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Abstract: This paper examines the complexity of the current negotiations to avert climate change under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Drawing on economic game theory modelling, it interprets the latest developments within the international negotiations and provides a political economy analysis of the climate change architecture. It places the pursuit of international co-operation, via the Kyoto Protocol׳s second commitment period, in the context of a country׳s maintenance of national interest and a flexible emissions abatement strategy. Accepting that countries will reject an international agreement or obligation that is seen as inimical to their economic competitiveness, it incorporates a new game theory model, considers how learning from such models can influence agreement design and proposes a new approach from a non-monotonic polluting payoff function. Attention is placed on enabling conditions that entice countries to ratify a climate agreement, thereby encouraging participation and accelerating a near term deployment of low carbon technologies. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]