Search

Social Europe, or the social dimension of the European Union (EU), has been receiving increasing attention in academic debates. This special issue introduction discusses Social Europe through the analytical framework of multi‐level governance while asking, perhaps controversially, whether Social Europe has the potential to become a fully‐fledged welfare state. This introduction also summarises the articles included in this special issue which focus on different governance levels, including EU institutions, member states, national parties, economic sectors, workers and the general public. On this basis, the introduction identifies sources of challenges and opportunities for Social Europe from various levels of governance. We conclude that the needs and demands become more diverse when we move from European institutions to the citizens. Notably, obstacles from one governance level often carry over to another governance level. Consequently, it becomes much more difficult to design welfare policies on the EU level that work for everyone. While a more evolved EU‐level welfare state may be possible in the future, substantial obstacles make it difficult to achieve in the short run. Hence, future research should examine the multi‐level structure of Social Europe in more detail to better grasp what Social Europe can and cannot deliver and why. Such research is not only relevant in the European Union but also in other multi‐level governance systems across the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do national political parties vary in their views on Social Europe? I focus on an aspect that has received less attention despite its growing prevalence—EU regulations with ambitions to diminish social inequality to encourage social convergence among Member States. Since the Juncker Commission, the European Commission has become increasingly active in pursuing this aspect of Social Europe. Thus, understanding parties' positions on this aspect of Social Europe has become more important. However, current literature lacks measures of national party stances towards Social Europe, and explanations for these stances. Here, I use data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (2006, 2009, 2014 and 2019) to develop an indirect measure of party positions on Social Europe. Leveraging studies in party politics and EU politics, I propose that party families and national economic conditions may affect parties' positions on Social Europe. The analyses suggest substantial variation in parties' positions on Social Europe both within and across party families. The analyses also demonstrate that socialist and green parties support Social Europe most, whereas radical right parties support it least. Lastly, I do not find systematic evidence that national economic conditions influence parties' support for this aspect of Social Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I study if industrial decarbonisation yields elevated perceptions of political and economic unfairness. Decarbonising industry is central for the Green Transition, but it will disproportionately affect regions where brown sectors, which have been made uncompetitive, are concentrated. I contribute to studies on political consequences of the Green Transition by exploring perceived unfairness as one outcome from these uneven effects. In regions where industrial decarbonisation and employment declines in brown sectors have been greater than in other regions, residents may feel that they have disproportionately borne the economic costs of industrial decarbonisation for their country, and may consider their governments to have neglected their interests. I test these expectations in 60 West European regions using past (2013–2018) employment and CO2 emissions trends from the three most carbon-polluting sectors, as proxies for industrial decarbonisation accompanied by employment declines in brown sectors, and combined them with micro-level data from the European Social Survey (2018). I find that regions exhibit elevated perceptions of economic and political unfairness only when they experience both relative CO2 emissions and employment decline in these sectors. As perceived unfairness underpins some of the political discontent observed today, this finding highlights the need for Green Transition policies that minimise labour market disruptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU aims for net carbon neutrality by 2050. Since industry contributes substantially to carbon emissions, reforms to decarbonise industry are necessary to achieve this goal. However, these reforms may entail labour market costs in the form of unemployment, which may necessitate social policies to mitigate them. Our article provides a novel contribution to the existing literature by developing a framework to classify how these policy responses may vary across EU Member States and it also suggests sources for these variations. We analyse the planned social policy responses of four countries – Denmark, Germany, Spain and Poland – by comparing the emphasis on social investment relative to compensation; the emphasis on social relative to industrial policy; and the extent to which social policy is targeted. Our findings suggest that Danish plans will rely primarily on social investment, whereas Poland will rely on compensation. In Germany, there is a greater emphasis on industrial policy, and Spain’s planned responses differ between policies targeted at coal miners and policies for other workers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]