Search

"The world has enough for both of us" has come to be a regular refrain of Chinese and Indian leaders. Even academic commentaries sometimes use this argument to explain why Asia's two fastest growing economies and increasingly dynamic billion-plus-strong societies will not clash as they pursue peaceful development. Their relationship continues to be examined in simplistic dichotomies of competition or cooperation, rivals or partners, friends or foes, etc., ignoring the complex nature of their evolution and interactions. This paper argues that their continued rapid economic growth and resultant ever-expanding engagement with the external world is not completely innocent, and that their growth has begun to influence their bilateral relations. Prima facie, multilateral forums provide China and India with a relatively neutral playground in which the two countries have gradually begun to decipher their stronger commonality of interests in addressing their regional/global challenges within multilateral settings. This expanding mutual trust and understanding at the multilateral level is expected to have a positive impact on the nature of their historically complicated bilateral equations. No doubt, their difficult bilateral engagement also impacts their interactions at the multilateral level and their mutual trust deficit circumscribes their joint strategies in multilateral forums. Yet, on balance, contemporary Sino-Indian relations seem to mark a clear shift in the center of gravity from a bilateral to a multilateral matrix. This shift is nosy discernible enough to stand scrutiny and also to guide the future direction of Sino-Indian equations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite close geographical proximity and centuries-old ties, the relationship between China and India has been filled with obstacles and stumbling blocks. The majority of academic research and media reports tend to examine relations at the national level, yet cities have become increasingly important due to urbanization and globalization. This paper argues that, through the city platform, India and China can turn potential cooperation into reality. The differences between Chinese and Indian cities beget complementarity that provides great potential for cooperation. Local governments in both China and India have high levels of administrative power in decisionmaking. Cooperation between cities can avoid many obstacles that prevail in national-level cooperation. Local governments will not only be motivated to cooperate, but also can accomplish a great deal in promoting cooperation between the two countries. The conditions for city cooperation are improving. Cities can and should become a key path and a new engine for Sino-Indian cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and India have had an often turbulent relationship. At the state level, strategic and diplomatic relations between the two are fraught with complications, tensions and misgivings that many observers believe are destined to continue for the foreseeable future. The purpose of this paper is to detail the various opportunities for cooperation that stem from the common challenges that China and India face as they continue to develop into major global powers. We argue that the key to successful cooperation will not occur at the intergovernmental level; rather, it will be based upon the building of social and cultural bridges between the Chinese and Indian people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this paper is to examine how patterns of Indian and Chinese reporting on Myanmar reflect the political climates of each country. A sample of 94 articles from Indian sources and 106 articles from Xinhua News Agency (English) was examined using content-analysis techniques. Then is a clear divergence in the topics covered by the Indian and Chinese media during the time period reviewed, 3 November to 17 November 2010, which was selected to coincide with Myanmar's first nationwide elections in twenty years as well as the release of political prisoner Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest. The Indian press provided more coverage of Suu Kyi's release and of Myanmar political affairs than the Chinese press, but neither India nor China covered Suu Kyi's activities in the days following her release. The Chinese press provided more coverage of economic affairs and the Myawaddy border crisis, which the Indian press ignored. Surprisingly, the press in non-democratic China attentively chronicled and promoted Myanmar's elections while the press in democratic India had very little to say about them. This suggests that on these issues, the press focus on what they perceive to be in tile national interest of their respective countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the threat of a water war between China and India. It argues that Indian suspicion of China has been premature. Beijing has not yet given its approval for major water diversion projects in Tibet, it has taken some limited steps toward easing the concerns of the Indian government and a growing number of Chinese experts have taken an interest in developing institutional frameworks for managing transboundary rivers. However, definitive settlement or cooperation will be difficult because both countries perceive themselves as the victim of a greedy neighbor. While India complains about China's ravenous exploitation of the Himalayan rivers, it is common in China to accuse India of exaggerating the Chinese threat and being unreasonable in its demands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]