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As China faces a rising tide of separatist movements and terrorist activities within its own borders, Beijing has sought closer cooperation with the governments of the Central Asian republics. In June 2001, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan declared the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with anti-terrorism, extremism, and separatism being its central task. The September 11 terrorist attacks against the US further enhance the need for close collaboration among these countries. Indeed, the SCO will a critical part of Chinese efforts to stem and eradicate external links to domestic separatist and terrorist cells. While the immediate focus of the SCO would be to fight terrorism, the larger issue for the longer term would whether the organization could evolve into a sub-regional arrangement that would contribute to peace, stability, and prosperity. Beijing has already suggested the organization’s uniqueness in promoting common goals and indeed has great interest in seeing it succeed as a counter model to US-led military alliances. However, the path to success may not be smooth and problem-free as is hoped. This paper will seek to examine both the prospects for and the potential obstacles in achieving key objectives sought by SCO member states: management of ethnic and religious unrest, including the fight against terrorism and separatism; maintenance of stable borders; development of energy resources; nuclear nonproliferation; and promotion of economic prosperity. Within this broader context, the paper will examine whether or not China can extend its influence to Central Asia using SCO as a vehicle and the implications for US interests in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I seek to answer some basic questions about the process of globalization in the defense industry and the security considerations that result from it. I concentrate on two major groups of players; states and firms. In the first section I briefly lay out the definition of globalization that is commonly used in analyzing defense issues and then look at what the phrase really means in terms of the defense trade. The following section examines the manifestations of globalization in the defense trade, which are many and profound. There is a particular focus in this section on the effects of globalization on defense production, but there is also some discussion of the effects of globalization on the defense trade; the ?sharp end? of the issue. The next section examines the effects of globalization on security for the state and the firm Throughout this paper the phrase ?defense trade? is used rather than ?arms trade? this reflects the fact that much of what is now traded does not look like a defense good; it is a component, a software code, a training package or simulator, even a computer. Today?s trade is less in finished defense goods than in the components of a system. The phrase ?defense trade? captures this dynamic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies George W. Bush?s narrative; the relationship between U.S. national security and information technology after the painful experience of 9/11. Bush?s phrases of national security and information technology are in the nucleus of international and national political challenges, yet they are in many ways problematic and controversial. I am asking if they even are a central part of the problem of global war on terror itself. Nevertheless my intention is rather to try to understand what I suggest as Bush?s narrative of ?nightmare? by generating questions from political philosophy that challenge and open up these fundamental phrases. As President Bush is boldly able to simplify the complex phenomenon of terrorism, his acts will raise a question more fundamental in the West: how far he can go with the phrases. Colonizing a cyberspace with totalitarian surveillance activities maintains a paradoxical silence; a vast amount of information without knowledge. In this sense, President Bush has taken in his ?ride? American national security culture to the new frontiers. This has a potential to lead to the deterritorialization of national security. Using Lyotard?s thoughts, the paper discovers questions of putting the phrase ?take the battle to the enemy? into practice. On an information technology level of analysis this can be seen as total accident, in Paul Virilio?s terms, with the pragmatism of permanent cybersurveillance (Patriot Act) of the Americans and not just terrorists. It is a logical step for modernity to define information technology as a tool in this battle in which ?freedom does not come free?. On a narrative level of analysis, I suggest that phrases of information technology should be turned into recognizing a differend. These phrases put forward the unpresentable which, even though it opens up a question of the concept of ?enemy?, reveals how the United States in its travel is struggling not with the enemy but with itself. Bush?s disputable phrases of information technology occupy an important place in U.S. national security culture because of their contradictory relation between state and individual to western expansion of freedom. This is enabled in Bush?s narrative which is legitimated by a possible ?nightmare?. By ?discovering? this ?frontier? in Bush?s universe, we can better understand the modern project grounding its legitimacy in the imaginable future ? and not in 9/11. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Paper Proposal for the 45th Annual ISA Convention, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 17-20, 2004: European Security after September 11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq Heinz Gärtner Traditional security thinking dominated the Cold War. Reliance on military capabilities was the primary strategy adopted to achieve greater security. In the new post-1989 world, and in particular post- 9/11, a broader and more complex concept of security has emerged. With the end of the Cold War, attention was thus given to building more sophisticated and integrated security concepts and developing frameworks designed to embrace a more comprehensive construct for security. The dramatic shift in threat perceptions brought about by the fall of communism have been confirmed by a wide variety of post-September 11 development: Wars between competing political ideologies and inter-state conflicts are no longer seen as the prime dangers to international security. The real security risks in the near future seem to come not from strong and stable governments but from failed and collapsed states. This paper examines both the impact of the developments before and after September 11 on both NATO and European Security, in particular on the concept of collective and territorial defense. By far the greatest proportions of the operational efforts of NATO and the European Union (EU) have already shifted away from collective defense. Crisis management is the paradigm that forms the cornerstone of the post-Cold War security system. Since the end of the East-West conflict NATO underwent a significant transformation process that has been speeded up by the terror attacks of September 11. Founded as a collective defense organization at the onset of the Cold War, NATO has revised its strategic concept to respond to the broader spectrum of the threats. The invocation of its Art. 5 security commitments for a war that took place not on NATO-territory changed the meaning of this article together with Art. 6 that prescribes this area. With NATO enlargement, a greater role for Moscow, NATO’s small military role in Afghanistan and Iraq, NATO seemed likely to lose military significance in international significance. NATO was at risk of becoming totally irrelevant in a world in which terrorism has become the principal strategic threat. So it had to give up more and more the old NATO, a collective security organization designed to protect Western Europe against Soviet invasion. At the Prague summit the heads of governments approved the formation of a Rapid-Response force of around 20,000 troops that would be deployable within 30 days wherever they are needed. In the framework of the Prague Capabilities Commitment individual countries will also have to commit themselves to provide specific equipment and expertise within set deadlines. In the case of Iraq Germany, France and Belgium blocked the start of NATO military planning to protect Turkey against the threat of an Iraqi missile attack. Subsequently, Turkey has requested consultations under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, that states that NATO’s members will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any NATO country is threatened. With the post-cold war era NATO’s traditional role as a collective defense organization was coming to a close. NATO together with its PfP could become a military toolbox of allied forces. The European Union launched a 60,000-strong Rapid Reaction Force in 2001, is supposed to be up and running by 2003, but is struggling amid budget restrictions and affected by post-September 11 events, the war in Afghanistan and the pending war against Iraq. After the end of the East-West Conflict European deficiencies of military capabilities became more and more visible, however. One important reason lies in the legacy of the Cold War. During this period the European armies prepared for a confrontation with the major threat from the East in a collective effort to defend their territories. The conflicts and challenges after the end of the military bipolarity do not require massive, heavy-metal European armies, not suited for transport and projections to distant places, but rapid reaction forces with flexible structure and light weapons, deployable over great distances, equipped with modern communication assets to coordinate their actions, surveillance and reconnaissance facilities. A draft report of the Presidium the European Convention provided recommendations and the wording of new articles for the Treaty of The Convention. The report recognizes that the concept of security is very broad, by nature indivisible, and one that goes beyond the purely military aspects covering not only the security of States but also the security of citizens. On the basis of this broad concept of security, the common foreign and security policy and the European Security and Defense Policy. It allows the Union military options over and above the civil instruments of crisis prevention and management. Within this broad concept of security, disarmament occupies an essential place. In the area of crisis management there is the danger of duplication of NATO and EU capabilities and missions. Division of labor and role specialization could avoid it on the one hand, and cooperation in certain areas such as common command structure for crisis management on the other. There must be appropriate division of labour. The wars in Kazoo, Afghanistan and Iraq showed that the overwhelming U.S. contribution is war-fighting capability - what is by comparison a limited European contribution. In this the gap between the military capabilities of the U.S. and the rest of the world is huge and is growing. However, a capability to act does not only imply war fighting. Europeans are more designed for peacekeeping, humanitarian action, disaster relief and post-conflict reconstruction rather than the rapid deployment of larger forces over long distances. The United States will need to continue to project forces in high-intensity conflict. There should be some risk- and responsibility sharing, however. European states should keep a minimum level of participation in all phases of an operation. As Europeans should keep and develop some war fighting capability U.S.-troops also should participate at least at a minimal level in lower end peace support operations. They should not be reduced to war fighting alone but demonstrate that they are able to do humanitarian and rescue and peacekeeping operations. Hence, despite the transatlantic differences, there is clearly consensus among some of the EU Member States and the United States on the need to develop force planning and strategies for ‘ad-hoc’ coalitions of the willing that can have access to NATO and EU economic, military and human assets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the relationship between theory and practice in international relations by examining the recent environmental security literature and its ability to guide in the formation of policy. At the end of the Cold War, international relations scholars began to challenge the traditional understanding of national security. This work argued against the narrow focus on military weapons as threats to national security by pointing to the threats induced by natural resource shortages and global warming. These authors argued that resource scarcity and global warming produced negative economic and political pressures leading to regional instability. Since its introduction, the environmental security literature has gone through three generation of scholarship, each improving our understanding of the relationship between the environment and national security. Despite this, all three generations have not remedied important shortcomings within this literature that weakens our ability to draw policy prescriptions from its conclusions. First, environmental security scholars have focused on an economic understanding of the relationship between the environment and security. In other words, they argue that given a shortage of critical resources -whether it is water, air, soil, or oil- nations will face a national security threat. But, as this paper will argue, the physical environment a nation finds itself in will present a national security threat regardless of the abundance of a resource. To appreciate the ecological interdependence a nation finds itself in, the paper considers the example of international rivers. The second critique of this literature is its focus on environmental security as a source of conflict. In reality the physical environment can be a source of cooperation or conflict. The national security threat induced from ecological interdependence can be so costly, that even enemies are induced to cooperate. Consider for example the stable cooperation between India and Pakistan over the Indus River system. This cooperation has survived through several wars, numerous border clashes, and even nuclear rivalry. And finally, this paper will demonstrate that the ecological interdependence created among nations can become a weapon used to signal discontent to a neighboring nation. To demonstrate this, the paper will draw on the use of rivers as weapons by riparian nations. In the process of analyzing and critiquing the environmental security literature, the paper will draw on the experience of the nations sharing the Indus, Ganges, Jordan, and Euphrates Rivers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anthony A. Loh Department of Political Science Vanderbilt University (615) 343-6046 Email: anthony.a.loh@vanderbilt.edu The events of 9/11 helped expose the underlying incompatibilities between an emerging American hegemony and the Westphalian system of international relations. In much of International Relations literature, the assumption is that the international system is given, while the distribution of power can take the form of multipolarity, bipolarity and unipolarity. Yet in the aftermath of the Iraq war of 2003, the United States has clearly consolidated its post-Cold War triumphant gains in political, economic and military leverages over the rest of the world, including its allies in Western Europe. It has sought to fill the void left by the former Soviet Union. A new systems structure appears to be emerging that is centered on the United States, and anti-hegemonial coalitions that could sufficiently balance it are becoming more difficult to assemble, although sub-state actors like Al Qaeda cell groups have risen to attempt to check the hegemon through insidious means and transnational networks. It is time for Waltzian claims to receive yet another nuanced revision or perhaps a complete rejection. At the highest level, systems structure may no longer be anarchical, whereas at the lowest (sub-state) level, it remains to be so. This paper explores the significance of these structural changes for international politics. There has been a near-explosion of IR literature on the United States becoming a new imperium. The central question addressed here is how this new American imperium differs from traditional-type territorial empires and what is its significance for U.S.-East Asian relations in the 21st century. The paper looks at the potential shifts in U.S. policies in South and North Korea, Japan, Singapore, Philippines, Taiwan, and China. These East Asian states have been watching closely the military and political outcome of the 2003 Iraqi war. The implications of American unilateralism ? with its doctrines on regime change and strategic preemption ? worry them. Some of them are authoritarian regimes and are regarded by the United States as proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. The shift in post-9/11 U.S. strategy from containing peer competitors to dealing with terrorist threats have lifted some pressures on China, but the neoconservative agenda to remake the international order will be sure to bear on regional security and stability. How will the United States deal with North Korea in light of the Iraqi campaign of 2003? Some East Asian states have already seen the need to revise their traditional relationships with the United States. South Korea, in its drive for reunification, might abandon its reliance on U.S. security umbrella and turn to China as the new power broker. Japan, America’s staunchest ally in the region, might choose to remilitarize rather than continue to rely on the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Still other East Asian states might be polarized into pro-U.S. and anti-U.S. camps, especially since there is little cohesiveness among them to begin with. The limits of U.S. military power are particularly felt in the East Asian context. Yet the question that concerns all of East Asia is how the U.S., with its global military supremacy, would exercise its political rule as a neoimperial power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We must feel safe. We must feel safe not just from the threat of terror, but also from the threat of due process abuse. We must feel safe from the threats of armed terrorists; but also, from the fear that would surely follow if M1-A tanks were parked at our intersections. We want our safety; and we want our freedom. It’s about trust: who, how much, when, and maybe even how. In searching for the answers to these questions, there are certain components we must understand. Only through informed decisions can outcomes succeed. This paper addresses some of the essential elements to consider ? hopefully helping us debate the issues from an informed view point and allowing us to reach consensus in what is surely the greatest challenge of our time. There are four essential elements to consider. They are the 4-Rs: resources, rights, and restrictions resting on a foundation of risk management. We must ensure a delicate balance ? a three-legged stool: one leg representing cost [resources] (dollars, people, equipment, training); one leg representing the due process freedoms [rights]; and the third representing the degree of convenience (or lack thereof) [restrictions] we can live with. The stool must rest on a foundation of risk management: threat assessment, risk assessment, and cost/benefit assessment. We must understand the issues of each to ensure we build a capability that will allow appropriate balance; ensuring the stool does not tip too far in any one direction. As we go through the discussion, these 4-Rs will always run just below the surface; behind the decision. This paper examines these issues in a way applicable throughout the United States, but also within the context of recent efforts undertaken in the state of Alabama. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the Cold War came to an end, UN peacekeeping changed suddenly and dramatically. Traditional principles of peacekeeping were discarded, peacekeeping missions were deployed in the midst of ongoing civil conflicts, and the number of missions doubled in a few short years. While other studies have examined this shift in terms of changing distributions of power, norms and ideas, and the roles of specific UN actors, this paper treats the post-Cold War transformation of peacekeeping as an agenda-setting problem, and employs a garbage can model of organizational choice (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972; Kingdon 1984, Olsen 2001) to analyze it. The garbage can model portrays organizational agenda setting as the contingent byproduct of the coupling of previously disconnected streams of problems and solutions, rather than the result of efficient rational decision making. The model is used to explain how peacekeeping came to be defined, and placed on the UN Security Council’s agenda, as an appropriate solution to problems for which it had previously been considered inappropriate, or not considered at all. The UN fits the defining criteria of organized anarchies, to which the garbage can model can be expected to apply: unclear preferences, opaque organizational processes, and fluid participation. Drawing on Kingdon’s adaptation of the garbage can model, this paper explains changes in peacekeeping as the result of the linking of a solution stream (peacekeeping) to a problem stream (post-Cold War civil conflicts) in the context of a policy window created by the end of the Cold War. Michael Cohen, James March, and Johan Olsen, A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice, Administrative Science Quarterly 17, 1 (March 1972), pp. 1-25. John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternative, and Public Policies (NY: Harper Collins, 1984.) Johan Olsen, Garbage Cans, New Institutionalism, and the Study of Politics, American Political Science Review 95, 1 (March 2001), pp. 191-198. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses an emerging interaction between bilateral and multilateral security arrangements for conflict resolution in Asia since the 1990s by emphasizing the correlation of Asian hegemony management with foreign policy strategies of the US, China and Japan. As protracted conflicts of the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits have threatened regional prosperity and stability, regional security institutions have become an important policy concern in the post-Cold War era. Detecting nascent multilateral institution-building in Asian regional security, this paper asks how and why US-led bilateral alliances interact with multilateral security arrangements such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN-Plus-Three. In order to examine this puzzle, the paper focuses on three points: (1) foreign policy strategies of three countries, (2) domestic interests concerning the feasibility and legitimacy of supplementing bilateralism with multilateralism in Asian security, and (3) impacts of Asian hegemony management on establishing regional security institutions. The paper compares the three countries’ preferences to regional security by focusing on the relationship between bilateralism of the US-led alliances and multilateralism. It then tries to demonstrate that both the dynamics of Asian hegemony management and the policy preferences concerning bilateralism and multilateralism are essential in understanding regional security arrangements in Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the progress of democratic consolidation in Central Europe from the perspective of national security. The paper analyzes the depth of democratic reforms that have already taken place in the various national security institutions of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland and highlights the gains that have been made as well as areas in need of deeper reforms in order to ensure the success of the overall democratic consolidation effort in each case. Special emphasis is placed on examining the interface between the various government agencies that participate in the national security policy making process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been some contestation as to the nature of security and the causes of insecurity in the post cold war era. In the Caribbean region, it is being argued that threats from non-traditional sources have the potential to create security dilemmas that can destabilize the region. This paper analyzes the role of international and regional organizations in Caribbean security issues, using Ralph Bunche’s work with the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission (AACC) as a point of departure. The paper will examine Caribbean economic, social, and military security issues, and explore the need for the creation of new instruments for addressing the security concerns of the region. CARICOM, arguably a successor organization to the AACC, does not possess the necessary institutional and regulatory mechanisms for maintaining regional security, neither is its mandate oriented toward recognizing emerging security threats, from domestic, regional sources and international and transnational phenomena such as migration, drug trafficking and the effects of globalization, which expose the region to more vulnerabilities and create regional and national security dilemmas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper undertakes a reading of the UK government’s recent white paper, Secure Borders, Safe Havens. The aim is to investigate the politics of in/security by comparing it not with the geopolitics of the Cold War but with the politics and discourse of social security. The paper concludes by proposing a concept of ‘domopolitics’ to make sense of the identities and practices present in British immigration debates, but also in the US experience of ‘homeland’ security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many conceptions of global life assume a kind of distinction between the risks confronted by sovereign states in geopolitical relations and those encountered by ‘everyday’ individuals in the course of daily life. This apparent distinction is evident, for example, in stories of ‘globalization’ which ask individuals increasingly to bear a direct form of global risk by participating in global financial markets. This logic of individualized risk is often implicitly or explicitly conceived as separate from the kinds of geopolitical danger/risk assumed by sovereign states in accordance with Westphalian discourses of national security. ..ASA-In contrast, this paper argues that geopolitical danger often is (and for a long time has often been) inseparable from questions of individualized security. To accomplish this task, this paper reviews and analyzes the everyday culture (advertising images, narratives, advice literature) of several ‘popular financial’ initiatives from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This analysis draws upon archival material including the educational, advertising and public information campaigns organized by the New York Stock Exchange. The main point of this cultural analysis of earlier campaigns (which predate neo-liberal concerns with ‘personal finance’) is to underscore the ways in which, across different time periods, programs targeted at individual security have also often been self-consciously framed simultaneoulsy as constructions of geopolitical security. Both historical and contemporary programs of ‘popular finance’ have persistently represented individual and geopolitical security as mutually implicated and constituted. Such a cultural analysis could help provoke more historically-situated analyses of personal financial security and of the connections between conceptions of individualized and geopolitical security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper builds on the paper Disarmament, Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Couterproliferation: In Search of Synergy and Policy Coherence that was presented at the combined International Security Studies Section, ISA, and National Security and Arms Control Section, APSA, meeting at Richmond, VA in October 2002. That initial paper examined the development of the four title policy elements against the emerging international security environment as a foundation from which to examine US Government internal policy, process, and organizational factors for arms control as a policy arena. The follow-on paper proposed here would depart from the same conceptual and process development, but it would examine the external position, emphasis, and priority of the four title elements in US external foreign and security policy and its implementation. The focus here will be on analyzing and critiquing the shift from, for example, nonproliferation to counterproliferation, and from relatively more collective approaches to arms control policy to a more unilateral emphasis. A preliminary outline would be something like the following: Policy Evolution (place, role, and priority in US policy) Disarmament and Arms Control Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation; Bush Administration Policy and Rationale No Place for Disarmament, An end to Arms Control Counterproliferation first, Nonproliferation in a Supporting Role; Policy Relevance and Recommendations; Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Counterproliferation CBW Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Counterproliferation Conventional and Emerging Arms Control Arenas; Crafting and Implementing a Coherent and Synergistic Approach to Arms Control [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As we await a final report from the commission investigating the terrorist attack on the US in September 2001, we know enough now to determine whetehr or not the failure to detect and thwart the surprise was the fault of America’s multi-billion dollar intelligence system or something else. The purpose of this paper will be to evaluate the intelligence activities surrounding 9/11, determine what failed and why, and draw lessons for the future from this extraordinary event. The paper will comment as well on the steps that have already been taken to prevent such surprises in the future and the laws that have been passed to protect national security, perhaps at a great cost to human rights and personal freedoms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Who gains the greater political advantage from new information technologies -- states (and some states more than others?), individuals, firms, or some novel form of organization? States function effectively in part because of their ability to accumulate, process, store, use and monopolize information. The rational-bureaucratic institutions of the modern state are, in essence, vast human-machine information processing devices. As state power is dependent on information and the systems for managing it, a massive shift in the underlying information infrastructure will, logically, have to threaten states, or, construing the question more narrowly, threaten national security. This paper will investigate the nature of that threat. I disaggregate the potential threats to national security into four conceptual categories: specific internal threats to regime survival, specific external threats to regime survival, specific threats to the physical security of citizens, and the general threat to nation-stateness itself. Each of these threats intersects with a different aspect of the new media. The paper lays out the case for considering each of these threats separately and then points towards evidence to help us evaluate the severity of each. My goal is to identify the mechanisms linking possible technological trajectories to particular political outcomes. The most important message, though, is disaggregation itself -- of both information technologies and threats. Although information revolution enthusiasts envision a seamless, ubiquitous digital future, different portions of new information technologies will affect different states differently. The trajectory of technologies themselves are still open to huge amounts of social and political influence, so the kind of national security threat information technology becomes, will be a consequence of the kind of information technology we make. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As more states gain access to orbit, the possibility of deliberate interference, accidents and misperception has increased and now threatens the common interest in the peaceful use of outer space. Only a few states have even a rudimentary tracking capability necessary to operate safely in an increasingly populated environment. Even the United States, upon which the world relies for essential orbital information, has identified reducing the gaps in its space situational awareness as a crucial priority for U.S. space programs?the US network only tracks objects larger than 10 cm (about the size of a baseball), does not provide continuous tracking and cannot determine the cause satellite failures. Although the United States has a strong interest in developing rules of the road for space regarding traffic control and reducing orbital debris creation, the United States has yet to commit to the expanded data sharing that would be necessary for such activities. Some U.S. intelligence agencies fear that cooperation might compromise sensitive national security information. This paper considers proposals to share satellite-tracking information in support of space traffic control and debris mitigation efforts. The paper concludes that expanding cooperative monitoring of activities in outer space to mitigate the risks from increasingly crowed orbital environment and to build confidence would enhance, rather than undermine, U.S. national security interests as well as the common interest in the peaceful use of outer space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how scientific research is conducted under shifting economic and political conditions. Two political trends ? the continuing spread of liberalized markets and the increasing perception of physical insecurity ? have led to changes in the how research is funded and directed, as well as in how the resulting knowledge is owned or controlled. The paper looks at conflicting and complementary interests of the public (the epistemic communities of scientists, the national publics, and a poorly defined global public), firms, and states by examining the case of national security, public, and proprietary interests in the global field of biomedical research. The paper will provide a theoretically informed discussion of power as the capacity to take advantage of research and its results (or to prevent others from taking those advantages). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is diplomacy an art of compromise or enterprise? This is the main challenge towards today’s Chinese foreign policy especially its American policy. The paper argues that the key to this question is how to manage the two basic goals: security and development. During the Iraq war, China focused on development factor more than security one. For the development means oil supply and Iraq market demand; the security factor has three basic meanings of state-power-will. Based on a survey on How Chinese View the Iraq War, one can see that China won the hard power in the short term and lost its soft power in the long term. The paper argues in the second part that from the Iraq war we can see that China considers the U.S. both as opportunities (which focus on America’s investment and export market) and challenges (America’s anti-terrorism campaign makes pressures on China’s strategic security environment) and explores what this means to the future Chinese-American relationship and international politics? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to look at some of the discursive links between security and the eastern enlargement of the European Union and their implications for the renewed emphasis on external borders in Europe and their functions. It argues that it is primarily non-military security concerns that have been important in the context of enlargement, and utilizing the concept of security as a ?speech act? suggests that perceived threats, such as immigration and organized crime, have been securitized. These discourses emanating from the European Union, in combination with non-discursive practices by relevant actors in the security field, have led to the implementation of internal security policies, whose effects are sometimes conflicting with the overall objective of peaceful and stable Europe. One of the outcomes has been a renewed emphasis on the new eastern border of the European Union and its permeability as a potential ?importer? of criminality into the EU. The paper also suggests that the strengthening, and even militarization, of this external border has implications for the political and economic evolution of those left outside the European Union, and possibly for identity formations on both sides of the border. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the form and content of nation-shaping in the US post 9/11. The attacks of 9/11 provide a touchstone for tensions between global integration on the one hand, and nationalist identification and mobilization on the other. In the US, the state has clearly seen its power and centrality fortified as concerns for ‘homeland security’ take center stage. In the process, the nation, or national community, has emerged as a key vehicle for legitimizing the state, and national identity or American nationhood are functioning as a central mechanism for marking boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. The paper draws upon Roxanne Doty’s notion of statecraft to analyze the top-down dimensions of nation-shaping that occur when the American state invokes the nation as a justification for its expanding role in defending political and cultural boundaries. Meanwhile, the politics of American nationhood also filter up as individuals and groups in society use national identity and membership in a national community to secure a rightful place as protected citizens of a hegemonic state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comparing three theoretical approaches to congressional-presidential interplay in foreign policy, this paper argues that the most useful and convincing theoretical explanation of congressional deference to the George W. Bush administration national security policy focuses on three variables: a) Congress?s perception of the existence of a global threat to U.S. national security; b) presidential success in foreign affairs; and c) the presence of an undivided government in Washington (with both Congress and White House controlled by the same party). Of the three variables, a) seems to be the most significant important. Thus, this paper concludes that the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington have created the conditions for a Cold War-like consensus in the United States. The general agreement that international terrorism is a global threat that needs to be fully assessed by the U.S. government reverts back to the Cold War pattern with respect to national security affairs of a dominant presidency and a compliant Congress in U.S. legislative-executive relations. In the near future, Congress may assert its foreign policy powers to a greater degree if the White House experiences difficulties with the global war on terrorism or if the Democratic Party regains control of the Senate and/or the House of Representatives. However, it seems that as long as Congress perceives that U.S. national security is threatened by the ?global and urgent threat? of terrorism, the presidency will be able to concentrate national security powers in its own hands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assesses the current state and future prospects of nuclear arms control. It does so within the context of the current unipolar security environment. Among the questions this paper will consider: Is nuclear arms control possible with a hegemon? With this hegemon? What are the prospects for significant nuclear arms control in the current security environment? Does the framework for analysis match that for conventional arms control? If not, what are core differences in the analytic framework? This paper will also evaluate some potential risks of the current nuclear arms control environment, including political, economic, and military factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the logic of current international politics (power politics)? In my paper, I try to analyze and understand the contemporary logic of international politics  particularly the logic of power politics. I argue that after 911, the world has turned into a power political state of mind, in which securitization seems to be a way of rule. From the perspective of power politics, international order seems to have elements of both an imperial and hierarchic system. The framework for analysis of this paper has three interlinked dimensions and elements. Firstly, the sphere of national security thinking provides the overall setting. The indefinable content of immanent national security explains the origins of securitization, of which forms the second element of the paper. I argue that securitization is both a useful tool for analysis and a way of ruling in existing world politics. With the help of securitization the politics and interests of national security is executed that results in hegemonic order. In the paper, my attempt is to explain why the combination of national security, securitization and hegemonic order constitutes a model, which explains, at least in part, the current logic of world politics . [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the relationship between power and knowledge in the context of the construction of security in Australia. Specifically, it seeks to apply critical theoretical approaches to security to the Australian government’s security discourse regarding asylum-seekers in 2001 and terrorist attacks in 2001 and 2002. It is argued in this paper that perceptions of the provision of security are central to the political legitimacy of states. In particular, specific actions on the part of governments may be enabled by perceptions among their citizens that these actions maintain or further their security. If we accept this point, then the crucial question becomes: how do certain meanings of security come to resonate with particular populations in particular contexts? It is argued here that we can further our understanding of this process through acknowledging relationships between power and knowledge, and specifically the role of governments in creating contexts in which particular meanings of security become resonant. Through applying such an approach to the Australian government’s depiction of asylum-seekers and its response to terrorist attacks in New York and particularly Bali, we can move towards a greater understanding of the ways in which security is constructed and of the relationship between security and political legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the demographic representations of threats in the post Cold War security context. Fears of differential fertility between regions, countries and ethnic groups have long been a focus of U.S. national security interests. Today, these fears center on differences in population growth rates between Israeli Jews and Palestinians, Hindus and Muslims in South Asia, and more generally Islamic countries and the West. Youth bulge theories predict that a high proportion of young males within a country predisposes it toward political violence. In the current war on terror defense and intelligence strategists are pointing toward youth bulges as an instigator of violence, especially in the Middle East. The paper also examines the gendered nature of these strategic doctrines as well as their integration into other international and domestic security models, e.g. environmental conflict theory, the superpredator explanation of juvenile crime, and racial profiling. It analyzes their relationship to migration issues and changing demographic realities such as mortality from the AIDS pandemic, slowing of population growth worldwide, and the gray dawn of population aging in the West. Are there subtle differences in the understanding and articulation of these threats among different political interests, e.g. conservative unilateralists and liberal multilateralists? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States, Globalization and the National Security State The suicidal terrorist attacks of September 11 were an audacious demonstration of how the dark side of globalization could directly impact on the security of the US. According to President Bush, September 11th changed the strategic thinking of the US. But it is evident that a new strategic era actually began with the end of the Cold War. What happened on September 11 is that the intra-state violence of the post-Cold War period finally caught up with the US. This paper will seek to explore whether the Bush administration has really come to terms with a radical change of context in the global security environment. While acknowledging new developments in US thinking about security in the post-Cold War world, this paper argues that a Cold War phenomenon known as the national security state, in which defence and foreign policy interests essentially merged to protect the state from the threat of military force, remains largely intact. Indeed, the ideas of US global primacy and pre-emptive war, adopted by the Bush administration in 2002, have reinvigorated and extended the concept of a US national security state. It will be shown that the impact of globalization on the US worldview has been limited, amongst other things, by America’s sole superpower status, the re-positing of the Republican Party during the 1990s and the traumatic effect of September 11. As a result, President Bush’s America remains an old fashioned partisan great power, rather than a truly global power. And given the US’s enormous structural power in military and economic terms in the post-Cold War world, it could be argued that Mr Bush’s new exceptionalism is becoming a major obstacle to fashioning an international consensus on security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Provisional Title: ‘Theoretical Perspectives on Coalition Warfare.’ (September 11 & the changing nature of IR / the relationship between theory and practice) Theorising coalition warfare to date has failed to provide comprehensive or convincingly definitive explanations for why military coalitions are formed, how common agendas are set, and through what means multinational capabilities are realised. This paper intends to contribute to filling the gaps in our current understanding of the phenomenon. Based upon ongoing doctoral research, it will examine three competing perspectives or ‘images’ of coalition warfare utilising international relations ‘levels of analysis’. It regards the phenomenon at the system, state, and ‘organisational’ levels while concurrently providing structural, procedural and ‘organisational’ explanations for coalition behaviour. In evaluating existing theories pertaining to alliances and exploring alternative explanations it aims to contribute to a more complete interpretation of why and how nations join together in combination against threats and an identification of the factors crucial to optimum coalition performance. The paper will contain a strong empirical base, drawing on thoroughly researched cases of coalition warfare during the Second World War and the 1956 Suez War. It emphasises throughout the importance of working with allies to attain national security goals and the serious consequences that may result from coalition failure. By considering this highly pertinent topic with reference to a post 9/11 environment, it aims to contribute to our wider understanding of the current practice of international affairs and to reappraise IR theories that date from the Cold War to explain politico-military alignments between states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most research on foreign policy decision-making has focused on the interactions that take place between states, largely ignoring the relationship between states and non-state actors. This criticism is not new and there is a growing literature on the role that non-state actors play in affecting state behavior. This work, however, has been mostly concerned with issues pertaining to the field of international political economy, focusing on multinational corporations, transnational advocacy networks, and international regimes. The fields of foreign policy analysis and security studies have given less attention to this subject. Nevertheless, historical examples abound of states? foreign policies being challenged by external, non-state groups who resort to violent methods to achieve their political goals. How to deal with challenges from these violent non-state actors (VNSAs) has become a central issue amongst foreign policy decision-makers. Violent non-state actors pose a particular problem to foreign policy analysis. Most models assume adversarial challenges to a state?s national interests to derive from other states. Violent non-state actors, however, only loosely mirror the characteristics of states. Some VNSAs control territory while others move amorphously, some rely on guerrilla warfare while others resort to acts of terrorism, and some have a recognized political wing capable of negotiating while others do not. This paper explores whether these differences lead to a different type of foreign policy decision-making than the type of decision-making that takes place toward states. It hypothesizes that while decision-makers initially approach foreign policy decisions toward VNSAs and states in a similar manner, the ultimate outcomes are different because of the distinct characteristics that exist between VNSAs and states. This paper uses data from the International Crisis Behavior Project to examine the types of foreign policy behaviors that take place during a foreign policy crisis. Ninety-six cases have been identified in which the actions of a violent non-state actor?whether a revolutionary/ideological group, religious/fundamentalist group, or identity/ethnonationalist group?have challenged the values of a state and heightened the probability of a military confrontation. This data is analyzed to determine the differences and similarities between decisions toward these groups and decisions toward states. The implications of these differences for the field of foreign policy analysis are then discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

PLEASE NOTE: This paper is still undergoing the required prepublication review by the U.S. Department of Defense. Upon completion of that review and clearance for public release, the paper will be posted in its entirety. You may also request a copy of the paper by emailing Dan Gressang at either Daniel.Gressang@dia.mil or Gressang@aol.com. Upon clearance for release from DoD, the paper will be emailed to you. Thank you for your patience. Bringing strategic level and tactical level analysis and prediction together are not easy tasks. Yet it is in strategic and predictive analysis that we need for effective threat recognition and effective homeland defense and security. And it is strategic and predictive analysis which are the least developed and leveraged at all levels of government. Terrorists are hard targets, constantly adapting, constantly changing, constantly threatening us and our interests in a variety of ways. The target ? terrorists ? is here, there, everywhere and nowhere. The threat seems to change daily, certainly with each new attack. Effective preparation demands broad cooperative efforts involving local, state, and national authorities. It demands the incorporation of law enforcement, intelligence, public health, first responder, and policy perspectives. It requires broad consensus on mission, goals, objectives, and processes if it is to be successful. It must, above all else, be dedicated to the predictive, the anticipatory so that threats can be identified before violent acts have a chance to highlight our shortcomings in security. Responding and reacting to terrorism is a necessary practice of government. Effective homeland defense and homeland security, however, revolve around anticipation of those threats and around efforts to disrupt and deter. Disrupting and deterring terrorists while securing the homeland from attack from within or without, in turn, requires the effective cooperation and coordination across jurisdictions, across perspectives, across levels of government. This paper examines one such effort, the Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center, and uses it to draw some operative lessons for building and operating an effective multi-jurisdiction analysis and warning effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper aims to capture the dynamics of contesting security in Southeast Asia and examines how state and non-state actors have responded to the changing nature of its security environment. The paper argues that in spite of structural constraints and problems with conceptual clarity, human security is finding a place in the regional security discourses. Albeit found along the margins of subaltern security discourses, human security is the concept that embodies the security concerns of societies and where the most vulnerable can rearticulate their security in their own terms, without being excluded and alienated. Civil society organizations have been pivotal in framing human security through their transnational linkages and work in human rights and development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper identifies and examines a number of long-term trends reshaping the security environment in the Taiwan Strait in ways that might produce a military conflict. Focusing on long-term trends is a useful analytical approach that highlights the possibility that political leaders may knowingly take risky actions in response to perceptions that adverse trends are eroding their security. Taiwan?s democratic transition and growing sense of a separate Taiwan identity have changed the political considerations governing Taiwan?s policy toward the mainland. China worries about growing pro-independence sentiment in Taiwan, but lacks the political tools to build support for unification. As a result, China has sought to deter movement toward Taiwan independence while developing the military capabilities to deter U.S. intervention in support of Taiwan. China?s goal is to force the United States to choose between continuing its support for Taiwan or sacrificing Chinese cooperation on economic and security issues. The perceived Chinese military threat to Taiwan has caused the United States to increase its support for Taiwan, included increased security cooperation. These trends are gradually undercutting the basis for the ?one China? framework that has served U.S. interests effectively for the past thirty years. The paper examines these long-term trends and assesses their implications for the stability of the security environment in the Taiwan Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do ‘humanitarian’ crises threaten states? I connect the ?humanitarian? impulse of an intervening state to the self-identity and corresponding ontological security interests of states. Through a comparison with the ?traditional? notion of survival-based security, the paper develops ontological security as a more comprehensive, sometimes competing state drive. I also introduce the concept of shame as it relates to the self-identity of states, and discuss how shame can compel a state to change its policy even if the material structures of world politics remain constant. The paper then discusses factors that impede or enable states to achieve ontological security. I then use an ontological security framework to interpret how past foreign policy decisions motivated Western powers to ?reform? their routines to accommodate crises in Kosovo and Liberia, and discuss the costs to using a minimalist approach to ?humanitarian? intervention. The paper concludes with some normative and ontological proposals for the further development of an ontological security research program. I argue that if there are costs to ignoring threats to ontological security, then there are also benefits to ?structuring? routines to battle these threats as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research on unregulated population movements suggests that illegal migration and undocumented migration for labor and other purposes is on the rise in Northeast Asia, and is demanding the attention of regional policy-makers. The last decade has also witnessed an increase in the criminalization of migration in the lucrative form of human trafficking, often related women and girls for prostitution. This paper reviews the scholarly debate on the linkages between security and migration, including how illegal migration has been incorporated into the discussion on traditional and non-traditional security, and human security. The emergence of illegal migration as a security issue in the European Union is discussed before a consideration of whether, and how, illegal migration has been defined as a "security" issue among politicians and policy-makers in Northeast Asia. The so-called Copenhagen School?s framework of "securitization" is discussed in relation to how securitization could be applied to specific cases of illegal migration and unregulated population flows within and from Northeast Asia. Finally, the paper draws some conclusions regarding the implications and lessons for regional cooperation on illegal migration in Northeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Case studies on Clinton Administration national security policymaking are an important area for policy relevant research. During the 1990s, there were various attempts by the Clinton Administration to innovate in national security policymaking. Innovations were attempted in peace operations, the interagency process, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Were the 1990s Clinton policy leadership efforts in stopping the threats of WMD proliferation in North Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq all policy failures that could have been prevented? Could more effective Clinton Administration policy leadership have made US counterproliferation efforts more successful? This paper focuses on the Clinton Administration?s Counterproliferation Policy Initiative in the 1994 North Korean Agreed Framework Case. The case uses coercive diplomacy theory to examine the existence of a theory-practice gap in assessing Clinton Administration top-down leadership in the 1994 North Korean crisis. This paper?s findings suggest a relatively effective linkage of theory and practice, however, the result is a short term rather than long term policy success. Additional case studies are necessary to further assess the effectiveness of Clinton era executive leadership patterns in Counterproliferation Initiative policymaking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After disarming and demobilizing, why do some ex-combatants re-engage in organized violence, while others do not? Even though former fighters have been identified as a major source of insecurity in post-civil war societies due to their military know-how, there have been few efforts to systematically examine this puzzle. This paper fills this research gap by comparing the presence or absence of organized violence in different ex-combatant communities - all the former fighters that used to belong to the same armed faction and who share a common, horizontal identity based on shared war- and peacetime experiences. It does so by analyzing six ex-combatant communities in two countries: ex-Cobra, Cocoye and Ninja in the Republic of Congo and ex-AFRC, CDF and RUF in Sierra Leone. Contrary to assumptions found in the literature on disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating (DDR) ex-combatants, this paper finds that factors such as the availability of small arms and lack of economic opportunities or personal security have little explanatory value in themselves. Instead, ex-combatant violence is rather the result of interaction between entrepreneurs of violence, relationships and intermediaries. It argues, more specifically, that former fighters only take to arms when they have access to entrepreneurs of violence - political, military, religious or business elites who have the will, capacity and ability to coordinate organized violence in a post-conflict setting. By utilizing relationships based on selective incentives and social networks, these actors can generate the enticements and feelings of affinity or trust, needed to convince ex-combatants to resort to arms. However, as entrepreneurs have limited contact with former fighters, they are dependent on the services of intermediaries - such as former mid-level commanders - to do the actual recruitment for them. These findings demonstrate that the hybrid character of many peace processes is a major source of ex-combatant violence; by failing to fully dismantle post-war structures peacemakers provide spoiling elites with the capacity to sponsor new violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the security-development nexus is portrayed as ?obvious? by national governments (e.g., UK, France, Canada) as well as in the discourses of international organizations (e.g., UN, OECD-DAC) and regional organizations (e.g., EU) and by a minority of researchers, the majority of scholars highlight the ambiguity of the security-development nexus as it is subject to multiple interpretations. These deductions raise the following concern: why is the security-development nexus described as ?obvious? in official political discourse(s) when the great majority of scholars emphasize the ambiguity of the security and development link(s)? This paper will argue that behind the ?obvious? security-development political discourse(s), referred to in this paper as ?strategic obviousness?, are hidden ambiguities. On the one hand, these ambiguities are what we call ?causal ambiguities?, that is infinite causal links which can be established between different issues deriving from the security-development nexus and, on the other hand, there are ?strategic ambiguities?, which refers to ambiguities that are used by actors who appropriate the security-development nexus and interpret it in order to serve different interests that are sometimes contradictory and incompatible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The deployment of military forces abroad has been a major component of US grand strategy since the beginning of the Cold War. From providing security to the United States, its interests, and its allies, there are multiple reasons for maintaining forward deployments. It has been from this conict and economic perspective that the Field of international relations has typically approached the issue of military deployments. Beyond the work in political science, others have argued that the presence of American military personnel abroad creates a series of negative externalities that local communities suffer from. In this paper, we put some of these claims to the test by looking at the effect that military deployments have had on crime rates within the host state. More precisely, we examine whether or not US military deployments are significantly asso- ciated with higher levels of criminal activity across a large subset of possible crimes, including theft, physical and sexual assault, and murder. To that end, we employ cross-national crime statistics from the United Nations as well as recently collected data on US troop deployments to examine the impact that a US military presence has on a host country. Consequently, this paper contributes to a greater understanding of the impact that US military deployments, and US foreign policy more broadly, have had on other countries. By extension, this study will also enhance our understanding of the micro-level factors that might affect relationships between alliance partners by examining the roots of domestic opposition to a foreign military presence within a host country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper discusses and analyzes European security from the perspective of Eastern Europe. The main argument is that in the region the EU is faced and has to deal with three different paradigms of European security simultaneously: cooperation, competition and conflict. The problem and challenge for the EU is that as a consensual winwin actor it is not equally or necessarily at all well prepared to play all of them. The paper introduces the main policies and instruments the EU has developed for the region and discusses the main developments/operations the EU has undertaken. The paper ends with some conclusions pondering the relative weight the three paradigms can be expected to have as well as discussing the role of the EU in the region in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the next twenty years, two trends will have a major impact on global governance: China's rise as a military power and the ability of regional multilateral institutions to effectively address disputes. In Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is attempting to build a security community but various internal and external challenges serve as an impediment to resolving the most complex issues. One clear example of the intersection of China's rise and the ability of multilateral organizations to impact regional security is the territorial dispute in the South China Sea. Therefore, this paper will examine the intersection of these two trends by focusing on prospects for dispute resolution between China and ASEAN. The paper will outline the various dialogue mechanisms between China and ASEAN and discuss the efficacy of those mechanisms for resolving disputes in the South China Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The poliheurisitic theory of foreign policy decision-making would benefit from being clearer in spelling out the conditions under which it holds more or less analytic promise. The paper makes the case that the concept of issue salience can help the theory address its shortcomings in this respect. In particular, the explanatory power of poliheuristic theory's two-stage model largely depends on the non-compensatory principle of major domestic political loss avoidance on the first stage of the model to simplify the choice set to be considered on the second stage. This is more likely to happen, however, in the case of issues that are highly salient to a government's selectorate than in the case of issues that are of low salience in the domestic arena. The poliheuristic theory should thus be more powerful if it is applied to domestic high-salience rather than low-salience decisions. These theoretical contentions are illustrated in a case study on the decision-making of the British Labour government under Tony Blair in the fields of European security and defence policy and the single European currency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The African Union was established in 2002 to promote peace, security and stability on the African continent. Since then the AU has launched military operations to help regulate conflicts in Burundi, Sudan, Somalia and the Comoros. This paper evaluates the first of these endeavours: the African Mission in Burundi in 2003-2004. The purpose of this analysis is to explore the AU's nascent approach to peacekeeping and to investigate the relationship between the Union's aspiration, experience and prospects to provide 'African solutions to African problems' in the security realm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The assumption that the balance of material costs and benefits of nuclear armament for Japan is sensitive to small changes in the scope and credibility of U.S. extended deterrence supports the current role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security and military strategy. This paper scrutinizes this assumption in terms of a constraint that is especially difficult to change: what kind of deterrent strategy can Japan implement against nuclear weapon states? I start with pessimistic assumptions about the need for an independent nuclear deterrent, and optimistic assumptions about the feasibility of building nuclear weapons, both of which are crucial for prediction and advocacy of nuclear armament. The first set of assumptions, in which the United States no longer extends deterrence, and China values victory in nuclear war against Japan, rules out a small force de frappe for Japan. Instead, Japan will need a large retaliatory force, even with an asymmetric counter-recovery strategy against energy resources, transportation, and sea power. This deterrent is not likely to become operational without a decade of investment. In short, a claim that a small nuclear deterrent is necessary and sufficient for Japan contradicts itself. Japan needs either a large nuclear deterrent, or none of its own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes Russia's recent efforts to provide Venezuela with a nuclear reactor and its implications for U.S. security policy. The Russo-Venezuelan nuclear program's intent was declared and signed into effect in November 2008, the first working group session took place in 2009, and it all culminated in the most recent agreement on October 15, 2010 to officially go ahead and start building a nuclear reactor in Venezuela. This is significant since it will be the first Russian nuclear reactor built in Latin America. It, most likely, is a harbinger and many more Russian nuclear reactors will be coming to not only Venezuela but to all of Latin America. This paper argues that future Latin American purchases of Russian nuclear reactors may seriously undermine the principle of the Monroe Doctrine, particularly since the customers will most likely have to rely on Russia for future enriched-uranium, expertise, and maintenance (usually, all are incorporated into a nuclear energy contract). Moreover, with the nuclear energy deal Russia has made recently many economic and military agreements with Venezuela worth billions of dollars. The benefits of a nuclear energy agreement can go well beyond the contract itself, particularly given the great value of nuclear energy and the very select number of suppliers. Nuclear energy deals, thus, can improve a country's chances at the very least of winning in many other competitive economic situations. In the end, with Latin America's ongoing rapid economic development and growing need for energy resources, a heavy reliance on Russian nuclear reactors could represent a major change in Latin American politics and, likely, a serious decline in American power in the region. It also may lead to the possibility that the enriched uranium may go from nuclear energy to nuclear weapons at anytime in the future and, thereby, fundamentally altering the balance of power in the hemisphere. Overall, this paper contends that the U.S. must do much better in defining the Monroe Doctrine and, then, competing more effectively with other countries seeking to penetrate the region through nuclear energy deals and other major agreements. The paper concludes with recommendations on how the U.S. can respond to this recent nuclear reactor deal and the potential effects on the Monroe Doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Obama Administration's national security strategy after the Iraq War is turning toward Northeast Asia, where are rising variable challenges to screw up regional security environment in danger. Even though Japan has conducted its main taskforce as the U.S. military headquarter in Asia since World War II, it recently required equal balance to upgrade its position in the military relations with the U.S. Japan's challenge has motivated the U.S. seriously rethinks its fundamental military strategy in Northeast Asia. In addition, the sinking of a South Korean warship by North Korea would revive China and Russia's military strategy to support North Korea in a very suspicious gesture whether North Korea actually attacked. It might be another symptom that China and Russia exploit this case to consider military expansion and take military actions to challenge the U.S. They criticize military drills and reinforcement between South Korea and the U.S. which will increase regional tension. North Korea even declares "Sacred War" in a reckless response signing additional provocations and China shows military strength with naval exercises off its eastern coast ahead of the U.S. drills with South Korea. Therefore, this paper investigates national security strategy of the U.S. how the Obama Administration should set up new military security line in Northeast Asia and rebuild the relationship with major powers based on regional security. It analyzes each step with detailed methodologies and offers effective strategy that the Obama Administration can take it in policy making process in advance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In fields as different as homeland security/emergency management and environmental conservation, there has been much discussion of the need for governance systems that are "resilient". Characteristics of resilient systems include flexibility, adaptability, diversity, redundancy, a mixture of formal and informal institutions, and robustness. Resilient systems are now frequently advocated to handle complex global problems that require the interaction of states, international organizations, and non-state actors. In this paper we consider how the concept of resilience can link to contemporary global governance thought and efforts. Given recent scholarship on institutional design, change, adaptation, and replacement, it seems that there is much interest in developing better ways to examine how international regimes are designed to address complex global problems. Surprisingly, however, the concept of resilience has not been used often in the IR field even as it is prominent elsewhere. We contend that resilience is a useful tool for studying contemporary global governance. This paper will clarify what is meant by resilience, link this meaning with current conceptual understandings of global governance, and demonstrate the utility of incorporating the insights of resilience into a better understanding of how global policy issues are managed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the Cold War Nordic cooperation blossomed and Nordic identity was strong but defence was left outside of the Nordic framework. After the end of the Cold War, Nordic cooperation waned and it was largely replaced by cooperation within the EU framework. During the past couple of years, however, the Nordic defence cooperation has been boosted by a number of initiatives and common projects. The paper tries to analyse this recent rise of Nordic defence cooperation. Theoretically the article revolves around the question of how material and identity factors explain security cooperation in today's Europe. During the Cold War it was easy to explain that identity was important in low politics cooperation between the Nordic countries but geostrategic factors and national interests based upon them determined (the lack of) defence cooperation. Even today, Nordic defence cooperation is justified more by costefficiency and geographical proximity than by common identity. The argument of the paper is that Nordic identity nevertheless plays an important role in motivating defence cooperation. It is not driven by pure cost-efficiency or strategic calculation. The role of identity needs however to be understood not as a kind of independent force but as part of the political process. Nordic identity explains the rise of Nordic defence cooperation in three ways: it facilitates informal cooperation between defence officials at various levels, it is easy to sell it politically to domestic audiences and it is not seen as contradicting European or NATO cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research that taps into the biological basis of human cognitive potential has been active in the past decade. Outside of academia, multiple US government agencies, particularly the ones in security communities, also have rising interests in the research and development of cognitive neuroscience applications. In light of this, certain questions need to be investigated: why are the security communities interested in the research of cognitive sciences? What kinds of potential benefits and problems do the research and application of cognitive sciences bring? How do discoveries in cognitive science and neuroscience research relate to the way that human behaviors are theorized in politics and war? The advances in cognitive sciences and their security applications present complex problems, yet the definition of these problems continues to remain ambiguous. This paper explores the ways through which the emerging research and security applications in the cognitive sciences impact how one theorizes about politics and war. Particularly, by emphasizing the "human" element of armed conflicts, this paper shows that certain discoveries in cognitive sciences present potential challenges to some existing assumptions made about combatants in terms of human costs, soldier's morale, and cognitive autonomy. It is suggested that these assumptions have limited scope and utility in light of today's scientific progress and may need further consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, China has been under frequent attacks by nature. Due to high population, low economic development, wide climate range and vulnerable environment, China would adopt appropriate adaptive and reduction actions according to the basic situation of the country and under the framework of sustainable development. the PRC government released its first policy report on climate change in June 2007, China's National Plan for Climate Change. In 2008 and 2009, China followed up with the release of a white paper titled China's Policies and Actions on Climate Change, which points out that "as a responsible developing country, China is fully aware of the importance and urgency of addressing climate change and has adopted a series of policies and measures in this regard." This essay addresses China's policy responses towards climate change. This paper discusses China's policy response to climate change. The discussion begins with the influences of climate change on China's environment and then moves on to discuss China's concern, guiding principle, goal and policy action in reaction to the issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]