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In recent years, China has been under frequent attacks by nature. Due to high population, low economic development, wide climate range and vulnerable environment, China would adopt appropriate adaptive and reduction actions according to the basic situation of the country and under the framework of sustainable development. the PRC government released its first policy report on climate change in June 2007, China's National Plan for Climate Change. In 2008 and 2009, China followed up with the release of a white paper titled China's Policies and Actions on Climate Change, which points out that "as a responsible developing country, China is fully aware of the importance and urgency of addressing climate change and has adopted a series of policies and measures in this regard." This essay addresses China's policy responses towards climate change. This paper discusses China's policy response to climate change. The discussion begins with the influences of climate change on China's environment and then moves on to discuss China's concern, guiding principle, goal and policy action in reaction to the issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the emerging 'triangle' in commercial relations between the EU, China and the United States, using the concepts of 'complex interdependence' and 'bi-multilateralism' as organising and evaluative devices. The paper argues that in the 'triangle' there are important areas of unevenness and variation reflecting differences of power, institutional factors and norms, but that nonetheless there can be discerned important elements of 'complex interdependence' as defined by Keohane and Nye. This can be observed in the bilateral relationships between the three parties; at the same time, however, the EU-China-US relationship is central to power, institutions and norms in the changing multilateral commercial system, centred on the World Trade Organisation. This means that many of the commercial policy negotiations between the three parties are essentially 'bi-multilateral': on the one hand, the management of bilateral relations creates externalities for the multilateral system, and on the other hand the evolution of the multilateral system creates new forces shaping the management of bilateral relationships. The paper explores two cases, China's entry into the WTO and the management of trade disputes over textiles, to illuminate the ways in which 'bi-multilateral' elements enter into the EU-China-US 'triangle'. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines global and national responses to the challenge of HIV/AIDS for young people. With reference to Thailand and China, the paper also introduces an on-going study into HIV/AIDS at community level in Chiang Mai and Kunming. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that IR has tended to mischaracterise the 'social' basis of international society. States and other actors orient their behaviour towards shared understandings of cooperation not because of a prior common identity but because the provision of public goods provides a high value pay-off in terms of status. In the early part of the paper, we draw on Wittgenstein's ideas on rule indeterminacy to critique the idea of the causal power of norms, a view which animates a great deal of mainstream constructivism. Working with an alternative sociology of norms, it becomes possible to view the international social system as being produced through 'recognition games' played on many different boards. The goal of international social action is recognition of rightful membership of institutions and alliances, an argument familiar to English school writings in IR. China's struggle for status in contemporary international society provides an illustrative case study, one which avoids the stark choice between managing China's imminent threat (realism) or liberal socialization (constructivism). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Growing demand for natural resources has become an issue of primary importance in China's foreign policy, and has led many observers to argue that conflict with the United States and other states in Asia is growing more likely. This paper evaluates the historical record on that question: under what circumstances have the resource needs of previous rising powers led to conflict with other states? I propose two independent variables: the ability to extract natural resources at home and the openness of the international trade system. In cases where the rising power has a large domestic resource base, and can supplement domestic production with easy access to foreign resources through trade, rising powers are less likely to generate conflict. In situations where the rising power has a limited resource base at home and the international trade system is closed, on the other hand, are more likely to lead to war. The paper evaluates three cases. For the United States in the late 19th century, massive domestic reserves and the first great era of globalization led to a "peaceful" rise. For Japan in the 1930s, an extremely poor resource base and rising trade barriers contributed to conflict. Finally, the paper turns its attention to China and argues that this important contemporary case more closely resembles the rise of the United States than that of Japan. China's domestic resource base remains quite large, and the international trade system is unprecedented in its level of openness. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite discussions about China's rise as a global manufacturing titan and the world's third largest trading economy, few notice the unevenness of China's integration into the world economy. While some Chinese export producers have shown signs of climbing up the global value chain, most others are still trapped in a downward spiral of "race to the bottom" competition based on cheap prices. What accounts for this local variation despite the availability of cheap labor throughout coastal areas? Based on comparative case studies, the paper finds that contrary to the expectation of both neoclassical economics and state-led development theory, export upgrading was neither a natural product of market competition nor a sheer outcome of deliberate government promotion of capital-intensive investment. Rather it resulted from the complex interaction between foreign capital on the one hand and local export institutions that took root before the entrance of FDI on the other hand. While local institutions heavily influenced the direction and the magnitude of FDI's impact on local export activities, the influx of FDI at a particular period also revised the institutional arrangements governing the behavior of local governments and export businesses. This produced intended and unintended effects on the likelihood of ruinous competition or export upgrading. The paper concludes that in a transformed eraâ??one in which outsourcing and offshore production has increasingly segregated the source of proprietary knowledge from manufacturing, one should go beyond the pure focus on the amount of capital-intensive exports and high-tech investment, and should devote more attention to the important role of social coordination in overcoming ruinous competition and in nurturing the indigenous capacity for innovation and upgrading. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractSince 2000, China has a major economic player in Africa. China's role in Africa has manifested not only in trade but in investments in different sectors of the African economy, and in the provision of aid. There has been a significant increase in the flow and stock of China's FDI in Africa since 2000. The increase is largely driven by expansion in China-Africa trade, the search for new energy sources and the need to elevate China's international stature in the world. This paper examines the major policy changes in China which acted as fillip to Chinese firms; the characteristics and patterns of China's FDI; and the salience of Africa. The paper also assesses whether China's FDI is a catalyst to generate industrial development or a Trojan horse that will create a dependent linkage between the African economy and China ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some leaders choose foreign policies that flout the constraints posed by international structures? This paper argues that leaders possess varying beliefs about their state's proficiency in different areas of foreign policy, or "national efficacy beliefs." When sufficiently strong, these beliefs inspire leaders to act boldly, even when international structures offer incentives for restraint. Strong martial efficacy beliefs inspire leaders to challenge more powerful opponents on the battlefield, while strong moral efficacy beliefs prompt leaders to engage in costly forms of cooperation even when the relevant international institutions are weak. In constrast, weaker senses of martial and moral efficacy produce policies that are much more sensitive to structural constraints. The paper outlines how this framework can explain why the foreign policies of both China and India have become more conservative over the past six decades. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When Foucault (1980; 2003) started to work on bio-power - which might be summarized as the maximization of state/national resources, including human resources -- he was clearly linking the state to the rounding out of the population as a whole. The focus on the intimate linkage of sovereign power and bio-power was made even more important since 9/11, when the exercise of sovereign power is used to justify the protection of population at home.The importance of state sovereign power in China is certainly unquestioned, even amidst economic reform. What is new in the governmental reasoning in China is that the full development of the individual now constitutes the source of the strength of the state, and that the full development of the individual involves, among other things, self-steering of the individual. The rationality behind this shifting is that the state realizes the knowledge economy is about competing globally for talents. This might be interpreted in terms of Foucault’s security (sécurité), “the future-oriented management of risk” (Valverde 2007, 172). "Knowledge economy", as a new concept, started to circulate in newspapers, magazines, media and Chinese leaders' speeches in 1998 since it first appeared in the 15th Communist Party Congress report. According to the rationalities of the state, the individual has to improve his/her physical, mental, psychological quality to prepare for and act as integral part of the new knowledge economy. This is fully in line with an emerging global elite consensus that is also evident in popularizers here in the West. Thomas Friedman's latest book The World is Flat (2005), popularizes the stakes in what he describes as a race to the top, one in which human capital/resources are identified as the deciding factor. Although Friedman does not say this, it is thus a global biopolitical race. Friedman pointedly identifies China, together with India and Brazil, as three most important players in the global race to the top.The proposed paper thus argues that China, although not a liberal society, is increasingly using governance techniques that remarkably resemble those used in the liberal society. In Foucault’s notion of governmentality, freedom is necessary to government. Individual's freedom is not a pre-given entity, but is a product of governmental steering through the desires, needs, interests, rights, and choices of individuals (Dean 1999, 149-175). Empirical materials for this paper derive from personal interviews I conducted in China and document analyses. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a heuristic model for the international development of nonproliferation education programs. The paper draws on the examples of five nonproliferation education programs at U.S. universities, plus a program currently being developed at Fudan University in Shanghai, China. Three phases of the developmental process are studied for both international and domestic programs: program development, curriculum development, and sustainability. Lessons learned from each of the three phases are combined into a developmental model, intended to serve as a guide to the further development of these programs by practitioners. The factors that contribute to program development, where the focus is on creating a viable institution of learning, are much the same for domestic and international programs alike. The factors that contribute to curriculum development are different for domestic and international programs. For domestic programs, the locus of development is the organization. For international programs, the center of gravity is a collaborative network. In the latter, the central challenge is maintaining the commitment of multiple participants, all in the pursuit of a shared intellectual enterprise. As a curriculum matures and comes to be recognized as the hallmark of a program, the need for a robust international collaborative network diminishes. Domestic and international programs eventually converge in their developmental paths, with each facing similar sustainability issues. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are unmistakable signs of rising nationalism in contemporary Japan. It has manifested itself in Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, the rewriting of history textbooks, Prime Minister Abe'ss denial of the Japanese military's direct involvement in forced prostitution during the Second World War (the so-called "œcomfort women" issue), the recent revision of the basic education law designed to instill patriotism among the nation's youths, and the move to revise Article 9 and other parts of the constitution. Neither domestic opposition to nor foreign criticisms of these developments have had a marked impact on the shift to the right in the discourse on nationalism in Japan. On the contrary, against the backdrop of an increasingly assertive political leadership in Tokyo, the emergence of post-war generations of opinion makers and opinion leaders in Japan, and the growing uncertainty in the nation's security environment, the chorus of foreign critics may be having the opposite effect and strengthening the nationalists' cause. This paper explores this proposition through an examination of the way Japanese nationalists are using Japan's disputes with China, Korea, and Russia and these countries' criticisms of Japan to articulate their cause. The paper concludes that the Japanese nationalists make a selective use of ideas, events, and institutions from the past in reconstructing a post-postwar "Japan" in their image, anchor their arguments around Japan's bilateral disputes with the neighboring countries, and exploit foreign criticisms of Japan regarding those issues to advance their nationalist cause. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do private entrepreneurs in China support democracy? This paper finds that in general private entrepreneurs find democracy desirable, but their concerns with the feasibility of democracy predispose them toward maintaining the status quo. This research employs a mixed method. On one hand, it draws on a national survey to show that Chinese private entrepreneurs are more likely to have democratic values than the non-entrepreneurial middle class and working class, controlling the effects of relevant political, regional and demographic factors. In-depth interviews, on the other hand, suggest that capitalists who demonstrate democratic values tend to argue that democracy is infeasible in China, at least in the near future. As a result, they adopt a pro-government stance in their economic, social and political activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do private entrepreneurs in China support democracy? This paper finds that in general private entrepreneurs find democracy desirable, but their concerns with the feasibility of democracy predispose them toward maintaining the status quo. This research employs a mixed method. On one hand, it draws on a national survey to show that Chinese private entrepreneurs are more likely to have democratic values than the non-entrepreneurial middle class and working class, controlling the effects of relevant political, regional and demographic factors. In-depth interviews, on the other hand, suggest that capitalists who demonstrate democratic values tend to argue that democracy is infeasible in China, at least in the near future. As a result, they adopt a pro-government stance in their economic, social and political activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building on the seminal work of Keck and Sikkink, recent years have witnessed an explosion of scholarly research on transnational advocacy networks-- globalized groups of activists bound and driven by a common commitment to principled ideas or values and working to promote, monitor, and enforce compliance with them at the state level. Most of the time, fidelity to core values within these networks is assumed to be unwavering and non-negotiable. Indeed, fixity in the moral commitments of advocacy networks is implicit in their very definition. This paper, however, argues that the principles motivating advocacy networks are not always stable or constant, and suggests conditions under which some networks may alter or retreat from the original stance taken. The argument is probed empirically through an examination of the transnational campaign for Tibetan independence, whose central objective has evolved from sovereign statehood for Tibet toward its greater inclusion within a multinational or quasi-federal Chinese state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's emergence as a powerful and confident international actor presents both a challenge and an opportunity for states worldwide. Assessments of how international actors have responded to China's rise have typically focused on rival great powers or on China's Asian neighbours. In these cases, relative power, geographic proximity, and regional institutions have conditioned elements of actors' relationships with China. China's relationship with the developing world has largely been defined by power asymmetry and the appeal of the Chinese governance model to authoritarian regimes. Absent from this discussion is an understanding of how Western middle power democracies are responding to the rise of China. This paper compares how Canada and Australia are responding to the rise of China. The two case studies are similar in many respects. Both are Western democratic states with prominent middle power foreign policy traditions. Both are resource based economies that have a track record of bilateral and institutional engagement with the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, both states are key US allies. These similarities allow the authors to isolate differences in the Canadian and Australian response to China's rise in the fields of political, economic and military engagement. China's rise challenges Ottawa and Canberra to adopt policies that balance often conflicting international and domestic priorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the efforts made by the international community on climate change, since the 1990s, the world has not yet reached an acceptable solution to tackle the problem. Disputes existed not only between the advanced economies and the emerging powers, such as the BRICS states, but also between the emerging developing nations and the least developed nations. The key issue was not about "whether" the climate change should be tackled, but rather on "how" to tackle it, namely, "what" should be done and "who" should make the decisions. As one of the greatest carbon emitters, China has often been blamed being responsible for the failure of reaching a binding international treaty at the Copenhagen Conference, yet China insists that it has the legitimated rights to develop its economy and that the Western nations should take more responsibilities. This paper aims to examine the current international architecture on climate change, and to explore the obstacles that prevented reaching a "fair" solution to tackle the issue, taking China's position as an example. It argues that although the approaches taken by the relevant parties are legitimate under their own circumstances, they are not beneficial to help reach a global solution to save the earth. To ensure more effective governance on climate change, some reform may be required to strengthen the global institutions and rules; but the emerging powers, including China, should also be prepared to bear more responsibilities at the international stage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the implications for the rise of China have been debated in the global or systemic contexts, as well as regional or bilateral contexts, thin scholarly attention has been devoted to the rise of the other great power - India, and how these two Asian great powers - India and China - perceive the ascendancy of the other state. Yet how these two very different Asian giants with a complex relationship view each other and consequently negotiate their paths in substantially changed international milieus will be important for scholarly interest and policy making. This paper examines how Indian elites - in political, security, and economic arenas - perceive the rise of China and their assessment of the feasibility of Indo-Chinese partnership ("Chindia") or rivalry by employing a mixed-method research strategy, combining secondary literature research, elite interviewing, and direct observation conducted over the summer of 2008. It analyzes the Indo-Chinese relationship through three paradigms - geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geocivilizational. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Up on the commanding heights, at the pinnacle of the state, China's top leaders agree that law should serve the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Down in the trenches, at the frontlines of decision-making, Chinese judges in civil environmental cases decipher this directive and attempt to diffuse local discontent. Faced with ambiguous legal standards, they enjoy limited discretion to decide cases as they see fit. But why do judges make the decisions they do? This paper looks at legal decisions (panjueshu) as a window onto judges as strategic actors as well as the everyday practice of law. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates crises in which the Chinese government requested an apology from the United States, and the official and popular reactions to these incidents. Two contentious episodes are studied: the 2001 EP-3E airplane collision near Hainan Isl ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past 30 years, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has transformed itself into a major actor in the international economy. This paper considers the extent to which China's growing economic power translates into political influence over the foreign policy priorities, behavior, and perceptions of its economic partners. I test quantitatively whether different types of economic exchange with China are correlated with a particular country's leadership travel to China, that country's willingness to recognize China as a market economy, and its public perceptions of China. Findings are mixed, but suggest on balance that bilateral economic ties are more closely correlated with behavior (recognition of China as a market economy) and public perceptions than they are with priorities (leadership travel to China). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By the end of 2008, after 30 years of opening to the outside world, China will have accumulated close to 1.5 million students and scholars who have studied overseas. In the past decade, many of them have decided to return to China; and many of those who have not returned play an active role in technology transfer, trade and investment in China. These Chinese returnees, and those who have remained as Diasporas, play an increasingly significant role in China's globalization. There is a great shift from focus in China on what China wants. China has become the number two export country in the world and it has become the endpoint of an enormous amount of foreign investment, now second only to the United States in the yearly FDI fare. China now has the largest foreign reserve in China and China now is not that hungry for money anymore, instead China needs more international talents, especially the returnees and diaspora, as they are emerging as the new important changing forces in China. This paper is the first of its kind to comprehensively examine the roles and contributions made by returnees in the Chinese economic and business front and their impact on the China globalization process and going out strategy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The unprecedented economic growth and development in China over the past two decades has been as impressive as it has been daunting. Surpassing all expectations, China's GDP continues to grow at an average of 6 to 8 percent annually since 1999. However such growth has not been without consequences including: 1) increased migration; 2) the increased gap between rural and urban development; 3) and the changing place of women in the economy and society as they are among the number of those migrating. The changing political economy of China has increased the costal-interior, urban-rural as well as gendered economic inequalities while exposing the inadequacies of social and labour policies to accommodate the changing needs of Chinese citizens. As a result, the rural and migrant women who have traditionally been marginalized continue to be vulnerable to the forces of market reform and globalization. It is therefore the purpose of this paper to show that while the changing political economy in China has afforded rural women an opportunity to enter the off-farm labour market with the hope of improved economic security, policy deficiencies continue to marginalize migrant rural women by categorically framing them as second-class citizens within the cities they move into. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The old debate of whether regional trade agreements are a stepping stone or a stumbling block for global trade liberalisation has become particularly pertinent today with East Asia's largest economies joining the rush to preferential trade. China is currently studying, negotiating or implementing FTAs with over 20 countries or regions. This notable development in China's economic diplomacy has caused other countries, especially those in the Asia Pacific, to embark on preferential trade agreements as well, causing concern from the WTO over the proliferation of discriminatory FTAs. This paper analyzes China's bilateral free trade agreements (FTA) and discusses their implications for the WTO. The focus will be on Chinese perspectives on the relationship between FTAs and the WTO, Beijing's motivations behind its activism in FTAs, China's approach to FTA negotiations, and the domestic roots of China's FTA policies. The implications of China's FTAs for the WTO include whether China has abandoned multilateralism for bilateralism for its international trade cooperation, whether Beijing hopes to facilitate trade liberalization under the WTO through the FTAs, and whether Beijing has tried to keep its FTAs compliant with WTO rules. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The necessity of using the law to address unrest has pushed "lawful environmental rights and interests"—the government-preferred formulation of environmental rights—towards an uncontroversial entitlement. Indeed, environmental rights look benign when even human rights are written into the Chinese constitution. But what exactly is a "lawful environmental right" and where did rights language come from? This paper explores both how elites talk about environmental rights and how these rights are translated into action. China's upwardly mobile classes have begun using environmental rights language to justify opposition to nearby high voltage towers, highways and railroad lines. I look at one NIMBY dispute, opposition to the Shanghai-Hangzhou magnetic levitation (maglev) train in 2006-2007, to explore how rights fit into a kaleidoscope of frames designed to elicit response from an opaque state. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chinese penetration in the trade and investments field in South America in the XXI century has changed national actors's expectations in the region during a transition period, after economic crises of the neo liberal development model. Based on the Chinese economy's own dynamics in today's global economic context, we believe that China's penetration in South America tends to consolidate, in short to medium term at the least, as part of a world strategy from that superpower seeking energy resources and other commodities, aiming food and energy security. Therefore this paper has as goal to evaluate political implications of Chinese economic penetration in South America in the global economic context of the XXI century, indicating the regional outspreads of the new world geopolitics of energy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) has become a major institutional linkage within the ASEAN Plus Three framework. This paper will employ an historical institutional approach to examine the development of the ASEAN-China linkage. The origins of the ACFTA and the sequence of events that has promoted the linkage will be analysed. The extent to which the positive economic and political feedback process as well as the timing and sequence of events have helped to reinforce the relationship will be assessed. It is argued that the resulting trajectory of the ACFTA underscores the political nature of the emerging association and makes it difficult, although not impossible, for other relationships to supersede the ASEAN-China linkage at the centre of the APT framework. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

IFew items being monitored by the international development assistance community have caused as much consternation as the emergence of China as a significant source of official development assistance (ODA). 40 years ago, similar criticisms were being made about Japan's ODA, which was considered a mere offshoot of its mercantilist trade policies. Yet today Japan is arguably a strong adherent to the prevailing international norms that guide (though perhaps do not govern) official giving, especially on positions with respect to tied aid, non-military aid, economic development, environmental impact, and monitoring and evaluation standards. This paper looks at international aid norms and how they came to be accepted in Japan despite domestic political opposition. It also places Japanese and Chinese aid in global perspective. There is a lesson to be learned from the Japanese experience: China will also one day converge towards international norms on aid. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's transition is drawing world-wide attention. China started market economic reform since 1978 and rapidly closes up the gap economically with world industrialized nations. The 1990s witnessed the downfall of Communist political system in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, yet the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule continued. However, the Chinese public and leaders have started to debate and explore where China should go politically and how to get there. Through examining the merits and weaknesses of four prevailing democratization theories: modernization theory, social mobilization model, cultural argument, and negotiation-pact transition theory, this paper intends to design an appropriate model for China's political future. It argues that (1) the conflict between the reform and conservative groups inside the communist regime will shape the process of China's democratization; and (2) the hope of China's political future may lie in continued economic development, a mature civil society, and the building of democratic political culture in society. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analysts have made efforts to explore the motivations behind China's deepening involvement in the South Pacific. Some are concerned that China is strategically motivated and China's growing influence poses a major threat to the West. This paper assesses the strategic value of the South Pacific in China's grand strategy, China's soft power in the region and some constraints to China's hegemonic rise. It concludes that China's policy toward the South Pacific is not mainly driven by its security strategy and that China's soft power in the region is limited. It also casts doubt on China's hegemonic rise in the region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Africa has embarked on a new phase of capitalist development, powered in large part by Chinese investment. After three decades of stagnation, the continent as a whole is witnessing growth rates of five percent per year and becoming once again a focal point of geopolitical dispute. This paper will focus on the Sino-African relationship and ask two questions in particular: what is China's strategy in Africa? And what is its likely developmental impact? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent summits have sought to redefine Japan-China ties as a "strategic relationship of mutual benefit" by "increasing political trust." Sino-Japanese trust is important because hedging in security affairs is expensive and can undermine stability. Lack of trust encourages worst-case assumptions about the other's motives, placing a ceiling on cooperation and making miscalculation and conflict more likely. Why is trust such a problem between Japan and China? Studies in international relations point to the power shift associated with China's rise and differences in regime type (democracy/authoritarianism). Research on contemporary Sino-Japanese ties often focuses on the significantly expanded and sometimes contentious trade relationship. Finding those explanations insufficient, this paper argues that trust problems are better understood as functions of national identity. The way that Japan and China perceive 'the other' in the context of their own national identities is the primary source of distrust. In Japanese perception, Japan tends to be seen as more developed and civilized than China and Chinese identity as obsessed with being at the center. In Chinese perception, China tends to be seen as morally and historically superior to Japan and Japanese identity as latently aggressive and disrespectful of natural order. These perceptions are traceable in Japanese views of China's human rights policies and regional diplomacy, and Chinese views of Japan's handling of history (including textbooks and Yasukuni Shrine) and military normalization. By explaining the link between identity conflicts and bilateral trust, this paper demonstrates why Sino-Japanese trust remains low and recent improvements in relations fragile. Peace and security in East Asia depend not only on how Tokyo and Beijing define and pursue their interests, but also on how they define and relate to each other. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the strategic outlook of the world's largest yet understudied armed force ? China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). With its sheer size, rapidly increasing capabilities, and uncertain intentions, the PLA's assessment of the country's external security environment entails profound implications for international relations. China has the world's largest military (with a manpower of over 2.3 million), second highest defense spending ($90 billion in 2004, by Pentagon's estimates; or $25.6 billion, by China's Defense White Paper), and one of the fastest-growing economies serving as the resource base for double-digit increases in defense spending for each of the past 15 years and for rapidly expanding its military capabilities. Yet, studying China's strategic intentions faces methodological challenges. China's decision-making process is opaque; its top leadership is not accountable to the electorate. A peculiar "civilian control of the military" ensures that the military will protect the party's interests. Access is guarded. Top generals rarely give interviews and their public statements echo top party leaders' statements. Discussions with "think tanks" affiliated with PLA tend to be formalistic. Moreover, a "strategic culture" of realism and a "cult of defense" combine to give Chinese an edge in deception and asymmetry. For a question crucial to U.S. national security, these problems have confounded scholars and policy-makers.The PLA's stated raison d'être is to "safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity" and preventing Taiwan's formal independence for now (or, in the future, incorporating Taiwan through force) has provided the impetus for the modernization of this armed force. But will China's aspirations increase with growing capabilities? The "Taiwan issue" thus provides a good angle to understand and evaluate China's perception and assessment of its security environment in the first decade of the 21st century.This paper tackles four questions: (1) How to disentangle the PLA's worldviews from those of China's civilian party leaders? (2) Compared to civilian leaders, is the military more hardline on issues perceived to pertain to sovereignty and territorial integrity but also more cautious on the use of force? (3) Are there subtle differences within the PLA -- by services, cohorts, doctrines -- on key strategic issues? (4) How does China's military development coalesce with the current leadership's stated strategy of "peaceful rise"? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the process and challenge of financial market opening in the People?s Republic of China. It will investigate particularly China?s progress in financial liberalization as well as liberalization?s potential costs and benefits. Since joining the WTO, China has integrated into the global economy and has enjoyed remarkable economic success. Under the WTO negotiations, China expects to deregulate restrictions for foreign financial institutions and liberalize its financial market. However, the legacy of the old state-planned economy?s restrictions and strict financial repression may hamper financial sector development, posing a serious challenge to establish a more market-oriented financial system. This paper argues that financial liberalization should be implemented carefully since haphazard liberalization tends to encourage financial instability, as many emerging economies have experienced. Successful financial market reforms that would guarantee sustained strong economic growth and avoid instability will depend on how well China implements economic reforms. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lately there has been increasing interest among IR scholars in Chinese thought both as an alternative to Eurocentric IR and because the PRC as an emerging power will soon have the institutional power to promote its view of the world. Rather than look for suitable Chinese parallels to 'international', 'security' or other mainstream concepts, this paper will examine the concept of 'Tianxia' to understand Chinese visions of world order. Tianxia is interesting both because it was key to the governance and self-understanding of three millennia of Chinese empire, and also because discussion of Tianxia is becoming popular again in the 21st century as a Chinese model of world order that is universally valid. Firstly, the paper will examine Zhao Tingyang's popular discussion of how the all-inclusive Tianxia system would solve the world's problems through a world institution that embraces difference according to a 'magnanimous' social grammar. Then it will examine some of the philosophical and historical problems raised by this reading of Tianxia: its relation to classical Chinese philosophy and modern social theory, particularly how it deals with 'Otherness'. And finally, it will conclude that Tianxia's most important impact will not be on the world stage, but in China's domestic politics. The paper will examine how Tianxia has been redeployed by China's intellectuals of the state and public intellectuals among the Chinese diaspora in ways that blur the conceptual boundaries between empire and globalism, hierarchy and cosmopolitanism. Yet rather than guide us towards a post-hegemonic IR, Tianxia presents a new hegemony that reproduces China's hierarchical empire in an updated form. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research question of this paper is: “Does economic growth make China a threat?” Bearing this question in mind, I review the “China threat” literature and its counter-arguments since the early 1990s. This paper examines the offensive realist theoretical basis for the “China threat” literature, and it outlines several oversimplifications that the “China threat” arguments often suffer. Moreover, it is argued that while the “China threat” literature tends to support its arguments by rejecting the liberalist interdependence peace hypothesis and democratic peace hypothesis in the China context, a Marxist dependency framework may be more relevant to explore China’s capabilities and intention to pose a threat to the United States. And, in order to fully assess the strategic implications of China’s economic growth, we need to place the economic growth in the background of economic globalization as well as to take China’s domestic social relations in the process of economic growth into consideration. My conclusion is that economic growth will not make China a threat. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides an overview of China’s international security cooperation diplomacy with the states of Southeast Asia. China has pursued international security cooperation both multilaterally and bilaterally. In March 1997, China broached for the first time what it termed its “New Concept of Security” at a meeting of the Association of South East Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF). In 2003, in a major development, China and ASEAN reached agreement on a “Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity” that included cooperation in security matters. Between 1999 and 2000, China negotiated long-term cooperative framework agreements with ten of the region’s states (East Timor excepted). Six of these agreements included a clause covering security cooperation. The six signatories included: Brunei, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. China already had long-standing defense links with Myanmar. In addition, China developed security cooperation ties with, Cambodia, Vietnam and Indonesia. The paper reviews the nature and scope of China’s bilateral international security cooperation in the period after 2002 when China revised this concept and began a renewed effort to promote security cooperation on a multilateral basis within the ARF. . ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Before the mid 1990s, China was skeptical about the value of participating in regional multilateral organizations. However, since the late 1990s China has changed its previous attitude toward Asian regionalism and has pursued a proactive policy toward regional integration. How should we explain China’s adaptation of policy toward Asian regionalism? Within the literature on regionalism, various theoretical approaches (liberalism, realism, domestic politics and constructivism) have different interpretations on rationales behind economic regional integrations. This paper follows the proposition of “analytical eclecticism” in explaining foreign policy issue. By using an integrated framework of micro-macro linkage approach and a case study of China’s rationales of building China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA), this paper investigates “how” and “why” China has actively participated in Asian regionalism. The data collection includes both primary data of interviews, government documents and official statistics, and secondary data of news reports, policy analysis and other scholar’s studies. No single theoretical approach can explain the complexity of China’s motivations for Asian regionalism. To some extent, China’s active participation into Asian regional institutions can be explained as a way of solving a realist problem with the policy prescriptions of liberalism and constructivism. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we discuss the significance of the UN for the development of Chinese environmental policies. First, we discuss the global conferences, primarily in terms of agenda setting and institutional growth. Then we turn to China’s relation to UNEP and CSD and discuss the extent to which these institutions have made any difference to China, and if so in what respect. In the fourth section we turn to Chinese experiences and perceptions of the GEF in terms of implementation of climate change – and biodiversity projects. In the final section we discuss briefly the significance these UN fora combined has had for Chinese environmental policies. Conclusions on the conferences are that the Stockholm Conference seemed to have a rather direct effect in terms of institution building and agenda setting. Similarly, the Rio Conference is seen by Chinese decision-makers as a turning point in its environmental policy. The time elapsed since WSSD is quite short, but again examples are mentioned as to its direct and positive effect. As these are short term events organized every ten (or twenty year), they need to be reinforced by other international institutions. It seems quite clear that UNEP has filled this gap quite effectively through various form of assistance while CSD has been useful not the least through the reporting procedures. Apart from secondary sources in Chinese and English, this paper builds on extensive interviews with Chinese decision makers over a period of many years. At this stage this paper essentially gives an empirical account of China and these UN institutions. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and India are two major rising powers in Asia. The two countries fought a border war in 1962 and since then border negotiations have been going on. Studying the relationship between these two major powers in Asia has significant implications for the future of Asia. This paper focuses on three major Chinese foreign policy decision makers –Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping—their operational code beliefs and belief changes during the 1960s and examines their belief changes and the impact of belief changes on the Chinese decisions to fight a war with India after breaking up with the Soviet Union. The 1960s was a hard time for the newly founded PRC, however, the Chinese leaders made the hard decision to break up with its ally and big brother, and fight a war with India who was the head of the non-aligned movements. As three major decision makers, do they have the same belief changes in making those strategic moves? This is an interesting question in helping us to understand the Chinese foreign policies during the Cold War time and also to look into the future of Sino-Indian relations. By examining the international and domestic situations of the Sino-Indian War in 1962, this paper compares the results of the narratives with an operational code analysis of three Chinese leaders and their subjective games. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emergence of the People's Republic of China as an international actor is unquestionable and goes well beyond the economic field. The Chinese diplomacy has been more active than ever and has been particularly successful in countries that fear internati ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Growing trade with China offer an array of new exportopportunities for Latin America, yet it also poses new challenges.Heightened demand for raw materials accentuates the need for industrialdiversification, while the new competition environment rais ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the 1990s China underwent major changes in its foreign policy as it integrated into the world economy, focused on its regional environment and entered into new multilateral commitments. This article analyses China's foreign policy agenda by reference to internal dynamics, resorting to a critical political economy analysis. The arguments suggest that the costs and benefits of the three most important instruments used to retain power - cooptation, legitimation and repression - have changed in the course of the economic reforms. China's foreign policy reflects an internal adjustment to these changing fundamentals of retaining power. Thus, firstly, China's foreign policy reflects the domestic policy dilemma between the need to buy the support of crucial groups within society and the need for scarce resources to be distributed among larger sections of society. Secondly, China's multilateral approach especially towards its Central Asian neighbours - primarily with regard to security issues - is designed to mitigate the rising domestic cost of repression by sharing information with external partners. And thirdly, the quest to legitimate the political system of the People's Republic is a prominent factor in the shaping of the country's current foreign policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's grand strategy, reflected in recent years by its "New Security Concept", is becoming more dependent on governmental and sub-governmental institutional cooperation. The development of sub-governmental dialogues (Track II) on regional security issues in the Pacific Rim has accelerated since the 1990s and is now widely seen as an optimal method of promoting both discourse and confidence-building in the region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The "hexie shehui (harmonious society)" is China's new slogan under the Hu Jintao regime, which pursues social and political stability based on sustainable development and people's welfare. However, the country's severe water scarcity and pollution has been a clear fault line in its path to the society. It has threatened people's sustenance; caused grain loss; brought about acquire depletion and its following land subsidence and seawater penetration; induced water-seeking migration; and, significantly, triggered conflicts and protests for water. China's political leaders are highly aware of the gravity of the problem and have contrived water-conservancy programs. However, as the Yellow River Allocation Program, the water consumption quota system/water price increase, and forestation programs demonstrate, the programs have not been implemented effectively due to their institutional flaws as well as the local government's parochialism and corruption. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The structure of the traditional East Asian system has been regarded as hierarchic by a number of scholars. Based on a case study of Sino-Korean relations during the early Ming dynasty (1368-1424), I argue that this is a dubious interpration. In fact, China failed to create authority over Korea. Korea adopted various strategies to deal with a preponderant China. The structure is best characterized as an attenuated anarchy. I also offer an interpretation of the Sino-Korean tribute system. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is changing. It is neither a totalitarian state in the traditional sense, nor is it reforming politically, as liberals predict, in response to economic development. Recent economic reforms have brought unprecedented wealth and change. Ideas and practices that were once verboten are becoming commonplace. However, along with material wealth, economic reforms have imported new challenges to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule. The CCP has only one overriding goal: the maintenance of its absolute dictatorship, and it engages in "adaptive repression" to further this goal. The CCP has no qualms jettisoning numerous tools (ideological principles, rhetorical stances, plans of action) if they fail to further the Party's dictatorship. China's spectacular growth has raised serious questions. What type of state is China? Will political reforms, as liberals believe, follow economic reforms? Is China's economic model sustainable? What are the new challenges that the CCP is facing and how will it adapt to them? What are some of the old challenges it has faced and will they provide lessons for the future? However, by examining two recent developments in China, the rise of Internet use and the new emphasis on protecting intellectual property, through the lens of Sujian Guo's reconceptualization of totalitarian theory, I will demonstrate that the CCP continues to adapt its methods of repression to maintain its absolute dictatorship in the face of new challenges to its authority. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Northeast Asia is often regarded as having an uneasy atmosphere, with tensions between the countries making the region sometimes look unpeaceful. North Korean arms tests and other aggressive gestures also contribute to this view, as well as tensions between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. My study tries to look closer at the development of the relations between the most important states in the region, China, Japan and South Korea, assuming that the above-mentioned conflicts are not dominating the relations between the three countries. The study tries to assess changes in the triadic and dyadic relations which don not get as much attention as the conflicts, but will also have an impact on the future relations in the region.These changes are studied by using the concept of Security Community that has been first developed by Karl W. Deutsch and later been elaborated by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. The larger goal of my study is to examine the long term stability of the peace between the three countries. A pluralistic Security Community is defined as a community of states having "dependable expectations of peaceful change". Whilst Deutsch developed the concept of the Security Community with reference to the North Atlantic region, Adler and Barnett and Amitav Acharya expanded the scope of the concept to other regions in the world. They also based it on constructivist ideas, giving it more theoretical rigidity, and added the idea of a development pattern with different stages in building a Security Community from nascent to mature. This now allows to study Security Communities that have not fully developed yet, such as in Northeast Asia. Following this concept, the key factors in the development of a Security Community are transactions, norms and institutions. In my work I study the changing relations of the three countries by looking at changes in these factors in different issue areas, with special focus on the development in the maritime domain, which seems to display a case of change towards closer co-operation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In studying national and state identity, scholars have primarily focused on official or political discourses as evidence of identity construction. More recently, Ted Hopf has underlined the importance of popular culture in examining societal discourses of Soviet and Russian state identity. By looking at portrayals of minorities in Chinese and Indian movies and visual arts we extend Hopf's framework in two ways. First, both China and India have significant heterogeneous, illiterate and poor parts of their population, rendering textual sources less useful as the primary means to study identity. Second, we want to see what types of culture are generated by the state as opposed to internal and external others. By looking at popular culture in a democracy and a non-democracy, we can assess to what extent popular culture is manufactured by the state or is representative of societal discourses. Through an analysis of significant films and art in the post-cold war period, we show how popular culture both reflects and is used as a means to carve out state identity with relation to 'internal' others, such as Muslims and the rural poor. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, relations between China and Japan have been stable yet contentious due to unresolved controversies concerning history textbooks, territorial disputes, military activity, market distortions, and environmental degradation. While by no means precluding the real possibility of reconciliation between China and Japan, such ends cannot be understood without explanations about cultural preferences amid materialist pursuits. As nearly 2,000 years in the history of Sino-Japanese relations thus demonstrates, unitary actors derive their general interests from specific identities such that the propensity for either apprehension or resolve need not always depend upon the effects caused by those structural factors (security dilemmas, imbalanced capabilities) which seem to be less conditional and more coincidental instead. For what has elsewhere been termed "civilizational realpolitik" continues to determine the conditions in constructing Sino-Japanese relations across time/space. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite its many alleged empirical and theoretical shortcomings, balance of power theory remains the departure point for much of the scholarship in the field of security studies dedicated to explaining great power behaviour. The most recent addition to the theory's toolbox is 'soft balancing,' an umbrella concept that articulates a distinction between traditional military balancing (i.e., 'hard balancing') and more subtle balancing strategies involving the use of one or more non-military measures, including but not limited to diplomacy, international institutions, and economic statecraft. Scholarly interest in the soft balancing concept has been stimulated by the absence of an explicit military challenge to American primacy. I argue that the balancing debate as it is presently constituted fails to take note of two important differences in the contemporary strategic and economic landscape. First, the assumption that quantitative and qualitative military equality must prevail for there to be an effective check on American primacy is erroneous. Second, and perhaps most significantly, the economic dimension of the balancing dynamic has been generally undervalued, particularly with respect to the time horizons that states currently employ when making decisions about grand strategy. Both balance of power theorists and their critics have thus overlooked some of the most critical evidence that unipolarity is gradually giving way to a bipolar international order, with China emerging as the second pole. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]