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Traditionally disability has been viewed in the popular imagination as either a highly positive or highly negative phenomenon. Disability and disabled people deserve to be seen in an integrated, holistic way and to have recognised as much diversity as characterises the human condition. The recent case of Oscar Pistorius fatally shooting Reeva Steenkamp has highlighted this tendency. Before this incident, Pistorius’ disability was viewed in a predominantly positive light. He had been described as a ‘supercrip’ who had, despite his physical impairments, ‘overcome’ his mobility limitations and was consequently attributed heroic status by some. However, after this fatal incident, the portrayal of Pistorius’ disability has, perhaps inevitably, shifted. This paper will offer possible psychosocial reasons for this tendency to view disability in a binary way. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

We live in a world of vast social differences. People of different ages, cultures, religions, gender and sexual orientation have, and indeed are expected to have, distinct differences in their behaviour, and in the way that they see the world. Asperger’s syndrome (AS) is no different. People with AS have different personality types and have different perceptions of the world. Yet medical conceptualisations of AS have led to it being viewed as a deficit, a ‘pervasive developmental disorder’ that should be diagnosed and treated to allow the person to function in ‘normal’ society. Research has focused on finding neurological and genetic ‘abnormalities’ to explain what is in fact a complex pattern of behaviour, no different from the behavioural differences between any social group. This paper attempts to provide a critical review of the literature behind medical conceptualisations of AS, and will seek to find a new conceptualisation, drawing on recent criticisms of its medicalisation, to shift the barriers to view AS, not as a medical condition but as a social difference that should be accepted, not reduced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We welcome Forshaw's reply to our paper because it opens up debate about psychology and its relationship with the development of an emancipatory disability studies. In our paper we aimed to: (1) raise possibilities for disability studies researchers' engagement with psychology (rather than psychology colonizing disability studies); (2) trace some of the epistemological journeys we underwent in carrying out disability research and community psychology research; (3) consider these possibilities and journeys in relation to previous literature on emancipatory disability research. Forshaw's reply appears to ignore aims (2) and (3) and instead focuses on the ways in which we (mis)represent psychology. He suggests that we: present an inaccurate account of qualitative research in contemporary psychology; make a divisive argument for a 'breakaway group' of community psychologists; epistemologically contradict ourselves because of our concern with 'reality' and social constructionism; argue for only adopting participatory action research; not least, adopt 'simplistic' and 'outdated' views of psychology. We will respond to these criticisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]