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One means of examining the structure of a scientific discipline consists of analyzing the editorial boards of its most influential journals. This work analyzes the networks among the top 100 sociology journals, formed by multiple memberships of editors to distinct boards (interlocking editorship). The results suggest that a small number of editors having similar profiles simultaneously serve on a variety of journal boards; top journals form a large and united community, with Anglo-Saxon universities dominating the same; universities from countries located in the Southern Hemisphere hold a marginal position; and general sociology journals are more connected than specialized sociology journals. These findings contribute to debates on disciplinary segmentation, degrees of internationalization, openness to nonacademic sectors and trajectories of the scientific "elite". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective/Context: This paper explores the relationship between corporate networks and business influence to figure out the conditions of state capture. Methodology: We analyze corporate networks through interlocking directorates in three Central American countries - Panama, Costa Rica, and El Salvador - using network analysis, and we pinpoint the relationship between the structure of the corporate network and two corporate political actions: contributions to presidential campaigns and revolving doors. Conclusions: Results show corporate networks were fragmented in the three Central American countries, except for a well-connected business cluster in Panama. The organization of business elites based on a single cohesive business cluster could facilitate coordination to finance political parties, which gives them more strength to demand government posts. On the other side, the absence of connections between business elites makes it difficult to reach agreements and weaken business influence. Findings suggest that networking among some (not all) business elites can be a source that precedes state capture, as it organizes access to the state through collective mobilization of resources and coordinated action planning. Originality: This paper is the first study on networks of interlocking directorates in Central American economies and combines original data on contributions to electoral campaigns and revolving doors. Therefore, it can be a benchmark for future studies on business power. In addition, this study introduces the analysis of interlocking directorates in the literature on state capture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An analysis of who owns large companies and how they are organised is overdue in the study of Latin American elites, especially at transnational level. It is a limitation that has hampered debates on the emergence of transnational business elites in the region. This paper identifies the owners of the largest companies in Latin America and analyses the networks they form. The results reveal the formation of an interlocking ownership network between a small number of transnational owners, most of whom are financial corporations in the United States and Europe. These findings allow us to discuss regional integration and the dominance of economic models imported from those territories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]