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Poor disease awareness (‘anosognosia’) is often observed in patients with various disabilities caused by brain damage. The lack of disease awareness can be due to the disruption of specific cognitive mechanisms and the development of psychodynamic mechanisms of denial. The aim of this paper is to review how these phenomena were discovered and evolved over time and to consider the relationships between them and the right hemisphere dominance for emotions. It is not clear whether the term ‘anosognosia’ refers to a basic mechanism that can explain similar awareness defects in different behavioural domains or whether it must be viewed as a multifaceted phenomenon in which both the disruption of cognitive or sensorimotor mechanisms and the emergence of motivational factors can play different roles in various forms of disease unawareness and in different kinds of ‘anosognosic’ patients. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tingling is a bodily sensation experienced under a variety of conditions from everyday experiences to experimental and therapeutic situations. It can be induced by both peripheral or afferent (external stimulation, peripheral pathology) and higher cognitive (expectation) processes. The paper summarizes the current scientific knowledge on the neurophysiological and psychological concomitants of the tingling sensation. Four possible models are identified and presented: the afferent, the attention-disclosed, the attention-evoked, and the efferent model. Of these, only the attention-disclosed model, i.e., attention discloses the sensation by opening the gate for suppressed sensory information, appears to be able to explain every aspect of the tingling phenomenon. Terminological issues and the possible role of the tingling phenomenon in medically unexplained symptoms, nocebo and placebo reactions, and body-oriented therapeutic interventions are also discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ransom, Fazelpour, and Mole (this journal - 2017) raise an important puzzle for the ‘prediction error minimization’ account of cognitive processing. That account depicts all cognitive processing as fundamentally in the business of minimizing prediction errors concerning the evolving flow of sensory information. One of the cornerstones of these highly ambitious, would-be unifying accounts is their depiction of attention as nothing other than the process of optimizing the precision (inverse variance) of critical prediction error signals. But that story, Ransom et al. suggest, cannot accommodate voluntary shifts of attention. In this paper, I show why this challenge to the grand unifying project fails. It fails because it locates the origins of voluntary attention in complexes of unanalyzed desire rather than in changing complexes of beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A body of research suggests compromise of autobiographical memory in Korsakoff’s syndrome (KS). The present paper extends this literature by investigating the subjective experience of autobiographical recall in the syndrome. Patients with KS and controls were asked to retrieve autobiographical memories. After memory retrieval, participants were asked to rate phenomenological characteristics of their memories (i.e., reliving, back in time, remembering, realness, visual imagery, auditory imagery, language, emotion, rehearsal, importance, spatial recall and temporal recall). Analysis showed lower “Mean Phenomenological Experience” in the Korsakoff patients than in controls. However, the Korsakoff patients attributed relatively high emotional value and importance to their memories. Although our findings suggest compromised phenomenological reliving of autobiographical memory in patients with KS, affective characteristics such as emotion and importance are likely to play a main role in the subjective experience of the past in these patients. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper revisits the debate about cognitive phenomenology. It elaborates, defends, and improves on our earlier proposal for resolving that debate, according to which the test for irreducible phenomenology is the presence of explanatory gaps. After showing how proposals like ours have been misunderstood or misused by others, we deploy our operationalization to argue that the correct way to align the debate over cognitive phenomenology is not between sensory and (alleged) cognitive phenomenology, but rather between non-conceptual and (alleged) conceptual or propositional phenomenology. In doing so we defend three varieties of non-sensory (amodal) 1 Note that the term “amodal” admits of two quite different uses in cognitive science. One (the one we intend) refers to processes or representations that are neither sensory-specific nor multi-sensory (or “multi-modal”) in nature. We assume throughout that concepts are amodal in this sense. The other use is the one that figures in the phrase “amodal completion” in vision science. This refers to the construction by low-level visual processes of an imaginary boundary of a partially-occluded object. The contrasting sort of completion – “modal completion” – refers to the construction of an imaginary boundary of the presumed occluding object. Both are exemplified in the famous Kanizsa triangles. Moreover, both are modality-specific (specific to the visual system) in our intended sense of “modal”. 1 non-conceptual phenomenology: valence, a sense of approximate number, and a sense of elapsed time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper analyzes the regularities referred to via the concept ‘self.’ This is important, for cognitive science traditionally models the self as a cognitive mediator between perceptual inputs and behavioral outputs. This leads to the assertion that the self causes action. Recent findings in social psychology indicate this is not the case and, as a consequence, certain cognitive scientists model the self as being epiphenomenal. In contrast, the present paper proposes an alternative approach (i.e., the event-control approach) that is based on recently discovered regularities between perception and action. Specifically, these regularities indicate that perception and action planning utilize common neural resources. This leads to a coupling of perception, planning, and action in which the first two constitute aspects of a single system (i.e., the distal-event system) that is able to pre-specify and detect distal events. This distal-event system is then coupled with action (i.e., effector-control systems) in a constraining, as opposed to ‘causal’ manner. This model has implications for how we conceptualize the manner in which one infers the intentions of another, anticipates the intentions of another, and possibly even experiences another. In conclusion, it is argued that it may be possible to map the concept ‘self’ onto the regularities referred to in the event-control model, not in order to reify ‘the self’ as a causal mechanism, but to demonstrate its status as a useful concept that refers to regularities that are part of the natural order. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The mirror neuron system is widely held to provide direct access to the motor goals of others. This paper critically investigates this idea, focusing on the so-called ‘intentional worry’. I explore two answers to the intentional worry: first that the worry is premised on too limited an understanding of mirror neuron behaviour (Sections 2 and 3), second that the appeal made to mirror neurons can be refined in such a way as to avoid the worry (Section 4). I argue that the first response requires an account of the mechanism by which small-scale gestures are supposedly mapped to larger chains of actions but that none of the extant accounts of this mechanism are plausible. Section 4 then briefly examines refinements of the mirror neuron-mindreading hypothesis which avoid the intentional worry. I conclude that these refinements may well be plausible but that they undermine many of the claims standardly made for mirror neurons. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Highlights: [•] This paper critically examines whether infant data provide support for the mirror neuron theory of action understanding. [•] It proposes alternative interpretations of the infant data. [•] Situates the infant data within an alternative framework in which the motor system is involved in action prediction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: What are mirror systems good for? Several suggestions have been made in response to this question, addressing the putative functions of mirror systems in minds and brains. This paper examines possible contributions of mirror systems to the emergence of subjectivity. At the heart of the discussion is the notion of social mirroring, which has a long tradition in social philosophy and social anthropology. Taking the existence of mirror devices in minds and brains for granted, I argue that social mirroring is a prerequisite for the constitution of mental selves, and, hence, the emergence of subjectivity. However, the fact that self and subjectivity are socially created should not be taken to indicate that they are illusory. They are as real as natural facts are. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Fechner remains virtually unknown for his psychological research on the unconscious. However, he was one of the most prominent theorists of unconscious cognition of the 19th century, in the context of the rise of scientific investigations on the unconscious in German psychology. In line with the models previously developed by Leibniz and Herbart, Fechner proposes an explanative system of unconscious phenomena based on a modular conception of the mind and on the idea of a functional dissociation between representational and attentional activity. For Fechner, the unconscious is a state of consciousness resulting from the isolation of representational activity from the rest of psychical life. Unconscious mental phenomena are unattended mental states that behave autonomously while remaining able to act on consciousness. This paper aims to revisit Fechner’s contribution to the history of the unconscious, but also the theoretical significance of the Fechnerian unconscious vis-à-vis current research on the cognitive unconscious. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The extended mind thesis (EM) asserts that some cognitive processes are (partially) composed of actions consisting of the manipulation and exploitation of environmental structures. Might some processes at the root of social cognition have a similarly extended structure? In this paper, I argue that social cognition is fundamentally an interactive form of space management—the negotiation and management of “we-space”—and that some of the expressive actions involved in the negotiation and management of we-space (gesture, touch, facial and whole-body expressions) drive basic processes of interpersonal understanding and thus do genuine social-cognitive work. Social interaction is a kind of extended social cognition, driven and at least partially constituted by environmental (non-neural) scaffolding. Challenging the Theory of Mind paradigm, I draw upon research from gesture studies, developmental psychology, and work on Moebius Syndrome to support this thesis. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The paper argues that Zahavi’s defence of the self as an experiential dimension, i.e. “identified with the first-person givenness of experiential phenomena”, and of the notion of a pre-reflective minimal core self relies on an unwarranted assumption. It is assumed that awareness of the phenomenal mode of experiences of objects, i.e. what the object “feels” like for the experiencer, is comparable with, indeed entails, first-person givenness of experience. In consequence both the arguments concerning the foundational role of the pre-reflective minimal core self and the explanation of the unity and identity of the self through time give rise to intractable problems. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Based on structural differences between spoken and written language, the purpose of this paper was to investigate whether spoken and written communication imply a different representation in reporting an experienced dream. In fact, the clausal-dynamic quality of the former and nominal-synoptic quality of the latter, with the consequent differences in length, cohesion and density, could enhance/reduce the perceptual character and narrative structure of report features often considered in order to assess sleep mentation. In particular, we wondered whether, after eliminating all the elements responsible for the more conspicuous quantitative differences across the two forms (false starts, repetitions, digressions, redundancies), we would obtain two equivalent ways of reporting dreams. Three hundred and two (101 males and 201 females) subjects, raging in age from 18 to 40 years, participated as volunteers in the study and were asked to complete a dream diary daily for 14 days, by tape-recording their own dreams and putting them down in writing. The reports were analyzed by a psycholinguistic system. Results indicated that the report modality is able to affect the dream experience representation, conditioning the figurative (re)translation carried out by the tester: written forms show a loss of hallucinatory information and a non-complete correspondence also of the bizarreness features with respect to the spoken texts. Partialling out for length eliminated any difference between spoken and written dream reports on bizarreness; on the other hand, controlling the sequence effect of the report did not introduce changes. Methodological and theoretical implications were discussed. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: This paper contributes an analysis and formalisation of Damasio’s theory on core consciousness. Three important concepts in this theory are ‘emotion’, ‘feeling’ and ‘feeling a feeling’ (or core consciousness). In particular, a simulation model is described of the dynamics of basic mechanisms leading via emotion and feeling to core consciousness, and dynamic properties are formally specified that hold for these dynamics at a more global level. These properties have been automatically checked for the simulation model. Moreover, a formal analysis is made of relevant notions of representation used by Damasio. As part of this analysis, specifications of representation relations have been verified and confirmed against the simulation model. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: According to the majority of the textbooks, the history of modern, scientific psychology can be tidily encapsulated in the following three stages. Scientific psychology began with a commitment to the study of mind, but based on the method of introspection. Watson rejected introspectionism as both unreliable and effete, and redefined psychology, instead, as the science of behaviour. The cognitive revolution, in turn, replaced the mind as the subject of study, and rejected both behaviourism and a reliance on introspection. This paper argues that all three stages of this history are largely mythical. Introspectionism was never a dominant movement within modern psychology, and the method of introspection never went away. Furthermore, this version of psychology’s history obscures some deep conceptual problems, not least surrounding the modern conception of “behaviour,” that continues to make the scientific study of consciousness seem so weird. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Whoever paid the bill at the restaurant last night, will clearly remember doing it. Independently from the type of action, it is a common experience that being the agent provides a special strength to our memories. Even if it is generally agreed that personal memories (episodic memory) rely on separate neural substrates with respect to general knowledge (semantic memory), little is known on the nature of the link between memory and the sense of agency. In the present paper, we review results from two experiments investigating the effects of agency on both explicit and implicit memory traces. Performance of normal subjects is compared to that of schizophrenic patients in order to explore the role of awareness of action on memory. It is proposed that reliable first-person information is necessary to create a stable and coherent motor memory trace. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]