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The topic of this paper is the investigation and analysis of the fundamental peace that occurs in the light of the encounter with the "Other" in the imperialist subject. Levinas presents a subject who imposes his desires on the world in order to establish an earthly paradise and is busy devouring others and subduing them to himself. The imperialism subject, who formed his identity with violence and in relation to others, encounters the "Other" who resists his totalitarianism. Levinas' idea to end violence is rooted in subjectivity that cannot be reduced to consciousness and imposes an infinite responsibility on the subject. From the beginning, encountering the face of the "Other" is peaceful. By reminding the subject for peace and solidarity, the face motivates him to fulfill his duty and before any question and choice, he makes the subject personally responsible for peace with the "Other"; a responsibility that has already been placed in it and cannot withdraw from it. The peace considered by Levinas is the fundamental peace, original and beyond conventional war and peace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kant argues that an action is morally worthy only if it is done not from inclination or self-interest but from duty. In the Groundwork, he provides examples to illustrate that the presence of motives aligned with duty undermines the moral value of an action. These viewpoints have sparked significant controversy, particularly in light of the resurgence of virtue-ethics in recent years. Notably, the work of two famous Kantian philosophers, Richard Hanson and Barbara Herman, are especially remarkable as they provide an enlightening interpretation of Kant's perspective and address the raised concerns. While Hanson outlines two innovative models for the conditions of action, he also identifies the relevant phenomenon of overdetermination and states that an action has moral worth when the motive of duty is sufficient by itself to generate the action. Furthermore, Herman complements these models by introducing a third one and arguing that an action maintains its moral value if it necessitates both duty and if its primary motive is the motive of duty, regardless of whether it reflects the agent's desires or not. In this paper, we assess the strength and effectiveness of these models by examining Kant's examples. Consequently, despite shedding light on Kant's intentions, these accounts do not significantly contribute to resolving the existing ambiguities. Critics can express concerns regarding the simplification of the overdetermination, the fallacy of circular and tautology. A thorough examination of Kant's philosophy reveals that fulfilling one's duty and disregarding other motivations are essential for the development of an individual's moral character. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A significant issue among philosophical issues is to determine the relationship between ethics and religion. Traditionally it was believed that ethics is based on religion and there could not be any ethical system without religion. With the increasing critics against religion in the modern era the attempts for demonstrating an ethical system independent from religion has been increase as well. The proponents of ethical autonomy put forward considerable critics against ethics based on religion which is difficult to ignore. The aim in this paper is to deal with relationship between ethics and religion. The writer while approving the significant challenge offered against ethics based on religion defend a theory displaying two pillars for ethics. According to this theory epistemic and psychological aspect of ethics is distinguished. The writer will display that the epistemic aspect of ethics is independent from religion while the ontological aspect of ethics is depended on religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scientific realism has always faced continuous criticisms from scientific anti-realists. Kyle Stanford's "unconceived alternatives" argument can be seen as a late and troublesome version of these challenges. In this paper, we will first briefly mention scientific realism and its supporting arguments, including the "no-miracle" argument and the "slippery slope" argument. Then we will list the main challenges that scientific realism has faced. Arguments such as "pessimistic meta-induction" and "underdetermination of scientific theories" are raised against scientific realism. In the following, we will take a look at Stanford's argument and examine how it creates a challenge for realism by combining historical and philosophical arguments, and we will also describe the realist answers raised to the said challenge. We will also try to explain from Roy Bhaskar's critical realism point of view how the Stratified view of the world and scientific theories, makes it possible to achieve knowledge of reality through scientific activity and also can weaken the basis of Stanford's anti-realist argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mullā Ṣadrā offers two different views regarding the references of the philosophical secondary intelligibles. According to the first view, philosophical secondary intelligibles only have external foundations for abstraction (mansha al-intizāʿ) and no external counterparts (mā bi iza ͗). And according to the second view, also known as Mullā Ṣadrā's final view, these concepts have external counterparts which exist with the very existence of their subjects. This view faces some problems: First, Mullā Ṣadrā's reason for the existence of these concepts' external counterparts begs the question and is therefore invalid. The argument Ṭabāṭabāʾī offers in his commentary on Mullā Ṣadrā's argument is also flawed since it presupposes a point that is more difficult to accept than the conclusion and so would naturally be rejected by the other side. Second, the purported counterpart's mode of existence is not clear. Third, it is not clear by virtue of what difference between quidditative and philosophical concepts the former but not the latter have independent counterparts. The method employed in this paper is library research and rational analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I will argue against certain criticisms of Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical argument and sceptical solution, made especially by Baker and Hacker, McGinn, and McDowell. I will show that their interpretation of Kripke's Wittgenstein's view is misplaced. According to Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical argument, there is no fact as to what someone means by her words. For Kripke, this conclusion, combined with Classical Realist view of meaning, leads to the Wittgensteinian paradox, according to which there is no such thing as meaning anything by any word. Wittgenstein presents this paradox in paragraph 201 of the Philosophical Investigations. As Kripke reads Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein is in agreement with his sceptic on the sceptical conclusion of the sceptical argument, that is, that there is no fact about meaning, and builds his sceptical solution on an endorsement of that. McDowell, McGinn, and others have objected that Kripke has failed to properly understand Wittgenstein's main remarks in 201, that is, that the paradox is the result of a misunderstanding of the ordinary notion of meaning. Wittgenstein does not accept such a sceptical conclusion. I will use the distinction George Wilson draws between two different conclusions of the sceptical argument and show that Kripke has respected all of the remarks that Wittgenstein has put in section 201. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Ockham's razor, assumptions must not be unnecessarily multiplied. While this principle is widely accepted, its justification is controversial. More precisely, we don't know whether Ockham's razor is truth-conducive. The present paper aims to address this problem within Betz's theory of dialectical structures (2012). First of all, I give a brief explanation of this theory. Here, the essential elements of Betz's theory, which pertains to my discussion, are highlighted. Secondly, I explain why Betz's theory is favored over the Bayesian framework. In the next step, it will be argued that, at least in the minimal complex positions, potential rivals for Ockham's razor don't discharge their functions unless Ockham's razor is considered as a criterion. The fourth step amounts to the evaluation of Ockham's razor and its rivals in the minimal complex positions. It is shown that each rival only represents an increase in the degree of justification of the likelihood of evidence given the hypothesis whereas Ockham's razor increases the degree of justification of the likelihood of evidence given the hypothesis as well as the posterior degree of justification of the respective hypothesis. This justifies to some extent Ockham's. Moreover, while the ratio between prima facie plausibility of two competitive hypotheses in the case of Ockham's razor is greater than those of the potential rivals, the hypothesis with lower prima facie plausibility receives higher posterior degree of justification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]