored by U.S. political authorities over the last fifteen years and the type of war for which the Soviet Union is preparing differ markedly, making the U.S. Army poorly prepared for a major war.

Alternative Security offers the thinking person a place to begin to kick the “nuclear habit.” Even as it accepts the premise that war is endemic to the human condition, it provides reassurance that an other-than-nuclear deterrence policy can work to effectively safeguard national and transnational interests. These eight original essays, acco

In this book Professor Kissinger examines the framework of our foreign policy, the stresses to which that framework is being subjected, and the prospects for world order in an era of high international tension. The three essays were written before Professor Kissinger took leave from Harvard to serve as Assistant to President Nixon for National Secu

Since the U.S. presidential elections of 1980, debate has intensified between those who believe that nuclear weapons can only deter a war not intended to be fought and those who see nuclear weapons as an advancement in weaponry that allows for the waging and winning of a nuclear war. At the focal point of this debate is the rise of the “counterforc

This book contains papers presented at a conference held at the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation in 1991. The papers reflect the spectrum of thought in the expert community that is likely to frame the policy debate over the future of nuclear deterrence..

Balanced and comprehensive in approach, this text assembles classic statements on nuclear strategy and arms control made by Soviet and U.S. policymakers, military thinkers, and opinion leaders during the last forty years. Major Soviet statements, rarely appearing in translation, reflect the disagreement over whether'victory'or'parity'is the goa

This book began as a personal effort to comprehend the effect of nuclear weapons on the current era and its international system. Nuclear weapons have not merely revolutionized the military sphere but havce also left their stamp on the world order. Knowledge of the basic principles of nuclear strategy has become a prerequisite to understanding world events. Consequently, no country can remain indifferent to nuclear strategy or can consider itself exempt from its implications. The very importance of the subject precludes the assumption of a narrow technical or military point of view. Political, historical, moral, and even religious implications must be considered.Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace serves as an introduction to the study of modern strategy within the framework of international relations, as well as a basic account for laymen to the intricacies of modern strategy and its ramifications. It deals with a wide range of problems: deterrence and its implications; surprise; and preemptive and preventative attack. The problems of quantities of nuclear weapons, limitations of war (conventional, tactical and strategic), and proliferation of nuclear weapons are also discussed. In the end Harkabi introduces alternate global approaches and the problem of coalitions in the nuclear era. By focusing on disarmament and arms control; peace in the shadow of terror; and stability of the international system and peace research he brings relevance to his study in terms of the current world climate.Many books and articles have been published on nuclear strategy. Most have been designed to formulate strategic policies to suit the needs of particular countries and influence their policy. Most books on nuclear strategy have appeared in the United States, with strategic prescriptions for the United States. This book will be of tremendous interest to anyone wishing to understand the major problems of our contemporary world from a global perspective.

This work stresses the importance, in making any choice of strategies-including the decision to use or refrain from using nuclear weapons-of gauging the intent behind the opponent's military moves. Dr. Brodie also suggests that the use or threat of use of tactical nuclear weapons may lead to de-escalation, that is, may check rather than promote the expansion of hostilities. The author applies his ideas about escalation to several imagined situations, examining them in relation to experiences in Europe, in the second Cuba crisis, and in Asia.Originally published in 1966.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Seit Hiroshima gilt die Atombombe als singuläre Waffe. Ihre Auswirkungen in Raum und Zeit sind analogielos. Ein mächtiges Tabu liegt auf ihrer Anwendung. Ihr Besitz war nur fünf Staaten erlaubt. Gleichzeitig wurde sie von Anfang an politisch und strategisch instrumentalisiert. Das „Gleichgewicht des Schreckens“ wurde zum Signum des Atomzeitalters. Nach 1989 scheint sich dieses Tabu allmählich aufzulösen. Die Zahl der Staaten, die über Nuklearwaffen verfügen, wächst langsam, aber sie wächst. Eine Gruppe von zwölf Wissenschaftlern - Physikern, Kerntechnikern, Politologen, Historikern und einem Völkerrechtler - hat die verschiedenen Aspekte der Singularitätsthese diskutiert und legt jetzt die Ergebnisse ihrer Arbeit in zwölf Aufsätzen vor. Jeder Autor betont andere Aspekte. Der Band enthält also weder abschließende noch gar einfache Lösungen. Er zeigt, dass die von Vielen geforderte Abschaffung der Kernwaffen und damit das Ende des Atomzeitalters erst möglich wird, wenn man die politischen, militärischen, technischen und sozialen Hindernisse klar erkennt, die es zu überwinden gilt.Seit Hiroshima gilt die Atombombe als singuläre Waffe. Ihre Auswirkungen in Raum und Zeit sind analogielos. Ein mächtiges Tabu liegt auf ihrer Anwendung. Ihr Besitz war nur fünf Staaten erlaubt. Gleichzeitig wurde sie von Anfang an politisch und strategisch instrumentalisiert. Das „Gleichgewicht des Schreckens“ wurde zum Signum des Atomzeitalters. Nach 1989 scheint sich dieses Tabu allmählich aufzulösen. Die Zahl der Staaten, die über Nuklearwaffen verfügen, wächst langsam, aber sie wächst. Eine Gruppe von zwölf Wissenschaftlern - Physikern, Kerntechnikern, Politologen, Historikern und einem Völkerrechtler - hat die verschiedenen Aspekte der Singularitätsthese diskutiert und legt jetzt die Ergebnisse ihrer Arbeit in zwölf Aufsätzen vor. Jeder Autor betont andere Aspekte. Der Band enthält also weder abschließende noch gar einfache Lösungen. Er zeigt, dass die von Vielen geforderte Abschaffung der Kernwaffen und damit das Ende des Atomzeitalters erst möglich wird, wenn man die politischen, militärischen, technischen und sozialen Hindernisse klar erkennt, die es zu überwinden gilt.Über die Beitragsautoren:Dr. Leopold Barleon, Ing., Kernforschungszentrum KarlsruheProf. Dr. Hans-Joachim Bieber, Historiker, Universität KasselDr. Eric Chauvistré, Politikwissenschaftler, FU Berlin/ Redakteur ZDF, Reuters, TAZDr. Constanze Eisenbart, Historikerin, Forschungsstätte der Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft Heidelberg Prof. Dr. Christopher Daase, Politikwissenschaftler, Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, FrankfurtWilhelm Gmelin, Ing. Luft- und Raumfahrttechniker, ehem. Direktor der EURATOMProf. Dr. Erwin Häckel, Politikwissenschaftler, Universität KonstanzProf. Dr. Martin Kalinowski, Kernphysikerer, Direktor des Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker-Zentrums der Universität HamburgProf. Dr. EgbertKankeleit, Kernphysiker em., TU DarmstadtProf. Dr. Thilo Marauhn, Jurist, Universität GießenDr. Christoph Pistner, Physiker, Öko-Institut e. V. Bereich NukleartechnikDr. Ulrich Ratsch, Physiker, Forschungsstätte der Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft Heidelberg

In this comprehensive introduction to nuclear physics, related national and international policy issues from Dr. Pete Pella, Gettysburg College nuclear physicist, educators will find a definitive textbook on the peaceful and military uses of nuclear energy. Pella traces both the scientific evolution and political history of nuclear power and arms, bringing us to current events including nuclear plant development, status of treaties, U.S.-Russia disarmament efforts, and policing of rogue nations. Must reading for the world's citizens concerned about these vital issues.

On Thermonuclear War was controversial when originally published and remains so today. It is iconoclastic, crosses disciplinary boundaries, and finally it is calm and compellingly reasonable. The book was widely read on both sides of the Iron Curtain and the result was serious revision in both Western and Soviet strategy and doctrine. As a result, both sides were better able to avoid disaster during the Cold War.The strategic concepts still apply: defense, local animosities, and the usual balance-of-power issues are still very much with us. Kahn's stated purpose in writing this book was simply:'avoiding disaster and buying time, without specifying the use of this time.'By the late 1950s, with both sides H-bomb-armed, reason and time were in short supply. Kahn, a military analyst at Rand since 1948, understood that a defense based only on thermonuclear arnaments was inconceivable, morally questionable, and not credible.The book was the first to make sense of nuclear weapons. Originally created from a series of lectures, it provides insight into how policymakers consider such issues. One may agree with Kahn or disagree with him on specific issues, but he clearly defined the terrain of the argument. He also looks at other weapons of mass destruction such as biological and chemical, and the history of their use. The Cold War is over, but the nuclear genie is out of the bottle, and the lessons and principles developed in On Thermonuclear War apply as much to today's China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as they did to the Soviets.

Please note this is a'Palgrave to Order'title (PTO). Stock of this book requires shipment from an overseas supplier. It will be delivered to you within 12 weeks. This book tells the history of nuclear age urban planning, civil defence and continuity of government programs in one of the nation's most critical Cold War targets: Washington, D.C.

Strategy in the Missile Age first reviews the development of modern military strategy to World War II, giving the reader a reference point for the radical rethinking that follows, as Dr. Brodie considers the problems of the Strategic Air Command, of civil defense, of limited war, of counterforce or pre-emptive strategies, of city-busting, of missile bases in Europe, and so on. The book, unlike so many on modern military affairs, does not present a program or defend a policy, nor is it a brief for any one of the armed services. It is a balanced analysis of the requirements of strength for the 1960's, including especially the military posture necessary to prevent war. A unique feature is the discussion of the problem of the cost of preparedness in relation to the requirements of the national economy, so often neglected by other military thinkers.Originally published in 1959.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.