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The conference solicits contributions of abstracts, papers and e-posters that address themes and topics of the conference, including figures, tables and references of novel research materials. This year's ERA conference focuses on studying the relationship humans have to their constructed social environments as well as the planet in which they inhabit and act upon through biopolitics, the ecology of humanity, and the anthropocene. The conference will bring together scholars from different fields including philosophy, psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, literature, linguistics, architecture, geography and others. This column contains descriptions of upcoming conferences and calls for papers relating to the study of time. [Extracted from the article]

Odontocetes, or 'toothed whales', have a complex brain structure and possess rationality, self-awareness, sociability and culture. Cognitive science and modern theories of personhood challenge the notion that humans alone are moral persons. This paper reviews evidence from the cognitive science literature relevant to moral personhood in bottlenose dolphins, orcas, and beluga whales. It applies theories of personhood of Peter Singer, David DeGrazia, and Steven Wise, and finds that odontocetes fulfil criteria to be granted at least borderline personhood. The legal implications of attributing personhood to dolphins remains uncertain. Recognition of dolphin personhood may lead to fundamental legal rights against capture, captivity, and killing; alternatively, the courts may continue to restrict legal personhood and associated protections to human beings. Finally, despite the major influence of personhood on morality and law in the West, the biologically more widespread quality of sentience is sufficient for greater moral considerability and legal protections for nonhuman species. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Cognitive Science of Nationalistic Behavior (CSNB), presented in this paper, integrates the political sciences of nationalities as invented communities with an evolutionary cognitive analysis of social forms as products of the human mind. The framework is modeled after the Cognitive Science of Religion, where decades of cross-disciplinary work has generated standards, predictions, and data about the role of individual cognitive tendencies in shaping societies. We study the nationalistic calendar as a cultural attractor and draw on cue-based behavioral motivation and differential autobiographical memory systems to explain its appeal to the human mind. Calendrical elements are analyzed in the context of essentialist thought patterns and action representation systems. We conclude with the implications of calendrical thinking on the control of elites who aim to forge and reinforce national identities. This paper lays the groundwork for applying a similar approach to the study of other nationalistic elements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper re-engages with the science versus religion debate in the light of the last three decades of scholarly progress in the study of religion coming from the cognitive and evolutionary sciences of religion. I begin by asking (1) 'if it is indeed possible to account for the origins of religious belief, its cultural transmission and evolution, and its maintenance— without any appeal to the real existence of any supernatural deity—then are we in a position to say we have explained it all away?' If we are, how does this affect central themes in the philosophy of religion about God's existence? In (2) I provide an outline of the cognitive and evolutionary approach to explaining religion. In section (3) I discuss abductive reasoning (3.1), problems with the accusation of having committed the genetic fallacy when answering (1) in favour of positive atheism (3.2), the need for first-order justifications of religious belief (3.3), and in (3.4) a peculiar divine attribute (i.e. omnipotent potential in a causal chain of events) that appears to immunise religious belief in a particular kind of supernatural deity from having been explained away. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theory of mind, the theory that humans attribute mental states to others, has become increasingly influential in the Cognitive Science of Religion in recent years, due to several papers which posit that supernatural agents, like gods, demons, and the dead, are accredited greater than normal knowledge and awareness. Using Old Norse mythology and literary accounts of Old Norse religion, supported by archaeological evidence, I examine the extent to which this modern perspective on religious theory of mind is reflected in religious traditions from the Viking Age. I focus especially on the extent to which superperception and superknowledge were attributed to Old Norse supernatural agents and the impact of this on expressions of religion; how the attribution of theory of mind varied with circumstances and the agents to which it was being attributed; and the extent to which features of religious theory of mind common in other societies were present in the historical North. On this basis, I also evaluate the usefulness of Old Norse historiography to Cognitive Science of Religion and vice versa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human kinship systems play a central role in social organization, as anthropologists have long demonstrated. Much less is known about how cultural schemas of relatedness are transmitted across generations. How do children learn kinship concepts? To what extent is learning affected by known cross-cultural variation in how humans classify kin? This review draws on research in developmental psychology, linguistics, and anthropology to present our current understanding of the social and cognitive foundations of kinship categorization. Amid growing interest in kinship in the cognitive sciences, the paper aims to stimulate new research on the ontogeny of kinship categorization, a rich domain for studying the nexus of language, culture, and cognition. We introduce an interdisciplinary research toolkit to help streamline future research in this area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The cognitive science of religion (CSR) is distinctive in its systematic methodology and its interdisciplinary nature. In the field of the study of religion, however, scholars are hardly receptive to CSR because of its "scientific" nature. The reason for this is that CSR is understood as distinct from other studies, nevertheless it has humanistic backgrounds. In order to investigate the intellectual backgrounds of CSR, the paper will describe the initial development of CSR by introducing researches and academic cooperation in the period from the 1990s to the early 2000s. Moreover, by examining academic contexts, what the emergence of CSR brought about to the study of religion will be clarified. CSR emerged as a result of the debate between modernist and postmodernist, connecting various views and resulting in a great shift in the intellectual landscape. This interdisciplinary role can be seen as the most important achievement of CSR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why should the study of religion in general and cognitive study of religion in particular be interested in philosophy in the first place, and vice versa? The paper offers some responses to the debate between John Shook and his respondents. It will suggest that such debates are useful, as it is a philosophical task to reflect upon the basic assumptions, inference patterns and theories of the study of religion. Furthermore, cognitive study of religion and other approaches in the study of religion should be of great interest to philosophers of religion. The paper puts the debate in a larger context of the dialogue of philosophy and cognitive science of religion and introduces two central themes: debates about psychological explanations and debunking arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the demons Pazuzu and Lamaštu from a cognitive science perspective. As hybrid creatures, the iconography of these demons combines an array of anthropomorphic and zoomorphic properties, and is therefore marked by a high degree of conceptual complexity. In a technical sense, they are what cognitive researchers refer to as radically “counterintuitive” representations. However, highly complex religious concepts are difficult in terms of cognitive processing, memory, and transmission, and, as a result, are prone to being spontaneously simplified in structure. Accordingly, there is reason to expect that the material images of Pazuzu and Lamaštu differed from the corresponding mental images of these demons. Specifically, it is argued here that in ancient cognition and memory, the demons would have been represented in a more cognitively optimal manner. This hypothesis is further supported by a detailed consideration of the full repertoire of iconographic and textual sources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many scholars have expressed fears that naturalism will homogenize religion, thereby reifying the concept and distorting the academy's perception of local cultures. Yet this fear is misplaced. In fact, recent advances in cognitive science, most notably regarding the development of interactional theories of cognition, lend significant support to conceptualizing religion heterogeneously. In this paper I first explore Russell McCutcheon's rationale for fearing naturalism. I then obviate McCutcheon's fears by demonstrating how the interactionalist perspective in cognitive science both promotes a heterogeneous understanding of human behavior as well as refutes sui generis religion. I conclude by recommending fusing insights from interactionalism with a ground-up, sociological approach to "religion" such as Timothy Fitzgerald's, which results in research methodology that is appropriately sensitive to the natural differences of behavior that have been historically identified as religious. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I explore two of the most pernicious kinds of scientific distortions and misconceptions pertinent to the study of religion (i.e., pseudoscientific trends focused on allegedly paranormal/supernatural phenomena and discontinuity between human and non-human cognition), arguing that: a) the adherence to the prestigious reputation of Eliadean academic frameworks may still cause grave distortions in the comprehension of relevant scientific fields; b) a reliance on cognition alone does not guarantee ipso facto a more epistemically warranted study of religion; c) an evolutionary and cognitively continuist approach to the study of religion is, instead, the most promising and fundamental scholarly tool to bridge the gap between the humanities and the natural sciences, even though it remains a long-term goal; d) the obsolete language of "aboriginal cultures" as open-air museums for our past is rooted in the aforementioned misconceptions and, though basically flawed, is still very much alive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]