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The paper approaches the central aspects of Husserl's conception of volitional consciousness, concentrating on its structure, its modalities and its ethical implications. After dealing with the fundamental traits of the early phenomenology of will, we address its meaning from the point of view of practical reason, emphasising the relationship between the will and practical possibility. Finally, we go deeper in the analysis of this relationship by taking into account Husserl's late ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we address and explore the Ortegian concept of authenticity. Life is a work that each person has to discover and conquer. This means that its fullness is inseparable from concepts such as "destiny", "project", "mission" or "duty". For Ortega, it is a matter of betting on a vital path that lives up to our best intentions, of examining and valuing the moral caliber of personal life. We suggest how Ortega's proposal could be adjusted to the contemporary context by taking into account some of the most relevant developments with respect to notions of subject and ego, which seem to be haunted by forces that prevent them from having absolute sovereignty over themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I will argue that Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments is not a relativistic ethics. Although many ethical norms are conventional, there are others, particularly those of justice, which are cross-cultural. Smith's view of justice, summarized in the imperative 'Do not harm our equals', contains two elements: on the one hand the term 'harm', which might be culture-relative; yet, on the other, the term 'equals', whose referent, although not always recognized, does not depend on different 'cultures' notions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]