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Migrant housing investments in the countries of origin are a demonstration of their transnational engagement and their potential contribution to local development. Yet, these investments remain relatively understudied on a large scale. In this paper, we explore three related questions on the drivers, prevalence, and development of transnational housing, drawing on an original survey of Ecuadorian and Indian migrants in different European cities. First, what factors account for the likelihood of migrants owning a remittance house? Second, for those migrants without houses abroad, what factors account for the likelihood of aspiring to have a remittance house in the first place, as opposed to "not being interested"? Third, how do factors affecting the likelihood of owning a remittance house compare to those affecting the likelihood of being a remittance house dreamer? Our findings suggest that, among those without a remittance house, the likelihood of being a transnational house dreamer decreases with the length of residence abroad, while the length of stay has no statistically significant impact on the likelihood of transnational house ownership. We also find that migrants with greater economic capacity are less likely to be dreamers and more likely to be transnational house-owners, suggesting that the difference between being a transnational house-dreamer and a transnational house-owner is often financial. Finally, greater attachment to the country of origin increases the likelihood of being both a transnational house owner and a transnational dreamer. We also discuss how the results change across migrant groups and across genders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we study the question of who and what drives forced migration governance in origin, host, and transit states, drawing on empirical material from the contemporary Syrian and Libyan, and the historical Algerian displacement situations. These three cases are examples for different forced migration governance approaches, ranging from open-supportive (Algeria), to restrictive-selective (Syria) and laissez-faire (Libya). We identify three key drivers of forced migration governance to explain variation in governance outcome: domestic, geopolitical, and international-normative drivers. We understand forced migration governance as a state-making strategy for different state and non-state actors in origin, transit, and host countries. We argue that while forced migration governance is negotiated around humanitarian principles in which international organizations and civil society play a crucial role, the international-normative driver remains strongly bound to domestic and geopolitical logics. Political and economic interests are key factors of forced migration governance in host countries, especially if they align with political interests and state-making strategies of state and non-state actors in origin countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inspired by the emerging literature on transnationalism in the United States, this paper studies the return visits of adolescent children of immigrants in four European countries. Using data from the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study, cross-classified multilevel analyses indicate that parental economic resources, ethnic motivations, and political suppression are related to adolescent children of immigrants' return visits. Furthermore, return visits are positively related to adolescents' identification with the origin country and negatively to adolescents' identification with the host country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]