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This paper inquires into the necessity and limits of what Edmund Husserl calls a "pure" phenomenological psychology. It argues that there may be merit to this notion as a kind of philosophical psychology, the notion of purity in clinical psychology would unnecessarily limit the kinds of factors that the psychologist must take into account in understanding and treating most of the psychological conditions the therapist faces. The paper suggests that phenomenological psychology nonetheless has value in providing a counter-balance to naturalistically inclined psychology that for its part neglects the meaning of various life events for the agent and can serve as means of critical reflection on the operative concepts guiding psychological practice. It can also help correct a deterministic tendency in modern psychology that does not take seriously enough human beings' capacity for self-reflection and for self-responsibility that can often serve as key elements in psychological therapy and healing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many philosophers have argued that psychological time is a fundamental, inherent quality of consciousness that provides continuity and sequence to mental events--enabling memory. And, since memory is consciousness, psychological time enables the individual intentionality of consciousness. Levinas (1961), on the other hand, argues that an individual's past, in the most original sense, is the past of other. The irreducible alterity of one's past sets the stage for the other who co-determines the meaning of the past. This paper is about the exploration cultural memory within the context of a Caucasian doctoral student entering into an African-American community during an internship, who finds that cultural memories are remarkably more complicated than the propositional description of historic events. The paper further explores how cultural memory is not a record of "what happened" hut a sociolinguistic creative meaning making process. Histories can he contested. Memory, on the other hand, never adheres to the strict true or false dichotomy. Memory is like searching for the Divine, it cannot he found, only revealed in mysterious and small details. Memory, is the intruding of the infinite, creating as an effect the idea of a finite (August, 2011), they are not "representations" of the past nor are they a kind of mnemonic system of subjectivism to mediate all of consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alfred Schutz is, without a doubt, one of the phenomenologists that contributed the most to the reflection on how to apply insights from phenomenological philosophy to the, empirical and theoretical, human and social sciences. However, his work tends to be neglected by many of the current advocates of phenomenology within these disciplines. In the present paper, I intend to remedy this situation. In order to do so, I will systematically revisit his mundane and social-scientifically oriented account of phenomenology, which, as I shall show, emerges from a theoretical confrontation with the Husserlian distinction between transcendental phenomenology and phenomenological psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ambivalence, broadly defined as feeling more than one emotion at a time, is thought to be a central aspect of human experience and to play an important role in a range of psychological processes. Ambivalence is experienced in close relationships, identity development, social and political attitudes, decision-making behavior, anxiety states, as well as in psychotherapeutic change. Eight under-graduate students participated in phenomenological interviews that were transcribed and served as the basis for the investigation. The primary purpose of this paper is to shed light on the meaning of the experience of ambivalence by explicating the organizational relationships of its constituent meanings. The paper will also clarify the relation of ambivalence to important psychological processes and developmental transitions during young adulthood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In response to criticisms of phenomenology as being a solipsistic approach to psychological research and theory, this paper examines the interplay of both the creative/active and receptive/passive constituents of subjective experience identified in Husserl's exposition of intentional analysis. By delineating the ways in which intentional constitution requires passive as well as active processes, we come to see in the first part of this paper how experience and personal identity are as much formed and informed by the social and historical world as they are created by individual subjects. Once we have established the non-solipsistic nature of phenomenology, we then apply it in the second part of this paper to open a window onto the disorder of self long considered to be integral to schizophrenia. Through an exploration of the constitution of sense of self in the experiences of two people with schizophrenia, we see how cognitive disruptions, auditory hallucinations, and delusional ideation may be related to fundamental peculiarities in a person's experiences of intentionality and his/her resulting sense of agency and identity. In conclusion, we suggest that while phenomenology may not be able to provide a complete account of psychosis, it may be used to shed valuable, descriptive light on subjective aspects that provide a conceptual base for the consideration of other factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Phenomenological descriptions of depressed mental life offer a profound understanding of depression from the first-person perspective. In this paper, such descriptions are developed by drawing on the work by Ludwig Binswanger (1881-1966) and on the autobiographical report of depression by Piet C. Kuiper (1919-2002). I will argue that Binswanger's central claim in his phenomenological description of the depressed state of mind fails due to crucial misunderstandings of Edmund Hus-serl's (1859-1938) phenomenology. Nonetheless, by drawing on Kuiper's first-hand account, I will develop a phenomenological description of depressed mental life, highlighting the altered manner of pre-reflective valuing in depression and introducing the concept of a 'depressive habituality.' This term refers to the acquisition of a new set of habitualisations, especially on the foundational levels of automatic mental life. It offers explanations for the fact that it is not easy to recover from depression and that people may more easily become depressed again. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Derrida (1992 /1991) made the case (following Mauss, 1990 /1925) that the 'pure gift' is impossible. Because of the element of obligation and reciprocity involved, gift relationships are inevitably reduced to relationships of economic exchange. This position echoes the exchange theory of the social behaviourists, the cost-benefit analyses of evolutionary psychology, and other reductionist conjectures. In this paper, 18 written accounts of gifting are analysed using established phenomenological tools of reflection. It is shown that the dynamics of the gift relationship are complex (for example the statuses of giver and recipient are problematical, as is the expression of gratitude) and, specifically, reciprocation in gifting is not akin to 'repaying' the gift, but should rather be seen as a response to the gift as an expression of affective affirmation, rendering this mutual. Gift giving is in the expressive realm rather than the practical (Harré, 1979). This was, intriguingly, known explicitly by Adam Smith (2006/1790). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Part of teaching the descriptive phenomenological psychological method is to assist students in grasping their previously unrecognized assumptions regarding the meaning of 'science.' This paper is intended to address a variety of assumptions that are encountered when introducing students to the descriptive phenomenological psychological method pioneered by Giorgi. These assumptions are: 1) That the meaning of 'science' is exhausted by empirical science, and therefore qualitative research, even if termed 'human science,' is more akin to literature or art than methodical, scientific inquiry; 2) That as a primarily aesthetic, poetic enterprise human scientific psychology need not attempt to achieve a degree of rigor and epistemological clarity analogous (while not equivalent) to that pursued by natural scientists; 3) That 'objectivity' is a concept belonging to natural science, and therefore human science ought not to strive for objectivity because this would require 'objectivizing' the human being; 4) That qualitative research must always adopt an 'interpretive' approach, description being seen as merely a mode of interpretation. These assumptions are responded to from a perspective drawing primarily upon Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, but also upon Eagleton's analysis of aestheticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nine short manuscript fragments by Dorion Cairns, one of Husserl's closest followers, are edited and presented here from Cairns' Nachlass (The Unpublished Papers), which are held at the Center for Advanced Research on Phenomenology, Inc. at the University of Memphis. The fragments address aspects of method for phenomenological psychology, namely: the natural theoretical attitude, reflection, psychological epochē and reduction, eidetic and factual description, understanding, and intersubjective verification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a continuation of the challenge begun by early phenomenologists of the reductionistic scientism of Natural Science Psychology. Inspired by five distinctions of Emmanuel Levinas, it seeks to bring a deeper interruption of the seemingly unalterable force of mainstream psychology to model itself after the hard sciences. Levinas distinguishes the experience of totality from infinity, need from desire, freedom as self-initiated and self-directed from freedom as invested by and for the Other, active agency from radical passivity, and the said from saying. Five commonly accepted characteristics of science, objective, empirical, causal, reducible, and value neutral, are used to compare three approaches to psychology: Natural Science, Phenomenology (psychology as a human science), and Psychology for the Other. Using the definition of science, "knowing the phenomenon as it shows itself," this paper argue that Natural Science Psychology is the least "scientific," Phenomenological Psychology is more scientific, and Psychology for the Other is the most "scientific" with its ethical command to allow the Other to reveal her/himself. This extravagant but compelling claim is illustrated with descriptions of research and therapy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because of the recent rapid transition in Britain from an elite system of higher education (HE) to one in which a much larger propor tion of the population is intended to participate, many students—whose social backgrounds would previously have (to a large extent) precluded their involvement in HE—experience strangerhood within academia in a particularly acute form. This paper deals with the experiences of members of an one particular HE course, especially designed for students over 21 years old—such "mature" students are a group who has not been traditionally found in large numbers in British HE Such students describe dramatic changes in their sense of self and in their relationships with others—to the extent that their biographical continuity with their own past becomes problematical.The applicability of an idea touted by certain postmodern writers, "the new selfconsciousness," is considered. Attention is also paid to the practical implications of the findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The last in a series of examinations, this paper articulates Husserl's mature position on the nature of a phenomenologically informed human science. Falling between the naïve positivity of a naturalistic approach to psychology and the transcendental view of consciousness at the base of phenomenological philosophy, we argue that a human scientific psychology—while not itself transcendental in nature needs to re-arise upon the transcendental ground as an empirical—but no longer transcendentally naïve—discipline through Husserl's notion of the "return to positivity." This notion of the return allows us to avoid "transcendental psychologism," differentiating psychological from transcendental subjectivity but from a transcendental, rather than naïve perspective. In this way, the return to positivity reclaims psychology as a worldly, but no longer naïve, discipline. To facilitate an understanding of the different perspectives in question, and the process of leaving the naturalistic perspective in order to return to it once armed with a transcendental understanding and its associated tools, we continue to develop the illustrative example of anorexia provided in the first part of this series. In conclusion, we discuss the implications of this framework for transcendental reforms both of clinical practice and of psychological research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]