Search

This paper starts from the supposition that civilization is an important concept for thinking about world order, and one that is increasingly coming back into play in world politics. It opens with a close look at the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI): what does it say, what does it imply, about what is it silent, and what are its policy contexts? It offers the theory of Uneven and Combined Development (UCD) as a way of looking at multiple modernities in terms of civilizational pluralism. This is followed by a historical unfolding of UCD since the early 19th century, showing how it has generated both single and multiple modernities cast in civilizational terms. The penultimate section focuses on the risks and opportunities that a world order of civilizational pluralism would create specifically for China. The conclusions summarize the main points of argument, and set out a more detailed global vision of what the GCI might aim to achieve if played well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's influence in extractive industry sectors worldwide has expanded in tandem with the rising global demand for the natural resources integral to producing such low carbon products as electric vehicles. Many Chinese-operated mining projects overseas have hence generated broad concern on the ground about their negative environmental and social impacts. Chinese actors, meanwhile, have begun to engage with transnational extractive governance initiatives entailing a transparency norm that requires disclosure of environmental and social risks. China, however, appears to be reshaping this transparency norm through its establishment of the Responsible Cobalt Initiative (RCI)—a China-led "transnational" governance initiative facilitating a Chinese version of that norm, known as "thin" transparency. Based on process-tracing and semi-structured interviews, in applying Acharya's (2018) norm-circulation model, this paper examines what type of Chinese domestic actors act as norm-makers and under what conditions. The study thus refines certain core analytical concepts of the model. The RCI case stands alone in highlighting China's growingly normative role in contesting the transparency norm through transnational interactions among Chinese and international actors in global extractives governance. The result shows China's norm-making as a strategic choice of a local idea-shifter to cope with China's internal and external legitimacy crises and to strengthen its emerging identity as a responsible great power. This study rejects the notion of China as a monolithic actor, rather suggesting a multi-agency and multilevel approach to understanding the complex realities of China's normative leadership in global governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies how China has established and exercised leadership by creating and operationalising the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" (CBDRs) in United Nations climate negotiations—from the embryo of this principle in the Stockholm Declaration to its operationalisation in the Paris Agreement. Building on the updated scholarship on climate leadership, this paper proposes a four criteria test to ascertain the existence of a leadership relationship. It comprises (1) a wilful leader; (2) consensual followers; (3) a commonly shared goal shaped mainly by the leader and accepted by the followers; and (4) a process of leadership-building triggered through use of any one of the following four modes of leadership: ideational, directional, instrumental, or structural. In light of the leadership criteria, this paper focuses on how China has operationalised these various leadership modes towards realising the evolving collective goals of its developing followers. In doing so, the paper provides empirical evidence of the significance of each of the four leadership modes in underpinning China's leadership in the climate regime. This paper finds that while ideational leadership was prominent in creating the CBDRs principle, instrumental leadership, with the support of occasional usages of directional and structural leadership, has also been vital to China in tackling the internal divisions of developing countries and in overcoming the limitations of such countries' normative power in the post-Kyoto era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both the Chinese and Indian governments have made assiduous efforts to desecuritise their water dispute. This is puzzling, because both countries have securitised most of the disputes between them, including the border dispute, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama issue. The triggers for securitisation exist in the China–India water dispute. Both countries are water-scarce, prone to floods and droughts in their shared river basins, and the water dispute is inextricably linked to their border dispute. Power asymmetries between the two countries also incentivise both sides to securitise their water dispute. China, the upstream riparian and more powerful of the two, could use water as leverage in border negotiations, while India could use securitisation as a tactic to gain attention and offset China's greater aggregate power. The tendency is also for water disputes around the world to be painted as existential threats. Why, then, do China and India desecuritise their water dispute? Furthermore, despite desecuritisation, cooperation between them has remained low, confined to an expert-level mechanism, and memorandums of understandings on sharing hydrological data. This refutes the conventional view that desecuritisation is a normative good that can lead to genuine cooperation. This paper uses the Q methodology, which is a quantitative measure of ideas and perceptions, to address these puzzles. Based on a Q survey of Chinese and Indian experts on the water conflict, we argue that ideas are essential to shaping Chinese and Indian behaviour. Material explanations do not adequately explicate the complexities and nuances of the water dispute because they are too broad and general to be useful. The Q survey revealed in depth the myriad of ideas and debates surrounding the water dispute. These views and beliefs explain why the Chinese and Indian governments desecuritise their water dispute and why, despite desecuritisation, cooperation remains low. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]