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We can make reference to two different main projections of future for the EU: (a) the position defended by France and Germany, which presupposes that there should be ‘not a geographically very big but politically and economically strong social European ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkish and French efforts to restrain their U.S. ally in 2003 demonstrate the regularity of alliance restraint in international affairs and the importance of the more powerful state in the dispute mobilizing its power resources. The French effort failed to stop or substantially delay the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Turkey prevented U.S. forces from invading Iraq in the north but did not stop the overall U.S. war plan. The United States mobilized its resources to overcome French non-participation, entice Turkey with aid and political guarantees, and, when that failed, fight the Iraq war without a major ground invasion from the north. U.S. officials were unified and seeking to attain high nationals security objectives, both factors that make a restrainee hard to stop. These results are generally consistent with my previous work on alliance restraint, Warring Friends. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The international organization of the Democratic Peace matters. Interdemocratic institutions are particularly suited to block escalation pathways between states and to prevent conflicts from resulting in war. The paper builds on findings from three fields of research: (a) the liberal analysis of the democratic peace, (b) systemic approaches to international institutions, and (c) new quantitative studies of armed conflicts. The paper identifies three pivotal contributions of international institutions to peaceful conflict management. International institutions can be used to overcome the security dilemma among states and to tame power competitions. They sustain international cooperation and forestall the recourse of governments to unilateral self-help strategies. Finally, international institutions increase the autonomy of issue areas, which decreases the risks of destabilizing spill-over effects from other issue areas. The paper holds that these three functions are extra-ordinarily well performed by interdemocratic institutions. Therefore, interdemocratic institutions are considered a missing link in the explanation of the democratic peace.To strengthen our argument, we choose five state dyads for structured-focused comparisons. We investigate the security relations of Argentine and Brazil, Argentine and Chile, Germany and France, Greece and Turkey, and Indonesia and Malaysia. Each of these dyads is integrated in a comparatively dense institutional network and in each case the United States has a hegemonic interest in preserving peace. In a first step, we look for significant differences in the form of international institutions. Do democracies tend to organize their security relations differently than other states? And do the form of international institutions change in predictable ways when their member states democratize? In a second step, we compare the robustness of international institutions in times of crisis. Here we ask whether interdemocratic institutions more effective in transcending the security dilemma and in stabilizing cooperation among member states? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, the headscarf controversy will be examined from the perspective of international human rights law, specifically from a gender perspective. I will devote particular attention to the cases of Turkey, France and the United States. Turkey, pred ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do constitutionally secular states pursue substantially different policies toward religion? State policies on six issues in schools--students' displaying of religious symbols, a pledge in schools that refers God, restrictions on private religious education, religious instruction in public schools, state funding of private religious schools, and student-led prayer--reveal significant differences between the US, France, and Turkey. I argue that various state policies toward religion in schools in these three cases are the results of ideological struggles between pro-secular and pro-religious movements. These struggles exist between the "separationists" and "accommodationists" in America, defenders of "combative secularism" and those of "pluralistic secularism" in France, and "Kemalists" and "pro-Islamic conservatives" in Turkey. Two distinct meanings of secularism constitute ideological hegemonies in these three countries that shape the conflicts between the two movements. In the US, the dominant meaning of secularism is what I call "passive secularism," which implies state neutrality toward different religions. The hegemonic understanding of secularism in France and Turkey, however, is "assertive secularism," which means that the state favors a secular worldview in the public sphere and confines religion to the private sphere. That explains the more positive state attitude toward religion in the US in contrast to the restrictive state policies in France and Turkey.Passive and assertive secularism became hegemonic ideologies in the state-building periods in my three cases: in the US, 1776-1791; in France, 1875-1905; and in Turkey, 1923-1937. I analyze initial conditions and relations between pro-secular and pro-religious movements in these critical junctures to understand how passive secularism in the US and assertive secularism in France and Turkey became hegemonic ideologies. I also examine why these two ideologies have preserved their influence until today despite certain policy transformations.I employ qualitative and comparative methodology. Using path dependency, I analyze historical origin of ideological hegemony. I also employ process tracing to unpack the micro dynamics of ideology and policy changes. The study depends primarily on field research conducted in the three countries in addition to the analysis of court decisions and archival materials. The paper attaches importance to human agency and criticizes structuralist theories, which explain religion and politics through either socio-economic (i.e. modernization theory) or religio-cultural (i.e. essentialism) structures. Its emphasis on ideologies is a challenge to the mainstream view in social sciences which attaches importance to actors’ strategic and instrumental behaviors, while disregarding their ideas. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do Islamic movements operate in secular democracies? Are Islamic visions of politics and society compatible with liberal democracy? The resurgence of religious organizations into public sphere in the recent years has given special urgency to these questions. The appropriate role of religion in secular democratic states has rapidly emerged as an extraordinary divisive issue globally. The answer given to this question sheds light on the role of Islam in the process of defining the norms that regulate public life and the values that institute the political community. Some scholars have argued that the undemocratic nature of Islamic notions of society and politics are not compatible with the notions of democracy and human rights. Others have argued that notions of democracy and human rights are established in the Islamic political discourse and their exposition depends on history, social structure and context. Although this debate have produced fruitful outcomes that help us framing the role of Islam in the public sphere, both sides of the debate have generally focused on essential sources of Islam. This debate needs to be extended to the empirical realm by the study of Islamic movements comparatively. The best way to look at this is to examine the political behaviors of Islamic movements in democratic countries. This examination should consider environmental factors within which Islamic movements are located, the strategies that the movements employ, and the Islamic repertoire that the movements use in mobilizing their followers. In this paper, I examine these two questions by examining the political attitudes and behaviors of Islamic movements in public in Turkey and France. Since Turkey and France has a strong secular republican public sphere, Islamic groups’ positioning in the public debates in these countries is a good indication for whether or not they can develop democracy-friendly public reasoning. I critically examine the public discussions on democracy, secularism, cosmopolitanism and republicanism to trace the position of Islamic groups in public debates. My data comes from the interviews I conducted in Turkey and France, surveys done by other scholars, critical analysis of news media, and primary publications Islamic movements. This study makes two conclusions: (1) Even though the political discourse of Islamic groups is not normatively democratic; they develop new strategies to operate in a democratic environment, which transforms their discourse toward more democracy-friendly ones. Second, in a democratically designed environment, Islamic movements’ involvement in public debates forces them to confront and come to the terms of democratic normative structures. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I examine the role of international norms about religious liberty on change of church-state relations. I study the impact of international law and the European Union policy norms on church-state institutions in France and Turkey. EU pressures produce different outcomes depending on historical and institutional legacies. I examine the reasons of this variation to understand the internalization of international norms about religious liberty at the state level. I ask two main questions: (1) When do international norms generate domestic institutional change in the governance of religion; and (2) how do international norms generate institutional change? I argue that to understand the relationship between international norms and domestic institutional change, institutionalist theories should be combined with the theories that have established the links between international and domestic arenas. Specifically, I develop a middle-range theory, which allows the specification of the conditions under which certain mechanisms work while others do not. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]