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Objective/Context: This paper explores the relationship between corporate networks and business influence to figure out the conditions of state capture. Methodology: We analyze corporate networks through interlocking directorates in three Central American countries - Panama, Costa Rica, and El Salvador - using network analysis, and we pinpoint the relationship between the structure of the corporate network and two corporate political actions: contributions to presidential campaigns and revolving doors. Conclusions: Results show corporate networks were fragmented in the three Central American countries, except for a well-connected business cluster in Panama. The organization of business elites based on a single cohesive business cluster could facilitate coordination to finance political parties, which gives them more strength to demand government posts. On the other side, the absence of connections between business elites makes it difficult to reach agreements and weaken business influence. Findings suggest that networking among some (not all) business elites can be a source that precedes state capture, as it organizes access to the state through collective mobilization of resources and coordinated action planning. Originality: This paper is the first study on networks of interlocking directorates in Central American economies and combines original data on contributions to electoral campaigns and revolving doors. Therefore, it can be a benchmark for future studies on business power. In addition, this study introduces the analysis of interlocking directorates in the literature on state capture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An analysis of who owns large companies and how they are organised is overdue in the study of Latin American elites, especially at transnational level. It is a limitation that has hampered debates on the emergence of transnational business elites in the region. This paper identifies the owners of the largest companies in Latin America and analyses the networks they form. The results reveal the formation of an interlocking ownership network between a small number of transnational owners, most of whom are financial corporations in the United States and Europe. These findings allow us to discuss regional integration and the dominance of economic models imported from those territories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes, compares, and explains the corporate elite networks formed by interlocking directorates across five Latin American economies in order to comprehend why corporate elites are interconnected by cohesive networks in some countries and not in others. Results show cohesive elite networks in Mexico, Chile, and to some extent in Peru, but not in Brazil and Colombia. After testing and rejecting the hypotheses from existing theories, the author identifies complementarities among cohesive corporate elite networks, state–business relations through strong encompassing business associations, and market openness. In economies where state–business relations are mediated by strong encompassing business associations and open up to free trade with developed economies, corporate elites form cohesive networks, whereas in economies with weak encompassing business associations and low trade openness, corporate elites do not form cohesive networks. These novel explanations are useful to understand corporate elite networks in emerging economies, and a benchmark for future studies on corporate elites. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]