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The multi-UAV network is promising to extend conventional networks by providing broader coverage, and better reliability. Nevertheless, the broadcast nature of wireless signals, and the broader coverage expose multi-UAV communications to the threats of passive eavesdroppers. Recent studies mainly focus on securing a single legitimate link, or communications between a UAV, and multiple ground users in one/two-UAV-aided networks, while the physical layer secrecy analysis for hierarchical multi-UAV networks is underexplored. In this paper, we investigate a general two-tier UAV network consisting of multiple UAV transmitters (UTs), and multiple UAV receivers (URs) in the presence of multiple UAV eavesdroppers (UEs). To protect all legitimate UT-UR links against UEs at the physical layer, we design a two-stage framework consisting of a UT-UR association stage, and a cooperative transmission stage. Specifically, we formulate the secure transmission problem into a many-to-one matching game followed by an overlapping coalition formation (OCF) game, taking into account the limited capabilities, and the throughput requirements of URs, as well as the transmission power constraints of UTs. A matching algorithm, and an OCF algorithm are proposed to solve these two sequential games whose convergences, and stabilities are guaranteed theoretically. Simulation results show the superiority of our algorithms, and the effectiveness of our two-stage game framework in the terms of secrecy performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we study the distributed precoding problem for simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) in decode-and-forward (DF)-based multiple-input–multiple-output (MIMO) relay networks. The system model considered here consists of a source, a relay, an information decoding (ID) receiver, and an energy harvesting (EH) receiver, all mounted with multiple antennas. Since full channel state information (CSI) is usually unavailable, a practical scenario, where only local CSI is required, is considered in this paper. Such a practical scenario naturally constitutes a noncooperative game, where the source and the relay can be regarded as two rational game players. With properly designed utilities, it can be further shown that the existence and uniqueness of the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) of the proposed game can both be guaranteed under some mild conditions. Therefore, a distributed iterative precoding algorithm can be developed based on the best-response dynamic to obtain the unique NE solution for the proposed game. Moreover, a proximal-point-based regularization approach is also pursued to ensure the convergence of the proposed algorithm without requiring special restrictions on the channel ranks. Numerical simulations are also provided to demonstrate the proposed algorithm. Results show that our algorithm can converge quickly to a satisfactory solution with guaranteed convergence. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Caching in wireless device-to-device (D2D) networks can bring contents closer to users and reduce backhaul traffic. However, the major obstacle to realize cache-enabled D2D communications is the selfish nature of users. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism for pricing the contributions of D2D transmitters in cache-enabled D2D-underlaid cellular networks modeled by stochastic geometry. A Stackelberg game is employed to resolve the conflict of interests between the operator and D2D transmitters. The main objective of this game is to reach the Stackelberg equilibrium, in which both the operator and D2D transmitters achieve the maximum profit by designing the optimal incentive price and the optimal caching strategy. We show the existence of the equilibrium and propose a low-complexity algorithm to obtain the near-optimal caching strategy and incentive price. Numerical results verify the existence of the SE and the advantages of the proposed scheme in terms of the utilities for the operator and D2D transmitters over existing caching schemes with fixed incentive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rapidly growing mobile traffic calls for higher quality of service (QoS) and lower on-grid energy cost. Integrating energy harvesting to small-cell networks (SCNs) with caching has been regarded as a promising solution. However, considering the limited resources of the small-cell base stations (SBSs), how to cache contents and serve the mobile users (MUs) is a crucial problem. In this paper, we jointly design a green content caching and mobile user–base station (MU-BS) association mechanism in the SCNs, where the number of MUs’ content requests served by the SBSs is maximized. This mechanism maximizes the number of requests handled by the SBSs under the constraints of the available energy and backhaul capacity of the SBSs, while concurrently ensures the QoS of the MUs. First, the joint optimization problem is formulated, which is NP-hard. To decrease the complexity of the problem, we divide it into two subproblems: MU-BS association and content caching. But when the number of SBSs is large, these two subproblems cannot be efficiently solved by the conventional centralized approaches. Thus, we construct a two-dimensional-action weakly acyclic game to optimize these two subproblems distributedly and iteratively, in which the existence of the two-dimensional-action Nash equilibrium has been proved. Finally, we propose a two-dimensional iteration algorithm to solve the problem. The simulation results show that the proposed algorithm can achieve better performance when compared with the other existing algorithms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent advances in loop interference cancelation techniques enable full-duplex relaying (FDR) systems, which transmit and receive simultaneously in the same band with high spectrum efficiency. Meanwhile, wireless virtualization has attracted a lot of attention from both academia and industry because it can provide more flexibility, diversity, and other benefits in the process of wireless network design, construction, operation, and management. In this paper, we introduce the idea of wireless virtualization into FDR cellular networks. Then, the problem of energy-aware virtual resource management is formulated as a three-stage Stackelberg game. The subgame perfect equilibrium for each stage is analyzed. In addition, the interplays of the three-stage game are discussed, and an iterative algorithm is proposed to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium solution. Simulation results are presented to show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]