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Whilst the Covid-19 pandemic affects all European countries, the ways in which these countries are prepared for the health and subsequent economic crisis varies considerably. Financial solidarity within the European Union (EU) could mitigate some of these inequalities but depends upon the support of the citizens of individual member states for such policies. This paper studies attitudes of the Austrian population – a net-contributor to the European budget – towards financial solidarity using two waves of the Austrian Corona Panel Project collected in May and June 2020. We find that individuals (i) who are less likely to consider the Covid-19 pandemic as a national economic threat, (ii) who believe that Austria benefits from supporting other countries, and (iii) who prefer the crisis to be organized more centrally at EU-level show higher support for European financial solidarity. Using fixed effects models, we further show that perceiving economic threats and preferring central crisis management also explain attitude dynamics within individuals over time. We conclude that cost–benefit perceptions are important determinants for individual support of European financial solidarity during the Covid-19 pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As 'Eurobarometer' surveys indicate, European populations are increasingly sceptical about further EU enlargement, especially as far as Turkey is concerned. Austria's rejection of negotiations with Turkey has been remarkable. While the Austrian government has been in line with European council resolutions, policy makers of different parties have reiterated their claim for alternatives to full membership for Turkey. Furthermore, opinion polls have shown that the Austrian population's refusal of Turkey is above EU average. Embedded in the popular arguments why Turkey should stay outside the EU, we find what Ralf Grillo has called 'cultural anxiety': essentialist views of 'our' and 'their' culture cause fears about a fast growing and predominantly Muslim population that would flow into EU labour markets and threaten 'us', in particular 'our' democracy, equality and human rights. Against this backdrop my interest will neither be focused on a further analysis of whether Turkey is sufficiently prepared for EU accession nor on the European Union's absorption capacity. In this paper I will rather focus on the emergence of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic cultural practices of selfing and othering in order to better understand the extensive refusal of Turkey's EU accession in Austria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]