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The ongoing and interactive processes of democratization, nation building and nationalism in Taiwan have a fundamental influence on the dynamics of cross-Strait relations (Chu 2004, Wu 2004). The combination of electoral competition and an evolving politicized discourse on Taiwanese national identity have rendered Taipei the most dynamic and volatile actor in CSR. However, in the absence of diplomatic communication channels between Taipei and Beijing, high-level interaction between Taiwan and China has predominantly taken the form of unilateral public pronouncements. Since the mid-1990's cross-Strait relations have followed a cyclical pattern of "working silence" punctuated by "provocative statements" issued by Li Deng-hui, and since 2000 Chen Shui-bian. Whether indicative of strategic calculation, deep-seated conviction or electoral contingency, President Chen's propensity to issue statements of the "one country on each side" type have resulted in his being characterized as a "pro-independence President" (Ross 2006). In consequence, conciliatory statements and Chen's insistence on decoupling "democratic reforms" such as referenda and constitution reform and non-confrontational expressions of Taiwanese identity from "Taiwan independence" have fallen on deaf ears. In this paper we investigate the content and strategy of Chen Shui-bian's public utterances by seeking to answer three questions: First, is the characterization of Chen as a "pro-independence president" accurate, or is it possible to distinguish advocacy of "Taiwan independence" broadly defined, from a qualitatively different "national identity" discourse? Second, how much variation in the content of Chen's speeches can be explained by his strategic relationship with the group to whom the speech is addressed? Third, what structure underlies the timing and locations of "pro-independence" proclamations that might help us understand Chen's presidential discourse? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]