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Clinical work, as all of consciousness, is steeped in and emerges out of language. Language is the medium of our knowing, and knowing the medium of our relating. Language has us; words dream us. For the mythical Navajo as for John of the New Testament, in the Beginning was the Word. Before any kind of distinction of thought, feeling, sensation or intuition comes language - language, not as 'just words', but as image. Words are images, and images as encompassing worlds present themselves as and through language. As a determinant of identity, language undermines all cues as to individual subjectivity, Yahweh's 'I am here' rendering time and place relative, and subjectivity co-constituted. This paper is a meditation on language for clinicians in the form that language presents itself, as a meandering flow of consciousness with associations and signposts leading onward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a historical, religious-philosophical context for the study of the Daoist text known as The Secret of the Golden Flower. An updated study is conducted into the controversy over the source of the text including the editions translated by Richard Wilhelm and Thomas Cleary. The main teachings of the text and the basics of two major denominations of Daoism are introduced to ground later critiques of Jung's commentary. The psychodynamics of analytical psychology, especially those concerned with integration of unconscious contents and the realization of the self (individuation) are compared with the psycho-spiritual dynamics of integration in Eastern spirituality based on the Golden Flower text. The paper concludes that it was amiss for Jung to have equated the Western ‘unconscious’ with states of higher consciousness in Eastern meditation practices, although his claim that Eastern higher consciousness is characterized by a nebulous state of non-intentionality does raise questions about the appropriateness of calling Eastern meditative states ‘consciousness’. A new concept is required to characterize the special qualities of this psychic state shared generally by Eastern spiritual traditions and a more meaningful comparison may be found in Jung's concept of the self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks at some of the processes that are at work in finding oneself in analysis. It explores Jung's unique contribution to our thinking about the self and its dynamic of individuation. The author attempts to show how the Self, in its quest for consciousness, requires the surrendering of ego inflation—the narcissistic delusion that the ego is the self. A case is made for seeing analysis as an individuation process which offers the opportunity for experiences of a more authentic sense of oneself. Jung stated that individuation requires the ego to enter into service of the Self. For this to happen, the author argues that both patient and analyst must be prepared to make sacrifices and take risks. Using clinical examples, he illustrates that, although purposive, the Self can be experienced as violent and destructive if the ego is unable to facilitate its expression. This may result in an individuation crisis for both analyst and patient. The paper demonstrates how impasse in analysis can evoke the transcendent function, which also requires sacrifices to be made and risks to be taken for analysis to proceed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is focused on the kinds of awareness that are exposed by clinical work conducted in the depth psychological tradition. The paper begins with an examination of Freud's clinical methodology, which is a description of a particular kind of attentiveness that reveals material normally obscured from conscious awareness. This type of awareness is thought to reveal the contents and the specific organizational features of the unconscious. In this paper, the organizational processes of the unconscious are interpreted to actually be the referents of a privileged type of perceptual awareness leading to a unique relationship to the immediate world. This is taken to be an assumption that is implicit in the models of psychotherapy authored by Jung and Reich. Both developmental and clinical researches are used to support this position. The differentiation between this awareness and the more traditional modes of awareness is further highlighted by an examination of the phenomenon of transference. Finally, a clinical example is presented to support the theoretical claims in the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author designates as 'traditional' those elements of psychoanalytic presumption and practice that have, in the wake of Fordham's legacy, helped to inform analytical psychology and expand our capacity to integrate the shadow. It is argued that this element of the broad spectrum of Jungian practice is in danger of erosion by the underlying assumptions of the relational approach, which is fast becoming the new establishment. If the maps of the traditional landscape of symbolic reference (primal scene, Oedipus et al.) are disregarded, analysts are left with only their own self-appointed authority with which to orientate themselves. This self-centric epistemological basis of the relationalists leads to a revision of 'analytic attitude' that may be therapeutic but is not essentially analytic. This theme is linked to the perennial challenge of balancing differentiation and merger and traced back, through Chasseguet-Smirgel, to its roots in Genesis. An endeavour is made to illustrate this within the Journal convention of clinically based discussion through a commentary on Colman's (2013) avowedly relational treatment of the case material presented in his recent Journal paper 'Reflections on knowledge and experience' and through an assessment of Jessica Benjamin's (2004) relational critique of Ron Britton's (1989) transference embodied approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper 1 takes the distinction between being conscious (‘core consciousness’) and knowing that one is conscious (self-reflexive consciousness) as a starting point for differentiating between three different aspects of the self: 1) the overall process of psychosomatic being which we share with all living creatures and which expresses itself through action (self as totality), 2) the conscious awareness of knowing the self that is a peculiarly human phenomenon consequent on the development of symbolic imagination (sense of self including numinous experiences of the self) and 3) having a self (or soul) as an essential attribute of being human that can only be achieved through being endowed with a self in the mind of others (self-identity leading to the self as the centre of the personality). Some clinical implications of these distinctions are considered including the role of interpretation as fostering integration through the provision of alternative self-images, the loss of self-reflexive consciousness in states of overwhelming affect and the attack on the spontaneous psychosomatic being of the self in states of self-hatred and self-division. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper 1 explores some aspects of the narrowness of Jung's usage of the term ego and the consequences which are understood to follow there from. Jung is understood to see the ego as a surface phenomenon and, essentially, as the focal point of consciousness, not recognizing its potential to function more broadly, deeply, and unconsciously. Furthermore, although he does recognize the ego as ‘the total conscious personality’ his use of the term frequently does not reflect that definition. Whilst Jung's analysis of the narrowly functioning ego is enlightening and groundbreaking, he treats this narrow functioning as if it is characteristic of the ego itself, ascribing any ‘broad functioning’ primarily to the Self. This narrow use of the term ego, and the corresponding use of the term Self, are understood to have significant consequences for clinical practice, including leading the analyst into an over-identification with the patient and a loss of the analyst's sense of self. It is also understood to lead to difficulties dealing with more disturbed individuals, to stuck and broken down analyses, to wear and tear on the analyst and, potentially, splits between the different schools of analytical psychology. These concerns all represent difficulties with working in the transference, and Jung's own experience of this is briefly explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]