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• A game-theoretic approach was harnessed to analysis the urban regeneration in China. • Redevelopment of industrial land that had been used by central SOEs is studied. • The bargains between stakeholders shifted from "prisoners' dilemma" to "pigs' payoffs", and then to "neo-pigs' payoffs". Drawing upon the game-theoretical concepts for urban land redevelopment in China, this paper provides further substantiation on, and demonstrates, two major fronts in empirical terms. First, the redevelopment trajectory of industrial land that had been used by a central state-owned enterprise (SOE) was identified and was shown as deadlocked by disputes on the pathway to cooperation between the local government and the original land user. Second, the shifts in the bargains between the pair from the "prisoners' dilemma" to "pigs' payoffs," and then to "neo-pigs' payoffs" were analyzed, and we showed how industrial land can be redeveloped. Finally, we argued that disputes between the entrepreneuralization of local governments and the politicization of SOEs constitute a potent system of explanatory coordinates that effectively reveal the hidden logic of industrial land redevelopment in urban China. Different from the redevelopment of local SOEs, communications between the user and owner of urban land, as well as the tradeoff of benefits, are key factors in breaking the aforementioned deadlock. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]