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In Soviet-occupied East Germany during the mid- to late 1940s, a remarkable but scarcely remarked-upon transition took place. Hundreds of thousands of young Germans who had previously been members of the Nazi youth organizations, the Hitler Youth (HJ) and the League of German Girls (BDM) flocked to join the Communist-led Free German Youth (FDJ), a unisex 'united youth organization' founded under Soviet auspices in March 1946. This paper examines the experiences of this 'twice betrayed' generation, whose members rapidly—though with varying degrees of enthusiasm—switched allegiance from Nazism to Communism after the Second World War and ultimately exchanged life in one authoritarian youth organization for life in another. Drawing on archival and interview material, it first seeks to outline Communist attitudes towards denazification among the young in the postwar period, before going on to examine from a grass-roots perspective the experiences, motivations, and attitudes of those who exchanged their Hi or BDM membership books for those of the FDJ. Despite, or perhaps because of, East Germany's strongly-espoused and rigidly dogmatic 'anti-fascism', open discussion of the Nazi past was—for a variety of reasons—taboo during the immediate postwar period, particularly among the young. This paper concludes by discussing the reasons behind this 'pact of silence' between the Communists and the 'Hitler Youth generation'—and how it impacted upon subsequent generations of young people 'born into socialism'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

East Germany's history can be broadly divided into two eras: Firstly, the 1950s ‘Aufbau’ period, in which the need to build a socialist society for future generations was emphasised – a project that involved a Stalinist approach, in which ideological commitment was central to political concerns. Secondly, the so-called ‘real-existing socialism’ of the 1970s, in which social stability, a sense of belonging and Honecker's ‘unity of economic and social policy’ were the watchwords. The reforms of the NÖS, or New Economic System – introduced in 1963 and abandoned at the end of the decade – marked the transition between these two periods and aimed to ensure the state's economic survival. This paper will examine both the economic and cultural policy of this period in order to contextualise the NÖS and to demonstrate that it was emblematic of wider trends in European history. I will also argue that the NÖS was perhaps the most important turning point in GDR history. It typified the regime's new approach to reconciling its desire to maintain control with the need to modernise the GDR. This period simultaneously represented the last gasp of revolutionary socialism, a doomed attempt to solve the structural problems of the Stalinist model and a foreshadowing of Honecker's GDR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on several articles, books, and conference papers regarding Marxism in Russia. It states that the general awareness of the variety and vitality of Marxist thought that has emerged since the collapse of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) is very little. It also notes that the political and economic fiasco of state socialism questions the certainties of Marxism-Leninism in an ideological context. It explores the three fundamental approaches that dealt with an assessment of Soviet socialism as described by V. Baranov. Information on Alternatives, a Moscow-based organization which engages in different kinds of social, political, educational and research activity, is also explored.

This paper deals with the returns to social capital in occupational attainment in the GDR, once a communist showcase. It examines the extent to which getting ahead in an industrial communist society depends on social capital, which by existing research was shown to be the case in agrarian communist and capitalist industrial societies. Industrial technology and a Marxist ideology supposedly both impede particularism, suggesting that social capital is not that important for getting ahead. In addition, the relationship between the use of and access to social resources is explored. Retrospective data from two random samples collected in 1992 and 1993 in Leipzig and Dresden have been used to test our expectations. Although universalism seemingly dominated the attainment process, as a person's education was more important than his father's resources, nearly half of the employed got their jobs through some informal channel. Yet, the use of informal resources only led to a better job if the contact person had high occupational prestige. Part of the influence of human capital on occupational achievement should be attributed to the effect of a person's social capital, i.e. a contact person with high prestige. Access to occupations through informal ties did not imply that these ties were used. Although one reached higher occupational ranks through weak ties (acquaintances), access through strong ties (friends or relatives) was crucial for finding a contact person with high prestige. This probably reflects the high damage potential of using illegal particularistic ties under communism. Using a high prestige contact person was far more important for getting a better job than having access to higher occupations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the political success and failure of schooling cadres designed to promote the socialist policies of the Socialist Union Party (SED) of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) of East Germany. The disparity between the GDR's ideological perception of itself as anti-fascist and the reality that nationalist sentiments survived the collapse of Nazism and included members of the SED is analyzed. The SED's conception of patriotism is examined. The mobilization of cadres at communist party schools under the umbrella organization the "National Front for Democratic Germany" intensified the campaign for German unification.