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How can one assess the quality of life of older people – particularly those with Alzheimer's disease – from the point of view of their opportunities to do valued things in life? This paper is an attempt to answer this question using as a theoretical framework the capability approach. We use data collected on 8841 individuals above 60 living in France (the 2008 Disability and Health Household Survey) and propose a latent variable modelling framework to analyse their capabilities in two fundamental dimensions: freedom to perform self-care activities and freedom to participate in the life of the household . Our results show that living as a couple, having children, being mobile and having access to local shops, health facilities and public services enhance both capabilities. Age, household size and male gender (for one of the two capabilities) act as impediments while the number of impairments reduces both capabilities. We find that people with Alzheimer's disease have a lower level and a smaller range of capabilities (freedom) when compared to those without, even when the latter have several impairments. Hence they need a special attention in policy-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mental health evaluation within a legal setting is widely seen as a power to judge. The aim of this paper is to challenge this current thesis, which was popularised by Michel Foucault, who encapsulated the notion in a brief sentence: "The sordid business of punishing is thus converted into the fine profession of curing" (Foucault, 2003: 23). On the basis of an ethnography of a French district court (between September 2008 and May 2009, n = 60 trials) including interviews with judges (n = 10) and psychiatrists (n = 10), we study the everyday penal treatment of sexual offenders using psychiatric reports. Our findings show how (i.) the expectations of the judges select the psychiatrists' skills (based on the following criteria for their reports: accessibility of knowledge, singularization and individualization of content) and (ii.) reframe the psychiatric report as a moral tool. The clinical reasoning of forensic psychiatrists in their reports offer moral affordances due to their clinical caution regarding the risk of recidivism (therapeutic and criminological reversal, moral prevention). Both the judges' evaluation and the psychiatrists' clinical authority are shaped by a moral economy of dangerousness, which eclipses the idea of lack of criminal responsibility. In conclusion, we show that these unintended effects are necessarily of interest to most clinical practitioners engaged in work as expert witnesses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]