Search

This paper extends a recently proposed model of dynamical interactions between the macro structures of a society to hierarchically ordered societies. The so extended model helps interpreting some social and political phenomena such as coalitions, their hierarchical level and the degree of anarchy on a certain hierarchical level. The surprising property of the underlined model that stability is certain in the constant parameter case strikingly extends to this model. One of the main results of the paper is that the system has a unique equilibrium exactly when there is no anarchy on the highest hierarchical level. These results apply to a study of changes in the equilibria as determined by the changes in the system parameters [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper describes the central-union theory, which offers a new approach to the formation of coalition structures in cooperative, sidepayment, superadditive n-person games. This theory treats formation of coalition structures as a probabilistic, endogenous process. Fundamental to this process is the new concept of coalition structure candidate set. For any given coalition structure, the predicted probability of formation is a function of two variables: (1) whether the coalition structure is a member of the coalition structure candidate set (coalition structures not in the candidate set will not form) and (2) the extent to which players accept that coalition structure. Players' acceptance, in turn, depends on differences among players in the level of satisfaction regarding the allocation of payoffs within the coalition structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a theory of behaviour in n-person conflicts. The theory and its solution are predicated on the inter-dependency of coalition formation and pay-off determination in an n-person conflict. The solution, therefore, involves not only pay-off determination but also coalition formation in the game. The theory is developed using mathematical notions of fixed points together with some behavioural theories about choice behaviour and interdependency of persons in competitive situations. It predicts not only the final state of coalition formation but also transient choices and coalitions in the games. Finally, the model is tested on some experimental games of W. Riker. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]