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During the complex learning process that occurred between 1979 and 1987, elites confronted anomalies in the long-term revolutionary development paradigm, which sought to establish a strong independent China by achieving three interrelated goals: security, prosperity, and self-reliance. Based on the perceived success of the SEZs and the nascent coastal development strategy, elites reached a consensus over replacing the long-term goal of self-reliance with a state-managed embrace of the international economy. The concept of self-reliance thus became obsolete as elites were no longer tethered to the Nativist beliefs of Mao Zedong and had incrementally learned of the limitations of import substitution. This paper hypothesizes that by 1987, Chinese elites agreed that China should join the rest of the East Asian economies in formally adopting outwardly oriented development regime, which regarded foreign capital, technology, and markets as tools to empower China. Elites thus initiated the GATT accession process, established the fifth special economic zone on Hainan, and announced the coastal development strategy. A new generation of technocratic elites would take over the country’s leadership to institute the new technocratic regime. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China has grown economically it has gained in world influence and military power as well. Some realist IR theorists believe that rising powers in general - and China in particular - pose serious dangers of conflict with the older great powers they seek to join or displace. Other scholars see China as acting cautiously and responsibly, like a status-quo-power. Neo-liberal theorists tend to believe that China can be integrated into a peaceful world system and constrained by a web of normative and legal obligations. Chinese leaders themselves speak of seeking a "harmonious world" and disclaim any intention to threaten anyone. What does the American public think about the rise of China as a world power? In this paper we use a variety of data collected by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and others to explore the nature and causes of Americans' views.It turns out that most Americans are well aware of the rise of China. Some are apprehensive about that rise, chiefly for national security (rather than economic) reasons, and many favor a degree of off-shore "balancing" of the sort that realists recommend. But few Americans want to actively work to limit the rise of China. Very few favor the use of troops to defend Taiwan. Very few favor a nuclear-armed Japan. Large majorities of Americans take stands more akin to those of neo-liberal than realist theorists, favoring cooperation and peaceful engagement with China. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper summarizes preliminary findings of a sectoral empirical case study that explores the impacts of contemporary globalization on national security. The case focuses on the Taiwanese semiconductor industry migration to China, as part of the continuous globalization of the chip sector, and the extent to which such a globalization process, under certain conditions, may pose security challenges to the United States, Taiwan and China. The paper is composed of four sections. The introductory section explains why it matters to adopt a sectoral approach to the study of globalization's impacts on security and why it matters to focus on the chip industry in the proposed study. The section further defines key concepts of globalization and security as used in the paper, identifies inadequacies in the existing literature, and highlights the significance of the proposed research undertakings. The second section explains rationale behind the methodological choice for the study, and summarizes strategies used to ensure interview access, data representativeness and data reliability. Using evidence collected in more than 140 in-depth interviews with a wide range of chip industry, defense sector and government insiders in the US and Asia, as well as English-language and Chinese-language secondary data, the next two sections dissect the empirical data in two major areas: the sectoral migration and the security implications. On sectoral migration, it is argued that the scope of the migration is extensive, the direction complicated, the cause multiple, and the outcome significant in boosting the indigenous Chinese chip industry development. The ways in which non-state actors of Taiwanese firms and individuals have violated government regulations in order to migrate to China are also identified. As for the ensuing technological and defense security ramifications, it is argued that there is no immediate security risk involved; long-term security challenges, however, may emerge taking into account two intervening factors. They involve the technological change in the sector concerning spin-on prevalence and dual-use nature of the chip technology, as well as the PRC grand strategy behind its resolve to establish a solid indigenous chip industry. These long-term security challenges are chiefly linked with three conduits of influence: the defense industrial base and the PLA modernization, technological security risks, and the dubious export control policy implementations. The concluding section argues how and why empirical findings presented in the previous sections deepen our understanding of globalization's impacts on security as far as the agency and scope of security, the autonomy and capacity of the state, as well as the balance of power are concerned. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]