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Introduction: Quality of life is included in the economic evaluation of health services by measuring the preference for health states, i.e. health state utilities. However, most intervention studies include a disease-specific, not a utility, instrument. Consequently, there has been increasing use of statistical mapping algorithms which permit utilities to be estimated from a disease-specific instrument. The present paper provides such algorithms between the MacNew Heart Disease Quality of Life Questionnaire (MacNew) instrument and six multi-attribute utility (MAU) instruments, the Euroqol (EQ-5D), the Short Form 6D (SF-6D), the Health Utilities Index (HUI) 3, the Quality of Wellbeing (QWB), the 15D (15 Dimension) and the Assessment of Quality of Life (AQoL-8D). Methods: Heart disease patients and members of the healthy public were recruited from six countries. Non-parametric rank tests were used to compare subgroup utilities and MacNew scores. Mapping algorithms were estimated using three separate statistical techniques. Results: Mapping algorithms achieved a high degree of precision. Based on the mean absolute error and the intra class correlation the preferred mapping is MacNew into SF-6D or 15D. Using the R squared statistic the preferred mapping is MacNew into AQoL-8D. Implications for research: The algorithms reported in this paper enable MacNew data to be mapped into utilities predicted from any of six instruments. This permits studies which have included the MacNew to be used in cost utility analyses which, in turn, allows the comparison of services with interventions across the health system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To equalize differences in health plan premiums due to differences in risk pools, the German legislature introduced a simple Risk Adjustment Scheme (RAS) based on age, gender and disability status in 1994. In addition, effective 1996, consumers gained the freedom to choose among hundreds of existing health plans, across employers and state-borders. This paper (a) estimates RAS pass-through rates on premiums, financial reserves, and expenditures and assesses the overall RAS impact on market price dispersion. Moreover, it (b) characterizes health plan switchers and investigates their annual and cumulative switching rates over time. Our main findings are based on representative enrollee panel data linked to administrative RAS and health plan data. We show that sickness funds with bad risk pools and high pre-RAS premiums lowered their total premiums by 42 cents per additional euro allocated by the RAS. Consequently, post-RAS, health plan prices converged but not fully. Because switchers are more likely to be white collar, young and healthy, the new consumer choice resulted in more risk segregation and the amount of money redistributed by the RAS increased over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]