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This article analyzes, compares, and explains the corporate elite networks formed by interlocking directorates across five Latin American economies in order to comprehend why corporate elites are interconnected by cohesive networks in some countries and not in others. Results show cohesive elite networks in Mexico, Chile, and to some extent in Peru, but not in Brazil and Colombia. After testing and rejecting the hypotheses from existing theories, the author identifies complementarities among cohesive corporate elite networks, state–business relations through strong encompassing business associations, and market openness. In economies where state–business relations are mediated by strong encompassing business associations and open up to free trade with developed economies, corporate elites form cohesive networks, whereas in economies with weak encompassing business associations and low trade openness, corporate elites do not form cohesive networks. These novel explanations are useful to understand corporate elite networks in emerging economies, and a benchmark for future studies on corporate elites. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]