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The recently in force Bolivian Constitution of 2009 brings a change in the structure of the legal system. This paper analyzes such change through the formal relations among the legal sources and exposes the structure of the Unitarian and territorially decentralized State shaped by the Constitution. Besides a previous theoretical frame, the paper is divided into two main parts: the first one regards the Constitution as a legal source, and includes the legal consequences of its supremacy, the limits of the interpretation clause of the Constitution and the application of the stare decisis doctrine to the Constitutional Court precedents; the second part exposes the ordinary legal sources, its respective position in the structure of the legal system and the formal relations among them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the reference to law on public policy theory is scarce, legal interest in this topic has increased in Colombia in recent years. One reason for this connection is the repetitive reference to the concept of public policy in constitutional jurisprudence. The aim of this paper is to reconstruct the narrative of the Colombian Constitutional Court about the notion of public policy since the promulgation of the 1991 Constitution until 2013. The approach to accomplish this task is the narrative analysis of public policy which is addressed primarily by Emery Roe (1994). The reconstruction of such narrative takes place in two stages: first, I explore different scenarios in which the Court refers to public policy in its narrative. Second, I analyze the formal aspect of the narrative, that is, the different ways how the Court understands the public policies and what is the legal form that these policies should take. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

France revised its Constitution in 1971, but the modification was not carried out by one of the organs authorised by that same text. Colombia replaced its Constitution in 1991, but did these constitutional changes comply with the laws of the time? The present paper is an overview of these juridical transformations from the point of view of the theory of juridical revolution, which is applied in order to determine the new legal basis of each of these legal systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper approaches, from a legal, doctrinal and jurisprudential perspective, the concept and extent of the "Own Acts Doctrine" or "Venire Contra Factum Proprium Nulla Conceditur" as a general principle of what it implies as a right, according to different law systems and, in particular, according to Argentinean law. It settles and analyzes the requirements for its due application in each precise case and to prevent therefore any discretional uses, acting either as a shield against inappropriate pretensions or as a device to silence an exasperating judged pretension, which, paradoxically have been given to this valuable tool founded on good faith. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]