In democracies with candidate-centered electoral systems, legislators must balance the demands of the more general and ideological interests represented by political parties against the demands of more the parochial and particular interests of their constituents. .x000d..x000d.I model legislators as agents of two principals, their parties and their constituents. Each of these principals can sanction the legislator, aiding or damaging her prospects for re-election. In a multiple principals framework, the challenge for the agent is to maximize positive sanctions net of negative sanctions..x000d..x000d.In systems with mixed electoral systems, we should see this tension play out differently for legislators elected under different tiers. For legislators elected from the party list, party and constituent interests will be almost perfectly aligned and will need very little cover. District legislators, however, will experience a greater tension. .x000d..x000d.I examine this logic in Taiwan. Drawing on a research design employed in several other countries, I test whether party cohesion among list or district legislators. I use an extended beta binomial model to analyze all roll call votes from February 1993 to January 2008. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]