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This book explores the work of Thomas Seebohm (1934-2014), a leading phenomenologist and hermeneuticist. It features papers that offer a critical and constructive dialogue about Seebohm's analyses and their implications for the sciences. The net result is an in-depth study and a helpful overview of Seebohm's general approach and his specific views on various areas of modern science. The contributors focus especially upon his final text, History as a Science and the System of the Sciences. They view this as the culmination and summary of his historical and phenomenological investigations into the foundations, nature, and limits of modern sciences. This includes not just history but the Geisteswissenschaften more generally, along with the social and natural sciences as well. The essays in this volume reflect that range. This volume presents insightful discussions about the nature and legitimacy of the human sciences as sciences and the unique character ofthe social sciences. It will be of interest not just as a matter of historical scholarship, but also and above all as an important contribution to phenomenology and to the philosophy of science and the sciences as such. It deserves attention by scholars from any philosophical tradition interested in thinking about the foundations of their disciplines and a philosophy of science that includes, but is not limited to, the natural sciences.

This volume presents discussions on a wide range of topics focused on eco-phenomenology and the interdisciplinary investigation of contemporary environmental thought. Starting out with a Tymieniecka Memorial chapter, the book continues with papers on the foundations, theories, readings and philosophical sources of eco-phenomenology. In addition, it examines issues of phenomenological anthropology, ecological perspectives of the human relationship to nature, and phenomenology of the living body and the virtual body. Furthermore, the volume engages in a dialogue with contemporary behavioral sciences on topics such as eco-alienation, sustainability, and the human relationship to the earth in the context of the cosmos.

Steven French suggests a radical new approach to the understanding of quantum physics, derived from Husserl's phenomenological philosophy. In 1939 two physicists, Fritz London and Edmund Bauer, published an account of measurement in quantum mechanics. Widely cited, their'little book'featured centrally in an important debate over the role of consciousness in that process. However, it has been fundamentally misunderstood, both in that debate and beyond. Steven French argues that London, in particular, approached the measurement process from the perspective of Husserlian phenomenology, which he had studied as a student and which he retained an interest in throughout his career. This casts his work with Bauer in an entirely novel light and suggests a radical alternative understanding of quantum mechanics in which consciousness still plays a role but one that is fundamentally different than previously conceived. Most interpretations of the theory approach it on the basis of the so-called'analytic'tradition in philosophy. However, there has recently been a surge of interest in'continental'approaches and this book offers a significant new contribution to such developments. Intertwining history and philosophy, it presents London's background in physics and phenomenology, together with an outline of the latter as developed by Husserl, Gurwitsch, Merleau-Ponty, and others, as well as a detailed analysis of the work on measurement with Bauer. The book concludes by comparing the London and Bauer understanding with that afforded by Fuch's QBism, Everett's'Many Worlds'interpretation, and Rovelli's Relational Quantum Mechanics. It is hoped that this exploratory work will open up new avenues of thought with regard to one of our most fundamental physical theories.

This volume explores how understanding relates to conscious experience. In doing so, it builds bridges between different philosophical disciplines and provides a metaphysically robust characterization of understanding, both in and beyond science.The past two decades have witnessed growing interest from epistemologists, philosophers of science, philosophers of mind and ethicists in the nature and value of intellectual understanding. This volume features original essays on understanding and the phenomenal experiences that underlie it. The chapters are divided into three thematic sections. Part 1 provides theoretical characterizations of understanding, including Henk de Regt's defense of a contextual theory of scientific understanding and a debate on whether scientific inference and explanatory power are necessary or central features of understanding. Part 2 explores how conscious experience and understanding are related. The chapters articulate a phenomenal theory of understanding and address themes that are connected to understanding, including awareness, transformative experiences and exemplification. Finally, Part 3 is devoted to domain-specific inquiries about understanding, such as logical proofs, particle physics and moral understanding.Understanding and Conscious Experience will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in the philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of mind, ethics and phenomenology.

This book aims to enrich our understanding of the role the environment plays in processes of life and cognition, from the perspective of enactive cognitive science. Miguel A. Sepúlveda-Pedro offers an unprecedented interpretation of the central claims of the enactive approach to cognition, supported by contemporary works of ecological psychology and phenomenology. The enactive approach conceives cognition as sense-making, a phenomenon emerging from the organizational nature of the living body that evolves in human beings through sensorimotor, intercorporeal, and linguistic interactions with the environment. From this standpoint, Sepúlveda-Pedro suggests incorporating three new theses into the theoretical body of the enactive approach: sense-making and cognition fundamentally consist of processes of norm development; the environment, cognitive agents actually interact with, is an active ecological field enacted in their historical past; and sense-making occurs in a domain consistingof multiple normative dimensions that the author names enactive place.

This book brings together the work of Wilfrid Sellars with work in 20th century phenomenology and 21st century speculative realism in order to think through one of the most important predicaments of contemporary philosophy. As a result of the disenchantment of nature in late modernity, philosophy has struggled to account for the place of persons, construed as loci of normative authority and responsibility, within a scientifically, naturalistically described world, bereft of values and norms. The book argues that Sellars takes both the framework of persons and science seriously and thinks that this implies the need not just for reconciling the manifest and scientific images but for fusing them into one stereoscopic vision of reality and our place in it. One of the main aims of this book is to address the issue of the form which a non-alienated experience of ourselves-in-the-world would take in the Sellarsian cryptic stereoscopic fusion of the manifest and the scientificimage. Through an extended discussion of Sellars'relevance for contemporary continental philosophy and phenomenology, in which his views on perception, the commonsense ‘lifeworld', science, normativity, personhood, morality and process metaphysics are presented and extended, the book sketches a novel view about what a stereoscopic fusion of the manifest and the scientific image would amount to at the level of our lifeworld experience.

This interdisciplinary volume collects contributions from experts in their respective fields with as common theme diagrams.Diagrams play a fundamental role in the mathematical visualization and philosophical analysis of forms in space. Some of the most interesting and profound recent developments in contemporary sciences, whether in topology, geometry, dynamic systems theory, quantum field theory or string theory, have been made possible by the introduction of new types of diagrams, which, in addition to their essential role in the discovery of new classes of spaces and phenomena, have contributed to enriching and clarifying the meaning of the operations, structures and properties that are at the heart of these spaces and phenomena.The volume gives a closer look at the scope and the nature of diagrams as constituents of mathematical and physical thought, their function in contemporary artistic work, and appraise, in particular, the actual importance of the diagrams of knots, of braids, of fields, of interaction, of strings in topology and geometry, in quantum physics and in cosmology, but also in theory of perception, in plastic arts and in philosophy. The editors carefully curated this volume to be an inspiration to students and researchers in philosophy, phenomenology, mathematics and the sciences, as well as artists, musicians and the general interested audience.

Recent years have seen a rise in interdisciplinary approaches to the study of the mind. However, relatively little emphasis has been placed on attention, its functions, and phenomenology. As a result, there are a multitude of definitions and explanatory frameworks that describe what attention is, what it does, and how it works. This volume proposes that one way to discuss attention is by utilizing an integrative multidisciplinary framework that takes into consideration aspects of attention as a means of accessing the world and as a mediator of experience. It brings together contributions from cognitive science, philosophy, and psychology in order to shed light on these aspects of attention. By including both theoretical and empirical approaches to attention, this volume will provide (1) an innovative framework for examining attention as something that mediates experience and (2) new perspectives on foundational and defi nitional issues of what attention is and how it contributes to our ability to access the world. By drawing together different disciplines, this volume broadens the concept of attention. It opens up a new way of looking at attention as an active process through which the world is disclosed for us.

This book focuses on the unique philosophical relationship between Hedwig Conrad-Martius and Edith Stein. The two phenomenologists discussed and debated insights and ideas about the nature of the soul, phenomenology, personhood and individuality, animal life, nature, being, and God. This book brings together for the first time leading international scholars of phenomenology to explore the philosophical exchange between both Conrad-Martius and Stein. This is an important book for understanding the development of the phenomenological movement and key phenomenological ideas and methods. It provides a critical and comprehensive overview of the key issues that helped frame both phenomenologists'philosophical trajectories. Additionally, the ideas of Conrad-Martius and Stein are mined to address contemporary questions surrounding such topics as personal identity, animal versus human personhood, contemporary atheism, and the relationship between religion and science. The book will have greatappeal to phenomenologists, philosophers, and historians of philosophy.

This book offers a phenomenological conception of experiential justification that seeks to clarify why certain experiences are a source of immediate justification and what role experiences play in gaining (scientific) knowledge. Based on the author's account of experiential justification, this book exemplifies how a phenomenological experience-first epistemology can epistemically ground the individual sciences. More precisely, it delivers a comprehensive picture of how we get from epistemology to the foundations of mathematics and physics.The book is unique as it utilizes methods and insights from the phenomenological tradition in order to make progress in current analytic epistemology. It serves as a starting point for re-evaluating the relevance of Husserlian phenomenology to current analytic epistemology and making an important step towards paving the way for future mutually beneficial discussions. This isachieved by exemplifying how current debates can benefit from ideas, insights, and methods we find in the phenomenological tradition.

This volume presents eco-phenomenology's role in pandemics and post-pandemics and takes up the task of eco-phenomenology as a unified project by not focusing on naturalizing phenomenology but rather exploring the full range of possibilities - such as creative acts and self-individualization – in dealing with ecological threats. Eco-phenomenological developments are based on the main concepts of “phenomenology of life”, as created by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. This volume also uniquely explores the Covid-19 pandemic as a phenomenologically interpreted and ecological phenomenon. It appeals to students and researchers working in the fields of phenomenology and environmental philosophy.

Since Hegel, philosophers have declared repeatedly that metaphysics is at an end, a pronouncement that has sparked much contemporary philosophical debate. What exactly does the end, or closure, of metaphysics mean, and what are the implications of this view?John Sallis characterizes the end of metaphysics as a limit, or horizon, both enclosing metaphysical thought and opening the field of thinking beyond it. He elaborates five areas in which the boundaries of thinking are extended: imagination as an opening power, the radicalizing of phenomenology's injunction to attend to the things themselves, Heidegger's shift of thinking toward an opening or clearing, archaic closure through a return to Plato and Heraclitus, and the nonidentity that takes place in the act of delimitation. This last question is developed in relation to Husserl's project of a pure phenomenology, to the debate between hermeneutics and deconstruction, and to the secluding of ground announced in Schelling's thought.

Für den heutigen Menschen ist die Auffassung vom Raum in entscheidender Weise durch einen Raumbegriff bestimmt, wie ihn vor allem die neuzeitliche mathematische Naturwissenschaft (seit Galilei) geprägt hat. Aufgabe dieser phänomenologisch ausgerichteten Untersuchung ist es zu zeigen, daß der mathematisch-naturwissenschaftliche Raum immer schon in einer ursprünglicheren Raumerfahrung wurzelt, aus der er im Verlauf der Geschichte erst entsprungen ist. Zur Gewinnung eines ursprünglichen Raumbegriffs wendet sich der Autor in einer weit ausgreifenden Interpretation vor allem zwei Hauptwerken der Phänomenologie zu: E. Husserls Spätwerk »Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie« (1936) und M. Heideggers Grundwerk »Sein und Zeit« (1927). Husserls Rückgang vom (ideal-)geometrischen Raum auf unsere sinnlich-anschaulich erfahrene »Lebenswelt« kann zunächst als Entsprechung dessen angesehen werden, was in Heideggers berühmter »Zeug«- und Weltanalyse als der vortheoretisch-praktische Umgang mit den alltäglichen Gebrauchsdingen in den Blick tritt. Eine vertiefende Analyse zeigt hingegen, daß Husserls Unterscheidung zwischen dem idealisierten und dem lebensweltlich-anschaulichen Raum für Heidegger als nur relative Differenz noch auf die Seite des theoretisch-apraktischen Welterkennens gehört. Darüber hinaus untersucht Neumann, inwiefern die aufgezeigten Phänomene im Spätdenken Heideggers (nach der vielberufenen »Kehre«) in einer gewandelten Weise in den Blick treten.

Hans Jonas ist einer der bedeutenden Denker des 20. Jahrhunderts. Das Handbuch erklärt die philosophischen, theologischen und naturwissenschaftlichen Kontexte, die sein Denken geprägt haben. Es präsentiert neben Informationen zur Biographie und den zeitgenössischen Bezügen alle wichtigen Werke und gibt Hinweise zu deren internationaler Rezeption in vielen Disziplinen. Zentrale Begriffe und Konzepte im Gesamtwerk von Hans Jonas werden ausführlich erklärt (z.B. Gnosis, Leben, Macht, Freiheit, Verantwortung, Technologie, Gott). Das internationale Autorenteam der über 50 Expertinnen und Experten aus fast 20 Ländern zeigt nicht nur das bis heute weltweite Interesse am Werk von Jonas. Sie eröffnen mit ihren Beiträgen auch eine Vielzahl unterschiedlicher Perspektiven auf sein Denken.

In Groundwork of Phenomenological Marxism: Crisis, Body, World, Ian H. Angus investigates the crisis of reason in a contemporary context. Beginning with Edmund Husserl's The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Angus connects the phenomenology of human motility to Marx's ontology of labor in Capital and shows its basis in natural fecundity (excess). He argues that the formalization of reason creates an inability to foster differentiated community as expected by both Husserl and Marx and that the formalization of human motility by the regime of value reveals the ontological productivity of natural fecundity, showing that ecology is the contemporary exemplary science. Addressing the crisis requires a philosophy of technology (especially digital technology) and a dialogue between cultural-civilizational lifeworlds, which surpasses Husserl's assumption that Europe is the home of reason. Angus's overall conception of phenomenology is Socratic in that it is concerned with the presuppositions and applications of knowledge-forms in their lifeworld grounding. He further shows that the contemporary event is the epochal confrontation between planetary technology and place-based Indigeneity. This book lays out the fundamental concepts of a systematic phenomenological Marxian philosophy.

This book is the first monograph that takes a comprehensive approach to Jacques Derrida as a philosopher of technology. It refines and complements his mainstream image as a philosopher of language and deconstructionist of classical literary and philosophical texts. This volume outlines the key features of Derrida's alternative philosophy of technology, a philosophy which Sjöstrand argues, avoids the problems associated with, on the one hand, a Heideggerian orientation, which completely separates thinking and technology and, on the other, an empirically oriented ”post-phenomenology” that can be said to be hegemonic within the field today.Based on a sustained interpretation of Derrida, and a robust, coherent philosophy of technology, a phenomenology of technology is developed that, in a radical way, extends the concept of technology to cover the entire field of phenomenology. This places the technological not in opposition to humanity, but rather always already in close proximity to man and, consequently, to life, ethics, politics, democracy and religion. Strikingly, this important aspect of Derrida's thinking is only rarely analyzed or discussed by his many exegetes. This text appeals to graduates and researchers working on Derrida, phenomenology, and the philosophy of technology.

The purpose of this work is to critically assess Errol E. Harris's process philosophy in the face of contemporary research in the special sciences. Harris devoted his life to grappling with the big questions concerning the relationships between nature, mind, and knowledge. His 70-plus year career was distinguished, his texts on the history of philosophy, philosophy of science, political philosophy, philosophy of religion, and consciousness were widely published, and yet his metaphysics has until now remained excluded from mainstream discussions. This book's contention is that Harris's work reveals as yet unnoticed connections between theories in numerous scientific disciplines ranging from psychology to cosmology and that an examination of certain theories within these disciplines may serve to strengthen his original arguments. This work maintains that the resulting metaphysics frames a transdisciplinary paradigm shift and provides a viable solution to the hard problem of consciousness.

This edited volume explores the intersections of the human, nonhuman, transhuman, and posthuman from a phenomenological perspective. Representing perspectives from several disciplines, these investigations take a closer look at the relationship between the phenomenology of life, creative ontopoiesis, and otherness; technology and the human; art and the question of humanity; nonhumans, animals, and intentionality; and transhumanism. Ontological positioning of the human is reconsidered with regard to the nonhuman, transhuman, and posthuman within the cosmos. Further examination of the artificial and object in the lifeworld is also explored. This volume also pays tribute to Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka and her methodical contributions to phenomenology. This text appeals to students and researchers of phenomenology worldwide.

This book considers the manifold possible approaches, past and present, to our understanding of the natural numbers. They are treated as epistemic objects: mathematical objects that have been subject to epistemological inquiry and attention throughout their history and whose conception has evolved accordingly. Although they are the simplest and most common mathematical objects, as this book reveals, they have a very complex nature whose study illuminates subtle features of the functioning of our thought. Using jointly history, mathematics and philosophy to grasp the essence of numbers, the reader is led through their various interpretations, presenting the ways they have been involved in major theoretical projects from Thales onward. Some pertain primarily to philosophy (as in the works of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Wittgenstein...), others to general mathematics (Euclid's Elements, Cartesian algebraic geometry, Cantorian infinities, set theory...). Also serving as an introduction to the works and thought of major mathematicians and philosophers, from Plato and Aristotle to Cantor, Dedekind, Frege, Husserl and Weyl, this book will be of interest to a wide variety of readers, from scholars with a general interest in the philosophy or mathematics to philosophers and mathematicians themselves.

This work is an introduction to the totality of the metaphysical philosophy of nature of Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888-1966). Her own training and inclination as a realist phenomenologist enables a unique perspective on central issues in modern and contemporary (twentieth century) theoretical biology and physics. Here we find novel theories of, e.g., space and time, as well as development and evolution. This work is thus of interest to anyone studying the history of the phenomenological movement as well as religious cosmology.The philosophical basis for this cosmology is Conrad-Martius'“realontology” which is a phenomenological account of the essence of appearing reality. The full elaboration of the modes of appearing of what is real enables the unfolding of an analogical theory of “selfness” within the order of nature culminating in an account of the coming to be of humans, for whom there is an essentially distinctive world- and self-manifestation for which she reserves the term “spirit.” Key to her position is the revival of ancient metaphysical themes in new transformed guises, especially potentiality and entelechy.Nature's status, as a self-actuation of world-constituting essence-entelechies, places Conrad-Martius in the middle of philosophical-theological discussions of, e.g., the hermeneutical mandate of demythologization as well as the nature of evolution. Of special interest is her insistence on both nature's self-actuating and evolving powers and a robust theory of creation.

This book explores the ways in which the spatio-temporal contingency of human life is being conceived in different fields of research. Specifically, it looks at the relationship between the situatedness of human life, the situation or place in which human life is supposed to be situated, and the dimensions of space and time in which both situation and place are usually themselves supposed to be situated. Over the last two or three decades, the spatio-temporal contingency of human life has become an important topic of research in a broad range of different disciplines including the social sciences, the cultural sciences, the cognitive sciences, and philosophy. However, this research topic is referred to in quite different ways: while some researchers refer to it in terms of “situation”, emphasizing the “situatedness” of human experience and action, others refer to it in terms of “place”, emphasizing the “power of place” and advocating a “topological” or “topographical turn”in the context of a larger “spatial turn”. Interdisciplinary exchange is so far hampered by the fact that the notions referred to and the relationships between them are usually not sufficiently questioned. This book addresses these issues by bringing together contributions on the spatio-temporal contingency of human life from different fields of research.

This volume offers perspectives on the theme of surprise crossing philosophical, phenomenological, scientific, psycho-physiology, psychiatric, and linguistic boundaries. The main question it examines is whether surprise is an emotion. It uses two main theoretical frameworks to do so: psychology, in which surprise is commonly considered a primary emotion, and philosophy, in which surprise is related to passions as opposed to reason. The book explores whether these views on surprise are satisfying or sufficient. It looks at the extent to which surprise is also a cognitive phenomenon and primitively embedded in language, and the way in which surprise is connected to personhood, the interpersonal, and moral emotions. Many philosophers of different traditions, a number of experimental studies conducted over the last decades, recent works in linguistics, and ancestral wisdom testimonies refer to surprise as a crucial experience of both rupture and openness in bodily and inner life. However, surprise is a theme that has not been dealt with directly and systematically in philosophy, in the sciences, in linguistics, or in spiritual traditions. This volume accomplishes just that.

Dana S. Belu combines Heidegger's phenomenology of technology with feminist phenomenology in order to make sense of the increased technicization of women's reproductive bodies during conception, pregnancy, and birth.

The idea that our memories, in some sense, make us who we are, is a common one-and not at all implausible. After all, what could make us who we are if not the things we have experienced, thought, felt and desired on these idiosyncratic pathways through space and time that we call lives? And how can we retain these experiences, thoughts, feelings and desires if not through memory? On the other hand, most of what we have experienced has been forgotten. And there is now a considerable body of evidence that suggests that, even when we think we remember, our memories are likely to be distorted, sometimes beyond recognition. Imagine writing your autobiography, only to find that that most of it has been redacted, and much of the rest substantially rewritten. What would hold this book together? What would make it the unified and coherent account of a life? The answer, Mark Rowlands argues, lies, partially hidden, in a largely unrecognized form of memory-Rilkean memory. A Rilkean memory is produced when the content of a memory is lost but the act of remembering endures, in a new, mutated, form: a mood, a feeling, or a behavioral disposition. Rilkean memories play a significant role in holding the self together in the face of the poverty and inaccuracy of the contents of memory. But Rilkean memories are important not just because of what they are, but also because of what they were before they became such memories. Acts of remembering sculpt the contents of memories out of the slabs of remembered episodes. Our acts of remembering ensure that we are in the content of each of our memories-present in the way a sculptor is present in his creation-even when this content is lamentably sparse and endemically inaccurate.

This book investigates the complex, sometimes fraught relationship between phenomenology and the natural sciences. The contributors attempt to subvert and complicate the divide that has historically tended to characterize the relationship between the two fields. Phenomenology has traditionally been understood as methodologically distinct from scientific practice, and thus removed from any claim that philosophy is strictly continuous with science. There is some substance to this thinking, which has dominated consideration of the relationship between phenomenology and science throughout the twentieth century. However, there are also emerging trends within both phenomenology and empirical science that complicate this too stark opposition, and call for more systematic consideration of the inter-relation between the two fields. These essays explore such issues, either by directly examining meta-philosophical and methodological matters, or by looking at particular topics that seem to require the resources of each, including imagination, cognition, temporality, affect, imagery, language, and perception.

Husserl's Missing Technologies looks at the early-twentieth-century “classical” phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, both in the light of the philosophy of science of his time, and retrospectively at his philosophy from a contemporary “postphenomenology.” Of central interest are his infrequent comments upon technologies and especially scientific instruments such as the telescope and microscope. Together with his analysis of Husserl, Don Ihde ventures through the recent history of technologies of science, reading and writing, and science praxis, calling for modifications to phenomenology by converging it with pragmatism. This fruitful hybridization emphasizes human–technology interrelationships, the role of embodiment and bodily skills, and the inherent multistability of technologies. In a radical argument, Ihde contends that philosophies, in the same way that various technologies contain an ever-shortening obsolescence, ought to have contingent use-lives.

This volume tackles Gödel's two-stage project of first using Husserl's transcendental phenomenology to reconstruct and develop Leibniz'monadology, and then founding classical mathematics on the metaphysics thus obtained. The author analyses the historical and systematic aspects of that project, and then evaluates it, with an emphasis on the second stage.The book is organised around Gödel's use of Leibniz, Husserl and Brouwer. Far from considering past philosophers irrelevant to actual systematic concerns, Gödel embraced the use of historical authors to frame his own philosophical perspective. The philosophies of Leibniz and Husserl define his project, while Brouwer's intuitionism is its principal foil: the close affinities between phenomenology and intuitionism set the bar for Gödel's attempt to go far beyond intuitionism.The four central essays are `Monads and sets', `On the philosophical development of Kurt Gödel', `Gödel and intuitionism', and `Construction and constitution in mathematics'. The first analyses and criticises Gödel's attempt to justify, by an argument from analogy with the monadology, the reflection principle in set theory. It also provides further support for Gödel's idea that the monadology needs to be reconstructed phenomenologically, by showing that the unsupplemented monadology is not able to found mathematics directly. The second studies Gödel's reading of Husserl, its relation to Leibniz'monadology, and its influence on his published writings. The third discusses how on various occasions Brouwer's intuitionism actually inspired Gödel's work, in particular the Dialectica Interpretation. The fourth addresses the question whether classical mathematics admits of the phenomenological foundation that Gödel envisaged, and concludes that it does not.The remaining essays provide further context. The essays collected here were written and published over the last decade. Notes have been added to record further thoughts, changes of mind, connections between the essays, and updates of references.

Integrated Truth and Existential Phenomenology: A Thomistic Response to Iconic Anti-Realists in Science relates an existential phenomenology to modal reasoning. By this reasoning, rooted in a consciousness of phenomena in themselves, a Thomistic realism is advanced wherein scientific inquiry yields objective truth and presupposes a causal principle. This principle, as an inferably true modality, strictly implies a first cause. And this cause as a supreme norm, causally created human nature as it ought to be. So with no naturalistic fallacy, a naturalistic ethics is inferred from our psycho-biological nature that also informs art and politics. Politics, as the institutionalization of ethics, is inferable from ethical prescriptions that are as certifiably true as the descriptions of science that inform it.