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In recent year, there have been significant developments in the peace and stability in cross-Strait relations, which is critical to the international relations in East Asia. In addition, the interaction among mainland China, US, and Taiwan is increasing as they are becoming more active in regional multilateral institutions. This situation raises the puzzle that whether institutions, economic interdependence can facilitate peace and stability among China, Taiwan and the United States. If the answer is yes, what are these causal mechanisms? Liberal theories of international relations emphasize the role of international institutions on fostering cooperation by reducing obstacles. such as uncertainty and transaction costs.. that stand in the way of mutually beneficial agreements between states. In addition, they also hold that interdependence decreases the incentives for conflict and war because states become reluctant to disrupt or jeopardize the welfare benefits of open economic exchange. This paper unifies these theoretical insights to explore the role of economic interdependence, institutions on the stability and cooperation between mainland China, Taiwan, and the U.S. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tries to look at the interactions between the U.S., Taiwan, and China in the period of 1987-1997. It will test two hypotheses that explain conflicts and cooperation between two regional rival states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely recognized that Taiwan was the most conflictual issue in U.S.-P.R.C relations both in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras (Ross, 1995). How the dynamics of the “strategic triangle” consisting of the U.S., Mainland China and Taiwan to be understood? How is the U.S. “strategic ambiguity” policy to be explained? Neorealists may argue that there was a tacit agreement between Beijing and Washington that so long as cooperation was imperative, the status quo in U.S.-Taiwan relations was temporarily acceptable. Revisionists such as Robert S. Ross, however, hold a more sophisticated view that even in the midst of cooperation, the ongoing conflict required continuous negotiations and mutual adjustment between the U.S. and P.R.C. (Ross, 1995). Nevertheless, few study, if any, have provided theoretical answers to the questions that under what conditions the equilibrium of status quo holds, how the U.S. commitment to defending Taiwan will affect the equilibrium outcomes of the game, and how the so-called strategic ambiguity policy is to be explained? By developing a game theoretic model, this paper will provide theoretical answers to those unresolved questions, drawing out both theoretical and policy implications. A historical examination of the interactions between the U.S., Mainland China, and Taiwan since the Korea War will be done to further illustrate the model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]