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This research paper seeks to examine the importance of the 2008 Olympic Games in regards to China's foreign policy options and subsequent future behavior, with particular emphasis placed on the Taiwan issue. The primary question addressed by this paper is whether or not China will use the 2008 Olympic Games as a means of demonstrating a responsible power identity. This paper asserts three hypotheses. First, China could forgo any gains to be made by hosting the Olympic Games and take defensive-oriented action against Taiwan as a means of protecting important national interests. Second, China could use the games as a propaganda tool and take offensive-action against Taiwan as a means of pursuing an expansionist agenda. Lastly, China could choose to take no action and use the Games to demonstrate a responsible power identity. These hypotheses are tested through three historical case studies: the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan and the 1980 Moscow Games; the 1936 Berlin Games and the aggressive German expansion that began shortly thereafter; and the 1964 Tokyo Games and the 1988 Seoul Games in that both Japan and South Korea used the Games to build identities. This paper finds that although the third hypothesis is most preferable, certain factors might push China towards selecting an option closer to hypothesis one. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On March 22, 2008, Taiwan elected a new President hence not only its domestic politics but also its relations with China have entered into a new phase. Taiwan's new President Ma Ying-jeou suggested and proposed a series of political standing points and views which are quite different with those of former President Chen Shui-bian. Compared with Chen, Ma expresses more open views on many issues, particularly on his cross-strait policy. For instance, he re-started the cross-strait negotiations which had been stopped for several years under the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and Chen Shui-bian's rule. Taiwan therefore signed many historical agreements with China. Ma Ying-jeou suggests having more controllable and stable cross-strait relations under the insistence of Taiwan's sovereignty. However, although the cross-strait relations seem to progress towards a more positive direction, there are still some points that need to be clarified and investigated. The most outstanding point is China's attitudes to Taiwan; that is to say, China apparently separates political issues from economic ones. Therefore, this paper attempts to investigate cross-strait relations by means of examining their contacts and exchanges on trade, governmental, social and security issues. That is, the author wants to examine whether Ma's policies have changed the cross-strait relations and the prospects of cross-strait relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Military threat was intensively used by China during Taiwan's presidential elections but is widely argued as counterproductive because it didn't prevent pro-independence candidates from winning the elections. To explain the logic of China's military threat and outcomes of the elections, this paper develops a formal framework in which China and the incumbent party has better information about the state of the world than voters and non-incumbent party. China's threat is interpreted as a way to transfer information to voters. Although she doesn't prevent the pro-independence party from being elected, China successfully prevents the winning party from declaring formal Taiwanese independence. In this way, China is always better off by issuing threats. In general, this paper not only attempts to improve our understanding of Taiwan Straight confrontation but also tries to shed new insight on the study of military threat in International Relations. It also offers a concrete game theoretic model to illustrate Putnam's two-level game metaphor. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan Strait is one of the few explosive spots in today's world that has the potential to trigger military confrontations between two major powers (the People's Republic of China and the United States). Since the leader of Taiwan is determined to seek Taiwan's formal independence, which cannot be accepted by the PRC, many scholars warn that a Taiwan Strait War will break out in the foreseeable future. Other observers argue that the PRC will not risk a war over Taiwan because it can hardly afford the economic cost of such a war. What are the possible consequences of a future Taiwan Strait War? This article examines the impact of war on the PRC through the history of three major Sino- wars that occurred after the establishment of the PRC. I also look back to the Tiananmen Square Incident to see the international reactions and its damage of a quasi civil war. Although history indicates that war does not necessarily impede the development of China in the long run, the consequences of a Taiwan Strait War will be more serious because of the uniqueness of the Taiwan issue as well as the highly interdependence between the PRC, Taiwan, and the rest of the world. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research employs historical institutional analysis to explore the absence of formal diplomatic relations between Beijing and the Holy See. By examining the perceived priorities from the two primary leaders of this diplomatic dance, I present the public narrative involved in the potential opening of formal recognition. Beyond the official transcript, however, this research also explores the roles of other interested parties, including the underground Chinese Catholic Church, the Taiwan-based Chinese Regional Bishops' Conference, and interested Catholics around the world. The relationship between the world's largest and smallest state is important beyond the exchange of papal nuncios and missions - its likely impacts will be felt by Chinese Catholics (estimated between 10-15 million, of which 8 million are likely "underground"); Taiwanese Catholics (estimated 300,000); and other groups seeking free religious expression and collective voices beyond religiosity.This bilateral relationship provides both unique factors as well as comparative insights. A distinctive aspect of this case study is the zero-sum nature of the Vatican's recognition of Beijing: should this switch indeed occur, the Holy See would relinquish its diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China on Taiwan, a move it appears prepared to take. Comparatively, the case of Beijing's relationship with the Vatican can best be understood by other cases in which diplomacy, internal affairs and religious freedom coincide, including the Vatican's relationship with the Republic of Cuba, and the seemingly imminent recognition between the Holy See and Socialist Republic of Vietnam. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]