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We present a formal model that analyzes the trade-offs between environmental policy and economic growth in a developing economy. The adoption of restrictive environmental policies limits the use of abundant fossil energy resources, which may slow down economic development and thus violate the Right-to-Development. If faster economic growth allows a country to grow out of pollution sooner, less stringent policies are good for growth and even for the environment, having adopted a long-term horizon. Accounting for a ceiling on cumulative emissions can reinforce the argument by providing an additional rationale to phase out pollution. One assumption is crucial for the argument to hold: polluting fossil energy is an essential input over the early phase of economic development, but not in the later phases. Such a discontinuity could result from structural change. We provide empirical evidence for the plausibility of a discontinuity in the elasticity of carbon dioxide emissions with respect to aggregate output, using cross country data, even if it does not appear to be as strong as assumed in the model economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the influence of industrial lobbying on national climate policies and the formation of an international environmental agreement if the coalition countries use border carbon adjustments to protect domestic producers. We find that the effects of this political influence crucially depend on the distribution of carbon tax revenues. If these are transferred to the households, lobbying distorts carbon taxes downwards to reduce the tax burden and does not affect coalition sizes. This leads to higher emissions and lower welfare. By contrast, if tax revenues are given back to the firms, lobbies in the outsider countries favor carbon taxes, whereas lobbies in the coalition countries favor carbon subsidies to raise the international commodity price. This reduces the tax difference and the welfare difference between the countries, which reduces the free-rider incentives. Then, lobbying stabilizes the grand coalition and reduces global emissions compared to a "perfect" world without lobbying if the political influence is sufficiently strong. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) provides a market mechanism to mitigate carbon emissions and has been introduced in many countries. Its fundamental idea is to make carbon emissions costly. Consequently, firms undertaking cross-border expansions may have to consider this extra cost when entering markets with an ETS. They may avoid these countries or relocate their investment to countries without an ETS. Using a large sample of international firms between 2002 and 2019, we investigate this issue via a difference-in-difference approach. Our results show that ETS implementation leads to significantly less cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) deals in the host countries, indicating an avoidance effect or potential carbon leakage. Further analysis reveals that ETS implementation decreases firms' financial performance and increases market risks, both contributing to cross-border M&A decisions. We demonstrate strong evidence of cross-sectoral differences, where carbon-intensive sectors tend to bear higher costs. This study contributes to the environmental economics and finance literature and provides evidence with policy relevance. • This paper explores the effects of Emission Trading Schemes on cross-border M&As. • ETS implementation is associated with a significant reduction in cross-border M&As. • The introduction of ETS can lead to lower financial performance of the acquiring firms. • Climate policy can significantly influence firms' strategic investment decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we assess the effectiveness of early climate policy in emerging economies by causally evaluating the impact of China's Low-carbon City Pilot (LCCP) on city-level per-capita CO 2 emissions and CO 2 intensity of GDP over the period 2003–2017. The idiosyncrasies of the policy design pose significant challenges for causal identification, which we overcome within a synthetic control framework. Contrary to previous contributions, our results suggest that the LCCP had no significant impact on either carbon emissions or intensity. The main takeaway of our empirical investigation is that even in emerging economies, effective environmental policy requires transparent, quantifiable targets, and credible enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]