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A literary criticism of the book "Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism" by David Enoch is presented. It examines Enoch's indispensability arguments on deliberation and schmeliberation. It looks on the robust realism that constitutes normative domain of reasons and values which guide and inform such thinking. It Notes the claims of Enoch that normative truths do not constitutively depend on the person's responses, attitudes or desires.

A literary criticism of the book "Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism" by David Enoch is presented. It looks on the deep meaning of the book's subtitle on the issue on realism that constitutes to normative truths and facts, expression of any practical attitude and a representation. It examines Enoch's arguments found at the second chapter which are complex and nuanced in conveying views through streamlined and simplified manner.

A literary criticism of the book "Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism" by David Enoch is presented. It examines moral skepticism which is an engaging and ambitious piece of metaethics. It looks on the competing metaethical theories of expressivism, forms of subjectivism and naturalistic realism. It also examines the arguments on metaethical objectivity from its moral implications and the deliberative indispensability of irreducibly normative truths.

A literary criticism of the book "Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism" by David Enoch is presented. It defines realism as the view of having moral truths, facts and properties that are response-independent depending on the individual. It notes defines robust realism as a view that contrasts with such views like ethical naturalism, constructivism and expressivism. It examines the objectivity of morality that is supported by a moral argument that are not objective.