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This book reviews the historical evolution of U.S. monetary policy, and then uses various methods such as mathematical models and econometric analysis to study the impact of U.S. monetary policy adjustments on the domestic economy and the spillover effects on the world economy. Finally, it summarizes the challenges faced by the Chinese economy in the post financial crisis era and proposes relevant countermea­sures and suggestions for China to respond to U.S. monetary policy adjustments.

Named one of Investopedia's 7 Best Economics Books of 2022The trailblazing story of Janet Yellen, the Ruth Bader Ginsburg of economics, and her lifelong advocacy for an economics of empathy that delivers the fruits of a prosperous society to people at the bottom half of the economic ladder. When President Biden announced Janet Yellen as his choice for secretary of the treasury, it was the peak moment of a remarkable life. Not only the first woman in the more than two-century history of the office, Yellen is the first person to hold all three top economic policy jobs in the United States: chair of both the Federal Reserve and the President's Council of Economic Advisors as well as treasury secretary. Through Owen Ullmann's intimate portrait, we glean two remarkable aspects of Yellen's approach to economics: first, her commitment to putting those on the bottom half of the economic ladder at the center of economic policy, and employing forward-looking ideas to use the power of government to create a more prosperous, productive life for everyone. And second, her ability to maintain humanity in a Washington policy world where fierce political combat casts others as either friend or enemy, never more so than in our current age of polarization. As Ullmann takes us through Yellen's life and work, we clearly see her brilliance and meticulous preparation. What stands out, though, is Yellen as an icon of progress—the “Ruth Bader Ginsburg of economics”—a superb-yet-different kind of player in a cold, male-dominated profession that all too often devises policies to benefit the already well-to-do. With humility and compassion as her trademarks, we see the influence of Yellen's father, a physician whose pay-what-you-can philosophy meant never turning anyone away. That compassion, rooted in her family life in Brooklyn, now extends across our entire country.

With original archival documents and interviews from the US and Europe, Michelle Frasher brings the reader into the negotiating room with American, German, and French officials as they confronted the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system and made decisions that affected the course of European integration and the contemporary neoliberal order.She identifies crisis as the catalyst for change in international monetary policies, but argues that the causes of crisis originated from a multitude of factors such as market speculation, American hegemony, institutional flaws, and ideational conflicts among the leaders themselves. Far from a planned and consensual process, this book shows that the transformation to neoliberalism was riddled with discord and fret with trial and error. She argues that the resulting currency regime allowed governments to entrench themselves in national interests and facilitated the'marketization'of the state, where states have became both clients and participants in the financialized global economy—to the detriment of international stability.Frasher's is the first work to connect the 1960s and 1970s to the difficulties of inter-state and inter-market cooperation that have plagued the system in the last decades, and it puts the 2008 debacle into historical perspective.

In recent years, the IMF has released a growing number of reports and other documents covering economic and financial developments and trends in member countries. Each report, prepared by a staff team after discussions with government officials, is published at the option of the member country.

Inflation and an addiction to debt characterize the U.S. economy, but a debt-based financial system is incompatible with a truly competitive economy. Yet our system exists by choice, not the dictates of immutable economic laws; and it is leading the U.S. to financial collapse. The author highlights essentially ignored inequities and fallacies inherent in major aspects of our economy and of economic theory. The text explains how the system is skewed to big government and a dominant financial sector and undermining our standard of living. Policies directed at avoiding deflation have yielded income and wealth redistribution and inequities; inflation; inordinate growth in government, the financial sector, money supply, and debt; currency debasement; fragility in the financial system; loss of international competitiveness; and distortions in interest rates, currency ratios, trade, labor and product pricing, and asset valuations. Whether through currency depreciation, unjust wage and price increases, the absence of real income gains for all through maximum price reductions from efficiency and technology gains, or other means, the unblessed are relatively impoverished by the wealth redistribution of the system courtesy of the distributional coalitions, big government, and the financial sector. The author provides a critical look at fundamental economic theory and practice in a nonmathematical, common sense presentation. He offers a new, insightful challenge to aspects of Keynesian and monetarist theories.

Since publication of Hetzel's The Monetary Policy of the Federal Reserve (Cambridge University Press, 2008), the intellectual consensus that had characterized macroeconomics has disappeared. That consensus emphasized efficient markets, rational expectations and the efficacy of the price system in assuring macroeconomic stability. The 2008–9 recession not only destroyed the professional consensus about the kinds of models required to understand cyclical fluctuations but also revived the credit-cycle or asset-bubble explanations of recession that dominated thinking in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. These'market-disorder'views emphasize excessive risk taking in financial markets and the need for government regulation. The present book argues for the alternative'monetary-disorder'view of recessions. A review of cyclical instability over the last two centuries places the 2008–9 recession in the monetary-disorder tradition, which focuses on the monetary instability created by central banks rather than on a boom-bust cycle in financial markets.

Capitalizing on Crisis offers a political sociology of the rise of finance in the U.S. economy over the last three decades. Krippner's core argument is that successive U.S. administrations embraced policy choices that heightened financialization as a way to escape direct confrontation with the pressing issues of fiscal crisis and legitimation crisis that emerged in the late 1960's, rather than as a policy goal of its own. This is an extremely important argument for understanding the last forty years of U.S. politics and social development and it helps reconnect economic sociology to political sociology. Krippner focuses on state actions that were crucial to creating a macroenvironment conducive to financialization: (1) the deregulation of financial markets during the 1970s and 1980s; (2) policies that encouraged foreign capital inflows into the U.S. economy in the context of large fiscal imbalances in the early 1980s; and (3) changes in the conduct of monetary policy following the shift to tight monetary policies (high interest rates) in 1979.

The Federal Reserve (Fed) defines monetary policy as the actions it undertakes to influence the availability and cost of money and credit to help promote its congressionally mandated goals, achieving a stable price level and maximum sustainable economic growth. Since the expectations of market participants play an important role in determining prices and growth, monetary policy can also be defined to include the directives, policies, statements, and actions of the Fed that influence how the future is perceived. In addition, the Fed acts as a'lender of last resort'to the nation's financial system, meaning that it ensures its sustainability, solvency, and integrity. This role has become of great importance with the onset of the financial crisis in the summer of 2007. This book explores the background, current policy and conditions of the U.S. Monetary Policy and Federal Reserve.

Crashing the Dollar crackles with the page-turning excitement of a spy novel or murder mystery as it tracks down those killing the U.S. Dollar, and strips bare the secret agenda and tactics of those behind today's impending economic collapse. The current economic downturn - the worst since the Great Depression - will soon be replaced, this book predicts, by severe inflation that could destroy the value of the U.S. Dollar. The dollar is the world's'reserve currency,'used in international purchases of oil and other key commodities, and in central bank reserves that many other countries use to support their own currencies. Inflation is coming, this book argues, because the United States now has combined short-term and long-term obligations of more than $120 trillion. The most politically palatable way to pay these obligations is by'monetizing the debt,'running tens of trillions of dollars off the printing press, which will cause the dollar's value to plunge and prices to soar. Crashing the Dollar offers ways to save our Republic and, if we prepare wisely, ourselves from the death spiral of extreme debt and extremist politics that scheming politicians and radical activists have deliberately created. Craig Smith, a street-smart, visionary entrepreneur, aided by former think tank futurist and investigative reporter Lowell Ponte, has produced a financial survival manual for those who love America. Crashing the Dollar book reviews and dollar news are posted daily at www.crashingthedollar.com.

“Whatever it takes”That was Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke's vow as the worst financial panic in more than fifty years gripped the world and he struggled to avoid the once unthinkable: a repeat of the Great Depression. Brilliant but temperamentally cautious, Bernanke researched and wrote about the causes of the Depression during his career as an academic. Then when thrust into a role as one of the most important people in the world, he was compelled to boldness by circumstances he never anticipated.The president of the United States can respond instantly to a missile attack with America's military might, but he cannot respond to a financial crisis with real money unless Congress acts. The Fed chairman can. Bernanke did. Under his leadership the Fed spearheaded the biggest government intervention in more than half a century and effectively became the fourth branch of government, with no direct accountability to the nation's voters.Believing that the economic catastrophe of the 1930s was largely the fault of a sluggish and wrongheaded Federal Reserve, Bernanke was determined not to repeat that epic mistake. In this penetrating look inside the most powerful economic institution in the world, David Wessel illuminates its opaque and undemocratic inner workings, while revealing how the Bernanke Fed led the desperate effort to prevent the world's financial engine from grinding to a halt.In piecing together the fullest, most authoritative, and alarming picture yet of this decisive moment in our nation's history, In Fed We Trust answers the most critical questions. Among them:• What did Bernanke and his team at the Fed know–and what took them by surprise? Which of their actions stretched–or even ripped through–the Fed's legal authority? Which chilling numbers and indicators made them feel they had no choice?• What were they thinking at pivotal moments during the race to sell Bear Stearns, the unsuccessful quest to save Lehman Brothers, and the virtual nationalization of AIG, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac? What were they saying to one another when, as Bernanke put it to Wessel: “We came very close to Depression 2.0”?• How well did Bernanke, former treasury secretary Hank Paulson, and then New York Fed president Tim Geithner perform under intense pressure? • How did the crisis prompt a reappraisal of the once-impregnable reputation of Alan Greenspan? In Fed We Trust is a breathtaking and singularly perceptive look at a historic episode in American and global economic history.

The ultimate Federal Reserve insider offers insights into the inner workings of the Fed over the past fifty years.

Details the evolution of the monetary standard from the start of the Federal Reserve through the end of the Greenspan era. The book places that evolution in the context of the intellectual and political environment of the time. By understanding the fitful process of replacing a gold standard with a paper money standard, the conduct of monetary policy becomes a series of experiments useful for understanding the fundamental issues concerning money and prices. How did the recurrent monetary instability of the 20th century relate to the economic instability and to the associated political and social turbulence? After the detour in policy represented by FOMC chairmen Arthur Burns and G. William Miller, Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan established the monetary standard originally foreshadowed by William McChesney Martin, who became chairman in 1951. The Monetary Policy of the Federal Reserve explains in a straightforward way the emergence and nature of the modern, inflation-targeting central bank.

Now more than ever before, executives and managers need to understand their larger economic context. In A Concise Guide to Macroeconomics, David Moss leverages his many years of teaching experience at Harvard Business School to lay out important macroeconomic concepts in engaging, clear, and concise terms. In a simple and intuitive way, he breaks down the ideas into “output,” “money,” and “expectations.” In addition, Moss introduces powerful tools for interpreting the big-picture economic developments that shape events in the contemporary business arena. Detailed examples are also drawn from history to illuminate important concepts. This book is destined to become a staple in MBA courses—as well as the go-to resource for executives and managers at all levels seeking to brush up on their knowledge of macroeconomic dynamics.

This book describes the deep contradictions plague market economies. It shows how the influence of these contradictions sometimes subsides, allowing the economy to perform relatively well. But in time, these contradictions accumulate and economy declines as if it suffers from some degenerative disease. The policies designed to rise above these contradictions often spawn even more severe contradictions. This book describes how these contradictions have affected the economy of the United States in the past and the dangers that the future poses. For example, policies to stimulate the economy eventually lead to stagnation. Policies to make hold down wages make business even more uncompetitive. It also analyzes the destructive consequences of the military, finance, and the Federal Reserve. Finally, it debunks the mythological promise of a New Economy.

In recent years governments have increasingly given their central banks the freedom to pursue policies of price stability. In particular, the German Bundesbank and the U.S. Federal Reserve have been widely considered models of autonomous policymaking. This book traces the origins of their success to the political struggle to adopt monetarism in Germany and the United States.The Government of Money contends that the political involvement of monetarist economists was central to this endeavor. The book examines the initiatives undertaken by monetarists from 1970 to 1985 and the policies that resulted once their ideas were enacted. Taking a historical approach to major issues of political economy, Peter A. Johnson describes both the political efforts of the monetarist economists to convert central banks to their preferred policies and the resistance offered by traditionalist central bankers, politicians, and financial and labor interests.Johnson concludes that monetarist ideas succeeded in part because their supporters convincingly claimed that price stability would promote political stability. He thereby challenges important assumptions about politics and policymaking in both countries and reveals the often hidden influence of monetary policy on the health of capitalist democracies.