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The purpose for this research paper is to investigate the reasons behind the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) initiation of democratization in Taiwan in using the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) of Mexico as comparison. The KMT should be consider as one of the rare hegemonic ruling party in the world to survive democratic transitions intact, even though the nature and structures of the party have been changed tremendously through democratization. The PRI possess the same qualities. However, the reasons for initiating liberalization of the two parties were somewhat different. Ultimately, four explanatory factors (two internal, two external) emerged as the main contributors to the democratization process in Taiwan. They are: first, the development of Taiwanese identity different from that of the Chinese; second, the political demands and activism of a growing middle class due to the economic success; third, the changes in United States foreign policy towards the encouragement of democratization; and fourth and most importantly, the competition with China for support and the recognition from the international community and the need for the Taiwanese government to enhance its appeal to international supporters, particularly the United States. In addition, while the four factors mentioned above all contributed to the KMT-led democratization in Taiwan, the influence of the United State’s foreign policy in the Fast East and its support of democratic states should be considered the most significant factor contributing to the democratization in Taiwan. In sum, the hypothesis proposed by this research paper is that the accumulation and interaction of all four factors made democratization in Taiwan and the end of the KMT one-party dominance inevitable, with the external pressure from the U.S. essentially playing the most significant role in impelling the KMT elites’ decision to liberalize, adopt electoral reform and stop the persecution of the opposition. The theoretical approaches of the paper are as the following: this paper will adopt the definition of “democracy” provided by Linz and Stepan (1978) to serve as guidelines for whether there is democracy in both Taiwan and Mexico. The definition from Linz states that the criteria of democracy are: “ [The] legal freedom to formulate and advocate political alternatives with the concomitant rights to free association, free speech, and other basic freedoms of person; free and nonviolent competition among leaders with periodic validation of their claim to rule; inclusion of all effective political offices in the democratic process; and provision for the participation of all members of the political community. Practically, this means the freedom to create political parties and to conduct free and honest elections at regular intervals without excluding any effective political office from direct or indirect electoral accountability” (Linz, 5). The paper will also posit that Lipset’s take on modernization theory (1959) holds valid in the case of Taiwan. The economic success in the 1970s and 1980s created a large, well-organized middle class that in turn demanded more political freedom, equality and liberalization. In addition, the paper also addresses Linz and Diamond’s (1989) claim that the genesis and maintenance of democracy is ‘greatly facilitated by values and behavioral dispositions, particularly at the elite level, of compromise, flexibility, tolerance, conciliation, moderation and restraint” (Linz, 12). The methodology use by the paper will be comparative analysis on both the KMT and the PRI’s initiation to liberalize. The paper will also provide historical analysis on the nature of the KMT and its 50-year dominance on Taiwan. Lastly, the paper analyzes voter turn-outs and the results of the 2000 presidential election, which validated the consolidation of democracy in both Taiwan and Mexico. Maybe it is because of the geographic distance; Taiwan and Mexico are not often compared and studied together. Even though there are great differences between the KMT and PRI authoritarian regime, the end result of democratization and the eventual ousting of both parties from power were the same. The paper hopes to shed light on the reasons behind an elite-led liberalization by comparing two difference cases with the same end results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite numerous studies having discussed whether and how electoral institutions affect voters voting behaviors, the conclusions diverse. To tackle this question, the 2004 electoral reform in Taiwan provides a natural experiment. By applying structural equation modeling techniques to panel data from the 2004-2008 Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study (TEDS) survey, I investigate whether and how the change in electoral institutions affect voters’ decisions. The statistical analysis supports conventional wisdoms and demonstrates that in contrast with single non-transferable vote (SNTV) and proportional representation (PR) systems, single member district (SMD) systems make voters identifying with minor parties become more likely to desert their favorite parties and to strategically vote for major parties. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan has increased its vote share in the past three legislative elections. Nevertheless, the 2004 and 2008 elections were widely viewed as major defeats for the party. Through an analysis of the DPP's performance in recent Legislative Yuan elections, this article considers the effects of electoral rules on election outcomes and the perception of those outcomes. In Taiwan, under both the previous Single Non-transferable Vote (SNTV) and the current Mixed Member Majoritarian (MMM) systems, the mechanical effect of how electoral rules translate votes into seats and the psychological impact this has on voter and party behavior have often dramatically influenced party electoral performance by causing vote and seat shares to diverge. This divergence also affects the perception of party electoral performance by causing outcomes not to meet expectations. In addition, this article analyzes the effects of recent changes to the electoral system in Taiwan and whether these changes structurally disadvantage the DPP. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The political attitudes held by the people of Taiwan can be explained by the unemployment rate and people visiting from both sides in this study. Only unilateral national identity can be explained by socioeconomic and cultural factors in this study. The theme of this research is to use quantitative regression analysis to interpret the causes of Taiwan people's political attitudes toward China since 1994. The main five variables used step by step in this research are emotional (national identity), political (political party identification), economical (economic growth rates), social (unemployment rates), and cultural (the amounts of people visiting from both sides) characteristics. The research is designed by three models: the first model tests the socioeconomic and cultural variables' relations with political attitudes, the second model tests the socioeconomic and cultural variables' relations with national identity, and the third model tests the above five main variables and its relations with political attitudes or national identities. The main contribution of this research uses socioeconomic and cultural indicators to observe changing attitudes in Taiwan over the past ten years. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates how party organization might enhance the durability of a single-paper regime overtime. Drawing from Angelo Panebianco's organizational theory, it argues that extent of party institutionalization influences the internal cohesion and stability of a party. Based on an in-depth study of the Kuomintang Party (KMT)'s party organization and recruitment patterns in Taiwan, this paper explains how an authoritarian-hegemonic regime under Chiang Ching-Kuo (1975-1986) transformed into a predominant party regime under Lee Teng-hui (1986-2000) and eventually gave way to competitive, liberal democratic regime in 2000. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some democratization studies suggest that former hegemonic/authoritarian parties should decline and/or whither away once a nation makes the transition toward democracy. Both Mexico and Taiwan made the transition to democracy and, in 2000, former hegemonic political parties in Mexico (PRI) and Taiwan (KMT) lost national power after ruling for several decades. Despite these historic losses, both remain strong political parties in their respective nations. In this paper, we look at hegemonic party reform in Mexico and Taiwan. We begin to examine how these former hegemonic parties have adapted to the new circumstances facing them and explore the variables/mechanisms that have allowed them to remain strong. Both the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) and the Kuomintang (KMT) have always displayed a degree of flexibility, even in the heyday of their hegemony. During the democratic transition period (1980s/1990s), the pace of internal party reform increased in both parties. The reform process became more intensive after 2000. Reforms and/or changes we examine include: how these parties have adapted to losing the national president as the defacto party leader; reforms that change the mechanism for selection of party leaders and candidates for public office; the changing status of sub-national party units; reforms that attempt to bring new members into the party or change the status and/or rules relating to party members; and reforms that result in changes in party ideology. Electoral loss appears to be a key factor that has driven party reform. It does not appear, however, that simply losing elections is the only variable that has led to change. In some circumstances it also seems as if these parties enact reform in order to prevent losing before it occurs, akin to taking “preventive medicine.” Initial indicators are that reform generally helps these former hegemonic parties in the electoral arena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is electoral government spending distinct between pre- and post-democratization periods? A large literature suggests that allocations are structurally different: generally, total spending and civilian distributions increase following democratization while the military’s share of the budget decreases. Further, these trends are pronounced in election years. However, a smaller set of studies point out that governments in less-democratic countries also respond strategically to constituency demands. Curiously, few studies compare pre- and post-democratization spending. This paper fills the gap with data from South Korea and Taiwan. Three findings are useful: First, it establishes strategic constituency responsiveness prior to democratization. Second, it reveals the strategic use of electoral spending following democratization to develop one branch of the government â€" the executiveâ€" that penalizes legislative parties. Third, the result of such strategic spending is an increase in the number of parties in the legislature. This result suggests that party fragmentation may enhance rather than jeopardize democratic performance. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzing roll call votes in the Taiwanese legislature, this paper both develops a new approach for measuring party pressure and simultaneously estimates party effects and ideological preferences. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks at how parties in the Taiwanese legislature get bills to the floor while ensuring their content accords with party goals. If committee members demand a heavy price in the normal review process, parties can opt for alternative paths. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan?s weakly-institutionalized party system can be attributed to the short period of time of competition, the personalization of campaigns and intra-party factionalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In democracies with candidate-centered electoral systems, legislators must balance the demands of the more general and ideological interests represented by political parties against the demands of more the parochial and particular interests of their constituents. .x000d..x000d.I model legislators as agents of two principals, their parties and their constituents. Each of these principals can sanction the legislator, aiding or damaging her prospects for re-election. In a multiple principals framework, the challenge for the agent is to maximize positive sanctions net of negative sanctions..x000d..x000d.In systems with mixed electoral systems, we should see this tension play out differently for legislators elected under different tiers. For legislators elected from the party list, party and constituent interests will be almost perfectly aligned and will need very little cover. District legislators, however, will experience a greater tension. .x000d..x000d.I examine this logic in Taiwan. Drawing on a research design employed in several other countries, I test whether party cohesion among list or district legislators. I use an extended beta binomial model to analyze all roll call votes from February 1993 to January 2008. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using time series data on Taiwan's legislative elections and the new Taiwan Election and Democratization Study 2005 election survey data set, this study examines the continuity in trends as well as the changing features in Taiwan's party system. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]