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Threat perception has been central in the field of international relations, especially in the literature of states' alliances and conflict solutions. International Relations (IR) balance of power and alliance theories have largely equated "threat" to "power." A standard narrative in Singapore's foreign policy toward great powers is its reluctance to choose between both. Singapore's immediate neighbor, Indonesia, the largest archipelagic country in the world, has voiced similar inclinations. Studies have concentrated on the larger power threat interpretation and their responses toward the change in the international order arising from China's growth or the rise of terrorism but rarely examining issues from small states' point of view. According to Realists' logic, small states possess little capacity to influence the fate of their own survival; therefore, they can only choose between balancing and band wagoning. Threat perceptions play an intermediary role in connecting the external environment and state foreign policy behavior. Hence, the study of threat perception is critical as it influences states foreign policies regarding issues ranging from defense spending to states' level of commitment toward international multilateral cooperation. IR scholars have examined how states form threat perceptions from various psychological and non-psychological perspectives. However, these factors are often studied independently. This paper argues that Gestalt principles of threat perception offer a more thorough analysis of Singapore's threat perception by bridging the gap between realist and constructivist studies by demonstrating how Singapore's threat perception as a small state is magnified due to its unique geographical position and its shared cultural affinity with China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We argue that the choice of electoral rules in Chinese villages results from the incentives that rural party elites face in their efforts to control electoral results. Using the rationalist approach, we propose four conditions under which they will adopt an institution that allows for electoral uncertainty: a large proportion of revenue from village-owned enterprises (VOEs), a large size of electorate, the presence of strong social groups, and frequent upper level government interventions. We use the 2011 Wukan incident to illustrate our argument. The cross-sectional analysis of survey data of 961 villages provides some evidence for the hypotheses: A larger number of labor force and frequent inspections by the upper-level government are significantly correlated with an increase of the likelihood that a village party leader allows villagers to freely nominate candidates. Theoretical and policy implications will be discussed in the end of this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since the end of the Cold War, there have been many ups and downs in U.S. relations with China. Each presidential administration—whether Democrat or Republican—has pursued a policy of “engagement.” Although this term, or policy frame, has meant many things, it represents for them a broad umbrella concept that includes a range of policy options mixing cooperative and competitive approaches. The Obama administration has been no exception. This paper explains the Obama administration's engagement policy by evaluating its two central elements: (1) the bilateral relationship with China itself and (2) the rise of a pan-Asian regional policy that undergirds its rebalance to Asia. In this analysis, the Obama administration's approach encompasses both cooperative and hedging strategies, thus demonstrating more continuity than change in its approach to China. It concludes by noting that, despite the growing competition in the U.S.–China relationship, strategic rivalry is not a preordained policy outcome. Rather, the common future for both states rests on leadership and smart policy choices, not fate. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since the 1980s, Hong Kong triad societies have evolved from hierarchical, pyramidal organizations to loose, compartmentalized syndicates that retain a modicum of hierarchy. Changes in triad organization and modus operandi occurred in response to stringent anti-organized crime measures enacted in Hong Kong. However, organizational evolution has facilitated triad transplantation to China and improved triads’ ability to engage in transnational crime. Triads have exploited favorable circumstances in China: prevalent corruption, rapid urbanization, and high demand for illicit goods and services. This paper includes two case studies of the Sun Yee On triad. The first examines Sun Yee On's localized activity by tracing the evolution of one Shenzhen area chapter. The second case study examines Sun Yee On's role as a supplier of methamphetamine precursor chemicals to Mexico's Sinaloa cartel. Sun Yee On exemplifies how modern triads have become hybridized, assuming attributes of both local Chinese organized crime and transnational criminal networks. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Recent commentary on China's approach to Afghanistan has argued that it is either driven by opportunistic “free riding” on US-NATO efforts or a fundamental caution determined by security concerns in its restive province of Xinjiang. In contrast, this paper argues that China has three primary goals with respect to Afghanistan that mirror those toward the other states in “Greater Central Asia”: (1) to ensure the security of Xinjiang; (2) to secure the development of greater economic links, including investment in natural resources; and (3) to combat the influence of the United States and India. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]