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Many recent studies find that international political conflictâ€"operationalized in a variety of waysâ€"harms trade. Well-known cases help to underscore these general findings. For example, Cold War tensions helped to undermine East-West trade, and trade between India and Pakistan slowed sharply in the years after partition. On the other hand, however, trade between adversaries also appears to vary substantially across cases. Indeed, trade can sometimes flourish despite intense political rivalry. In the current relationship between mainland China and Taiwan, for example, China has become Taiwan’s largest trading partner despite persistent political tension across the Taiwan Strait.How can we explain variation in the extent to which states trade with their adversaries? Building on existing literature, I develop a framework through which to understand how domestic coalitions concerning trade with an adversary are likely to form. While some actors are likely to favor or oppose trade for purely economic reasons, those without a direct economic stake in the relationship are likely to focus more on the political and security consequences of trade with the adversary. In this framework, two variables emerge as central in determining a country’s trade policy with an adversary: the relative political strength of internationalist versus protectionist economic interests, and whether those concerned primarily with politics believe trade will have positive or negative political and security externalities. I use the framework to develop several testable hypotheses, and evaluate them via short case studies of three contemporary rivalries: China/Taiwan; India/Pakistan; and North Korea/South Korea ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on economic interdependence and growing Taiwanese identity in cross-strait relations. It notes since the mid-1990s, the cross- strait relationship between the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC) and People's Republic of China (PRC) has been marked with turmoil with periodic crises in which the possibility of an outbreak of armed conflicts appears to have been significant. Also described are the economic and social processes that are increasingly connecting Taiwan to the Chinese Mainland.

The article offers legal perspective on the conflict and compatibility in the cross-strait relations between Mainland China and Taiwan. It notes that the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) was eventually recognized in 1971 by the United Nations General Assembly as the only lawful representative of the entire China in the organization. Also compared and discussed is the legal framework created for both the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) and the Macao SAR.

This paper tries to look at the interactions between the U.S., Taiwan, and China in the period of 1987-1997. It will test two hypotheses that explain conflicts and cooperation between two regional rival states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely recognized that Taiwan was the most conflictual issue in U.S.-P.R.C relations both in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras (Ross, 1995). How the dynamics of the “strategic triangle” consisting of the U.S., Mainland China and Taiwan to be understood? How is the U.S. “strategic ambiguity” policy to be explained? Neorealists may argue that there was a tacit agreement between Beijing and Washington that so long as cooperation was imperative, the status quo in U.S.-Taiwan relations was temporarily acceptable. Revisionists such as Robert S. Ross, however, hold a more sophisticated view that even in the midst of cooperation, the ongoing conflict required continuous negotiations and mutual adjustment between the U.S. and P.R.C. (Ross, 1995). Nevertheless, few study, if any, have provided theoretical answers to the questions that under what conditions the equilibrium of status quo holds, how the U.S. commitment to defending Taiwan will affect the equilibrium outcomes of the game, and how the so-called strategic ambiguity policy is to be explained? By developing a game theoretic model, this paper will provide theoretical answers to those unresolved questions, drawing out both theoretical and policy implications. A historical examination of the interactions between the U.S., Mainland China, and Taiwan since the Korea War will be done to further illustrate the model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Paper argues that the eventual democratization of Mainland China would not resolve the conflict between Beijing and Taipei. Moreover, political liberalization in the PRC would increase the risk of a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most of the contemporary policy debate regarding the interdependence of trade and conflict has been preoccupied with devising responses either in favor of or in opposition to the long prevailing notion that trade is positively and unconditionally correlated with peace because trading partners fear that conflict will result in the loss of welfare gains from trade. The realist response implies that political foes trade willingly only when relative gains are equivalent, and the liberal position implies that trade promotes peace because trade partners prefer gains from trade to conflict. The China-Taiwan security conflict provides a counter-example to each argument. Through the advantages of non-cooperative game theory, we model a trade-conflict interaction to discover the conditions under which trade and conflict will occur between trade partners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan Strait is one of the few explosive spots in today's world that has the potential to trigger military confrontations between two major powers (the People's Republic of China and the United States). Since the leader of Taiwan is determined to seek Taiwan's formal independence, which cannot be accepted by the PRC, many scholars warn that a Taiwan Strait War will break out in the foreseeable future. Other observers argue that the PRC will not risk a war over Taiwan because it can hardly afford the economic cost of such a war. What are the possible consequences of a future Taiwan Strait War? This article examines the impact of war on the PRC through the history of three major Sino- wars that occurred after the establishment of the PRC. I also look back to the Tiananmen Square Incident to see the international reactions and its damage of a quasi civil war. Although history indicates that war does not necessarily impede the development of China in the long run, the consequences of a Taiwan Strait War will be more serious because of the uniqueness of the Taiwan issue as well as the highly interdependence between the PRC, Taiwan, and the rest of the world. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]