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In most contemporary democracies governments play a dominant role in the law-making process, as they introduce a significant proportion of bills to the legislature. However, the probability of success of these bills varies considerably. For example, in Argentina, the number of government bills approved as a percentage of all government-sponsored bills introduced in the Chamber of Deputies from 1983 to 1996 amounts to an average 64 percent(including and a minimum of 49% in 1986 and a maximum of 80% in the previous year). This paper studies how cross-voting affect governments' legislative success. I argue that uncertainty about legislators' support for government bills and limited governmental resources to engage in "vote buying" explain why defeats occur. The paper shows that Argentine presidents' overall legislative success has not been very different from other presidential regimes. However, by looking at the content of those bills that never made it through congress, I identify a peculiar policymaking pattern that may account for Argentine governments’ poor performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a critical response to two main theoretical frameworks. First, the one that have linked democratic stability with development and economic growth; and second, to the literature that linked presidentialism with instability and regime breakdown. This work reacts to these frameworks showing that economic debacle does not necessarily mean regime breakdown, although it may lead, under certain circumstances, to government collapse. Second, it shows that presidential regimes can be reconstructed after periods of profound turmoil. The key lies in the political parties and the party system. I attempt to support these arguments through a case study: Argentina during 1995 and 2003. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]