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This paper presents an energy-sharing market coupled with carbon emission trading to quantify peer-to-peer energy-sharing markets' economic and environmental influences. We establish a bi-level peer-to-peer energy sharing market considering the interaction between energy prosumers and the system operator. An interaction algorithm and generalized Nash game are thus applied in this work. With the simulation results, we find that the daily disutility of provincial systems is reduced by about 7 ¥ when time-of-use electricity rates are applied. This pricing strategy can encourage prosumers to participate in energy-sharing transactions. The subsidies of electricity rates, carbon prices, and renewable energy investments can improve the social welfare of the whole system. Considering the development of power generation technology and emission reduction targets, the change of optimization parameters in the next 30 years is analyzed in the example. It can be concluded that the total CO2 emission in 2050 will be reduced to almost half of that in 2020 in the energy-sharing markets. The subsidy of renewable energy generation and stricter CO2 emission constraints may accelerate the reduction of carbon emissions. [Display omitted] • It is the first time to assess the environmental effect of peer-to-peer energy trading with actual data. • We analyze the peer-to-peer energy trading impacts on the carbon emission amount in China. • We compare the market participants' revenue and CO2 emission considering the different scenarios. • We develop a bi-level coupled emission right trading market to verify whether total emission is reduced. • The development of technologies and various energy structures are considered quantitatively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emission trading scheme (ETS) is considered as a tool to reduce emissions at a low cost, which can effectively promote the carbon peak and carbon neutrality. As the main participants in the carbon emission trading (CET) market, the behavior and strategies for governments and different types of enterprises affect the final emission reduction performance. Taking the national carbon market as an example, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model including governments and power generation enterprises with different emission reduction capacity to analyze the possible game situations in the development process of the CET market. The results show that with the development of the CET market, the governments and power generation enterprises will have different game results. In order to achieve the optimal stable equilibrium and maximize carbon emission reduction, governments should improve regulatory efficiency and formulate appropriate incentive strategies for excess emission reduction and punishment strategies for insufficient emission reduction. In addition, the initial willingness will not affect the final strategy choice of the three parties. Reasonable free carbon quota ratio, lower technology emission reduction cost and higher carbon price can stimulate the enthusiasm of governments and enterprises to reduce emissions. The above results provide a reference for coordinating the relationships between governments and power generation enterprises with different emission reduction capacity in the construction of the CET market in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]