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Poor disease awareness (‘anosognosia’) is often observed in patients with various disabilities caused by brain damage. The lack of disease awareness can be due to the disruption of specific cognitive mechanisms and the development of psychodynamic mechanisms of denial. The aim of this paper is to review how these phenomena were discovered and evolved over time and to consider the relationships between them and the right hemisphere dominance for emotions. It is not clear whether the term ‘anosognosia’ refers to a basic mechanism that can explain similar awareness defects in different behavioural domains or whether it must be viewed as a multifaceted phenomenon in which both the disruption of cognitive or sensorimotor mechanisms and the emergence of motivational factors can play different roles in various forms of disease unawareness and in different kinds of ‘anosognosic’ patients. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tingling is a bodily sensation experienced under a variety of conditions from everyday experiences to experimental and therapeutic situations. It can be induced by both peripheral or afferent (external stimulation, peripheral pathology) and higher cognitive (expectation) processes. The paper summarizes the current scientific knowledge on the neurophysiological and psychological concomitants of the tingling sensation. Four possible models are identified and presented: the afferent, the attention-disclosed, the attention-evoked, and the efferent model. Of these, only the attention-disclosed model, i.e., attention discloses the sensation by opening the gate for suppressed sensory information, appears to be able to explain every aspect of the tingling phenomenon. Terminological issues and the possible role of the tingling phenomenon in medically unexplained symptoms, nocebo and placebo reactions, and body-oriented therapeutic interventions are also discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ransom, Fazelpour, and Mole (this journal - 2017) raise an important puzzle for the ‘prediction error minimization’ account of cognitive processing. That account depicts all cognitive processing as fundamentally in the business of minimizing prediction errors concerning the evolving flow of sensory information. One of the cornerstones of these highly ambitious, would-be unifying accounts is their depiction of attention as nothing other than the process of optimizing the precision (inverse variance) of critical prediction error signals. But that story, Ransom et al. suggest, cannot accommodate voluntary shifts of attention. In this paper, I show why this challenge to the grand unifying project fails. It fails because it locates the origins of voluntary attention in complexes of unanalyzed desire rather than in changing complexes of beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A body of research suggests compromise of autobiographical memory in Korsakoff’s syndrome (KS). The present paper extends this literature by investigating the subjective experience of autobiographical recall in the syndrome. Patients with KS and controls were asked to retrieve autobiographical memories. After memory retrieval, participants were asked to rate phenomenological characteristics of their memories (i.e., reliving, back in time, remembering, realness, visual imagery, auditory imagery, language, emotion, rehearsal, importance, spatial recall and temporal recall). Analysis showed lower “Mean Phenomenological Experience” in the Korsakoff patients than in controls. However, the Korsakoff patients attributed relatively high emotional value and importance to their memories. Although our findings suggest compromised phenomenological reliving of autobiographical memory in patients with KS, affective characteristics such as emotion and importance are likely to play a main role in the subjective experience of the past in these patients. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper revisits the debate about cognitive phenomenology. It elaborates, defends, and improves on our earlier proposal for resolving that debate, according to which the test for irreducible phenomenology is the presence of explanatory gaps. After showing how proposals like ours have been misunderstood or misused by others, we deploy our operationalization to argue that the correct way to align the debate over cognitive phenomenology is not between sensory and (alleged) cognitive phenomenology, but rather between non-conceptual and (alleged) conceptual or propositional phenomenology. In doing so we defend three varieties of non-sensory (amodal) 1 Note that the term “amodal” admits of two quite different uses in cognitive science. One (the one we intend) refers to processes or representations that are neither sensory-specific nor multi-sensory (or “multi-modal”) in nature. We assume throughout that concepts are amodal in this sense. The other use is the one that figures in the phrase “amodal completion” in vision science. This refers to the construction by low-level visual processes of an imaginary boundary of a partially-occluded object. The contrasting sort of completion – “modal completion” – refers to the construction of an imaginary boundary of the presumed occluding object. Both are exemplified in the famous Kanizsa triangles. Moreover, both are modality-specific (specific to the visual system) in our intended sense of “modal”. 1 non-conceptual phenomenology: valence, a sense of approximate number, and a sense of elapsed time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]