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This paper examines a structural theory of industrial organization and operation. The analytical approach taken is largely based on the premise that industry is embedded in the social structure of market competition. Moreover, imperfect competition and industrial resource dependence are composed of and reflected in interindustrial transaction patterns. Using network models of imperfect competition, this study explains the determinants of Israeli industrial performance. The first part of this paper inquires into the structure of interindustrial relations using structural equivalence as a diagnostic tool. In the second part structural determinants of industrial profitability are estimated. Profitability is predicted by the degree of control an industry has over its domestic transactions and its linkage to the world economy. Implications of this study for the theoretical models of social competition and for an empirical analysis of markets and firms are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In aggregative games, each playerʼs payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players. Many common games in industrial organization, political economy, public economics, and macroeconomics can be cast as aggregative games. This paper provides a general and tractable framework for comparative static results in aggregative games. We focus on two classes of games: (1) aggregative games with strategic substitutes and (2) nice aggregative games, where payoff functions are continuous and concave in own strategies. We provide simple sufficient conditions under which positive shocks to individual players increase their own actions and have monotone effects on the aggregate. The results are illustrated with applications to public good provision, contests, Cournot competition and technology choices in oligopoly. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This paper examines the impacts of banking market structure and regulation on economic growth using new data on banking market concentration and manufacturing industry-level growth rates for U.S. states during 1899-1929--a period when the manufacturing sector was expanding rapidly and restrictive branching laws segmented the U.S. banking system geographically. Unlike studies of developing and developed countries today, we find that banking market concentration generally had a positive impact on manufacturing sector growth in the early twentieth century United States, with a somewhat stronger impact on industries with smaller establishments, lower rates of incorporation, and less reliance on bond markets (and, hence, relatively more reliance on banks). Because regulations affecting bank entry varied considerably across states and the industrial organization of the U.S. banking system differs markedly from those of other countries, we consider the impact of other aspects of banking market structure and policy on growth. Even after controlling for differences in the prevalence of branch banking, deposit insurance, and other aspects of policy and market structure, we find that market concentration boosted industrial growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper studies the effects of a tax on energy use in a growth model where market structure is endogenous and jointly determined with the rate of technological change. Because this economy does not exhibit the scale effect (a positive relation between TFP growth and aggregate R&D), the tax has no effect on the steady-state growth rate. It has, however, important transitional effects that give rise to surprising results. Specifically, under the plausible assumption that energy demand is inelastic, there may exist a hump-shaped relation between the energy tax and welfare. This shape stems from the fact that the reallocation of resources from energy production to manufacturing triggers a temporary acceleration of TFP growth that generates a -shaped time profile of consumption. If endogenous technological change raises consumption sufficiently fast and by a sufficient amount in the long run, and households are sufficiently patient, the tax raises welfare despite the fact that—in line with standard intuition—it lowers consumption in the short run. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

In his classic book, A Piece of the Pie, Stanley Lieberson described divergent trends in occupational standing for African Americans and European immigrants after 1920, as the Great Migration from the South swelled the size of the black population in northern cities. In this paper I build upon Lieberson’s work using longitudinal data drawn from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series for the census years 1880–1970. This more versatile data source allows me to examine separate occupational trends for northern-born blacks and southern-born migrants and to control for relevant socio-demographic characteristics. The findings confirm Lieberson’s general conclusion that blacks lost ground, occupationally, to immigrants after 1920. However, they show further that: (1) northern- and southern-born blacks experienced different trends in relative occupational standing after 1920, (2) that these different trends were due largely to compositional differences between the two groups of northern blacks, especially educational differences, and (3) that blacks were generally less successful than immigrants at translating additional educational attainment into improved occupational status, with southern migrants experiencing the weakest occupational returns to education. It is concluded that compositional differences and a racially-defined occupational queue were the most important factors shaping group differences and trends in occupational standing between 1920 and 1970. Timing of arrival in the northern industrial economy and a response by whites to the “racial threat” from a growing black population were less important. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Corporate innovation is often argued to result from, and be encouraged by, market competition. The tradition is to test such arguments with market concentration data; firms with stronger control over their market can afford the long-run investment of R&D. Network theory has broadened our understanding of how competition is a function of structure within and beyond a market. Producers earn high profit margins to the extent they are few and their customers and suppliers are many and disorganized. The first condition is measured by the traditional concentration ratio for a market. The second condition is measured by the network constraint of suppliers and customers. My purpose in this paper is to describe how our understanding of the market competition effect on innovation is enriched when the concentration measure of market competition tradition in economics is replaced with the network model of market competition now prevalent in sociology. Results indicate that markets facing competitive environments, in high constraint market positions, show greater R&D intensity and faster rates of innovation than do industries facing less competitive pressure. These effects persist even with controls for technological opportunity and appropriability, in contrast to traditional models using only concentration data to measure competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Resource dependence theory suggests a variety of ways in which an organization can ensure the supply of resources critical to its survival. This paper examines differences between surviving and failed firms and develops a predictive model using dimensions suggested by these theories: (1) industry profitability, growth, and stability; (2) control over the industry; (3) influence with critical resource providers; (4) buffering through diversification; and (5) present level of firm resources. Significant, consistent positive relationships were discovered between survival and the present level of firm resources, influence with critical resource providers, and the stability of industry environment. However, other factors did not significantly influence the model and theories are discussed to explain possible reasons for this outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]