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Written by the world's leading expert on the Tokyo sarin attacks, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Terrorism is a comprehensive examination of the use, detection, and prevention of chemical and biological attacks. Divided in two parts, one devoted to chemical and the other biological weapons, this book emphasizes defense, decontamination, detection, treatment, mechanism of toxic action, and pathological effects in the case of each. Covering a diverse range of substances, chapters draw on detailed case studies on the US anthrax attacks, the Tokyo sarin gas attacks, as well as an entire chapter devoted to the Iran-Iraq War co-authored with Dr. Sayid Abbas Foroutan, a former Iranian military surgeon who actively participated in the treatment of Iranian soldiers suffering from gas poisoning. Features include: A case study of the Tokyo sarin gas attacks from the leading expert on the subject A detailed case study on the U.S. anthrax attacks A chapter on the Iran-Iraq War and controversial weapons co-authored with an Iranian military surgeon with first-hand knowledge of the subject Details on the various ways chemical and biological weapons can be constructed and deployed Applicable defense strategies, including detection of materials and decontamination in the event chemical/biological weapons are deployed Featuring over 100 unique photographs and detailed chemical structures, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Terrorism is essential reading for counterterrorism experts, first responders and medical professionals, security consultants and military personnel seeking to expand their knowledge of preventative strategies. The book also will serve as a great resource for students in homeland security, public administration, and criminal justice programs.

This book explores how potential bio-threats and risks may evolve post 9/11 given the rapid changes in biotechnology and synthetic biology. It also explores what role intelligence communities can play in understanding threats and risks. It argues that although bio-threats and risks are largely low probability and high impact in nature, intelligence in ‘Five Eyes'countries remain insufficiently prepared to understand them. This book identifies key areas where intelligence reforms need to take place including a more strategic and systematic collaboration between national security/law enforcement intelligence and the scientific community. It is aimed at intelligence analysts, those in the scientific community working on health security threats, policy makers and researchers working on biosecurity and bioterrorism threats and risks.

'Living Weapons is a succinct, highly readable analysis of the unique challenges presented by biological weapons. Koblentz provides an excellent summary of the historic utilities and disutilities posed by biological weapons to international actors and the potential erosion of constraints on their future use. Highly recommended.'― Choice'Biological weapons are widely feared, yet rarely used. Biological weapons were the first weapon prohibited by an international treaty, yet the proliferation of these weapons increased after they were banned in 1972. Biological weapons are frequently called'the poor man's atomic bomb,'yet they cannot provide the same deterrent capability as nuclear weapons. One of my goals in this book is to explain the underlying principles of these apparent paradoxes.'—from Living Weapons Biological weapons are the least well understood of the so-called weapons of mass destruction. Unlike nuclear and chemical weapons, biological weapons are composed of, or derived from, living organisms. In Living Weapons, Gregory D. Koblentz provides a comprehensive analysis of the unique challenges that biological weapons pose for international security. At a time when the United States enjoys overwhelming conventional military superiority, biological weapons have emerged as an attractive means for less powerful states and terrorist groups to wage asymmetric warfare.Koblentz also warns that advances in the life sciences have the potential to heighten the lethality and variety of biological weapons. The considerable overlap between the equipment, materials and knowledge required to develop biological weapons, conduct civilian biomedical research, and develop biological defenses creates a multiuse dilemma that limits the effectiveness of verification, hinders civilian oversight, and complicates threat assessments.Living Weapons draws on the American, Soviet, Russian, South African, and Iraqi biological weapons programs to enhance our understanding of the special challenges posed by these weapons for arms control, deterrence, civilian-military relations, and intelligence. Koblentz also examines the aspirations of terrorist groups to develop these weapons and the obstacles they have faced. Biological weapons, Koblentz argues, will continue to threaten international security until defenses against such weapons are improved, governments can reliably detect biological weapon activities, the proliferation of materials and expertise is limited, and international norms against the possession and use of biological weapons are strengthened.

The effort to understand and combat infectious diseases has, during the centuries, produced many key advances in science and medicine—including the development of vaccines, drugs, and other treatments. A subset of this research is conducted with agents that, like anthrax, not only pose a severe threat to the health of humans, plants, and animals but can also be used for ill-intended purposes. Such agents have been listed by the government as biological select agents and toxins. The 2001 anthrax letter attacks prompted the creation of new regulations aimed at increasing security for research with dangerous pathogens. The outcome of the anthrax letter investigation has raised concern about whether these measures are adequate. Responsible Research with Biological Select Agents and Toxins evaluates both the physical security of select agent laboratories and personnel reliability measures designed to ensure the trustworthiness of those with access to biological select agents and toxins. The book offers a set of guiding principles and recommended changes to minimize security risk and facilitate the productivity of research. The book recommends fostering a culture of trust and responsibility in the laboratory, engaging the community in oversight of the Select Agent Program, and enhancing the operation of the Select Agent Program.

The same technologies that fuel scientific advances also pose potential risks—that the knowledge, tools, and techniques gained through legitimate biotechnology research could be misused to create biological weapons or for bioterrorism. This is often called the dual use dilemma of the life sciences. Yet even research with the greatest potential for misuse may offer significant benefits. Determining how to constrain the danger without harming essential scientific research is critical for national security as well as prosperity and well-being. This book discusses a 2007 survey of American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) members in the life sciences about their knowledge of dual use issues and attitudes about their responsibilities to help mitigate the risks of misuse of their research. Overall, the results suggest that there may be considerable support for approaches to oversight that rely on measures that are developed and implemented by the scientific community itself. The responses also suggest that there is a need to clarify the scope of research activities of concern and to provide guidance about what actions scientists can take to reduce the risk that their research will be misused by those with malicious intent.

Biosecurity and Bioterrorism is the first book to take a holistic approach to biosecurity with coverage of pathogens, prevention and response methodology. The book is organized into four thematic sections: Part I provides a conceptual understanding of biowarfare, bioterrorism and the laws we have to counteract this; Part II investigates known bioagents and the threat from emerging diseases; Part III focuses on agricultural terrorism and food security; Part IV outlines international, US, and local initiatives for biodefense and biosecurity. Case studies illustrate biodefense against both intentional terrorism and natural outbreaks. The authors bring an extraordinary combination of experience in academia and the clinical world, as well as real-world experience in technical and practical matters, to their writing. They make technical material clear and fascinating for readers with a basic knowledge of biology. Ryan and Glarum address the hazards in the context of vulnerability assessments and the planning strategies government and industry can take to prepare for and respond to such events. How are these agents used in biowarfare? How likely are we to face either a natural outbreak or intentional human/animal infection? How can we prepare for this effectively?

Biomedical advances have made it possible to identify and manipulate features of living organisms in useful ways—leading to improvements in public health, agriculture, and other areas. The globalization of scientific and technical expertise also means that many scientists and other individuals around the world are generating breakthroughs in the life sciences and related technologies. The risks posed by bioterrorism and the proliferation of biological weapons capabilities have increased concern about how the rapid advances in genetic engineering and biotechnology could enable the production of biological weapons with unique and unpredictable characteristics. Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of Life Sciences examines current trends and future objectives of research in public health, life sciences, and biomedical science that contain applications relevant to developments in biological weapons 5 to 10 years into the future and ways to anticipate, identify, and mitigate these dangers.

This new work offers a clear and thorough account of the threats posed by bioterrorism from the perspective of biologists. The authors examine thirteen disease-causing agents, including those responsible for anthrax, the plague, smallpox, influenza, and SARS. Each chapter considers a particular pathogen from the standpoint of its history, molecular biology, pathology, clinical presentation, diagnosis, weaponization, and defenses. The book also examines strategies for making vaccines and protecting the population in a bioterror attack.

The anthrax attacks in fall 2001 spurred an extensive and costly decontamination effort where many decisions had to be made about which sites required cleanup, what method to use, how to determine the effectiveness of the cleanup, and how'clean'the building had to be for reoccupation. As part of a project funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and managed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the National Research Council was asked to consider the criteria that must be met for a cleanup to be declared successful, allowing the reoccupation of a facility. The report finds that efficiently sampling and characterizing a pathogen is critical for choosing the best remediation strategy. However, there should be no universal standard for deciding when a building is safe to re-enter because varying pathogen amounts and characteristics could require different strategies. The report offers a flowchart for decision-makers that includes questions about the characteristics of the pathogen; how far it has spread; whether it is transmissible between humans; and how long it will survive to pose a threat. The report also recommends that a risk-assessment approach be adopted as part of a strategy for achieving a'socially acceptable'standard for cleanup.

In the wake of September 11th and recent anthrax events, our nation's bioterrorism response capability has become an imminent priority for policymakers, researchers, public health officials, academia, and the private sector. In a three-day workshop, convened by the Institute of Medicine's Forum on Emerging Infections, experts from each of these communities came together to identify, clarify, and prioritize the next steps that need to be taken in order to prepare and strengthen bioterrorism response capabilities. From the discussions, it became clear that of utmost urgency is the need to cast the issue of a response in an appropriate framework in order to attract the attention of Congress and the public in order to garner sufficient and sustainable support for such initiatives. No matter how the issue is cast, numerous workshop participants agreed that there are many gaps in the public health infrastructure and countermeasure capabilities that must be prioritized and addressed in order to assure a rapid and effective response to another bioterrorist attack.