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How do national political parties vary in their views on Social Europe? I focus on an aspect that has received less attention despite its growing prevalence—EU regulations with ambitions to diminish social inequality to encourage social convergence among Member States. Since the Juncker Commission, the European Commission has become increasingly active in pursuing this aspect of Social Europe. Thus, understanding parties' positions on this aspect of Social Europe has become more important. However, current literature lacks measures of national party stances towards Social Europe, and explanations for these stances. Here, I use data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (2006, 2009, 2014 and 2019) to develop an indirect measure of party positions on Social Europe. Leveraging studies in party politics and EU politics, I propose that party families and national economic conditions may affect parties' positions on Social Europe. The analyses suggest substantial variation in parties' positions on Social Europe both within and across party families. The analyses also demonstrate that socialist and green parties support Social Europe most, whereas radical right parties support it least. Lastly, I do not find systematic evidence that national economic conditions influence parties' support for this aspect of Social Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social Europe, or the social dimension of the European Union (EU), has been receiving increasing attention in academic debates. This special issue introduction discusses Social Europe through the analytical framework of multi‐level governance while asking, perhaps controversially, whether Social Europe has the potential to become a fully‐fledged welfare state. This introduction also summarises the articles included in this special issue which focus on different governance levels, including EU institutions, member states, national parties, economic sectors, workers and the general public. On this basis, the introduction identifies sources of challenges and opportunities for Social Europe from various levels of governance. We conclude that the needs and demands become more diverse when we move from European institutions to the citizens. Notably, obstacles from one governance level often carry over to another governance level. Consequently, it becomes much more difficult to design welfare policies on the EU level that work for everyone. While a more evolved EU‐level welfare state may be possible in the future, substantial obstacles make it difficult to achieve in the short run. Hence, future research should examine the multi‐level structure of Social Europe in more detail to better grasp what Social Europe can and cannot deliver and why. Such research is not only relevant in the European Union but also in other multi‐level governance systems across the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I study if industrial decarbonisation yields elevated perceptions of political and economic unfairness. Decarbonising industry is central for the Green Transition, but it will disproportionately affect regions where brown sectors, which have been made uncompetitive, are concentrated. I contribute to studies on political consequences of the Green Transition by exploring perceived unfairness as one outcome from these uneven effects. In regions where industrial decarbonisation and employment declines in brown sectors have been greater than in other regions, residents may feel that they have disproportionately borne the economic costs of industrial decarbonisation for their country, and may consider their governments to have neglected their interests. I test these expectations in 60 West European regions using past (2013–2018) employment and CO2 emissions trends from the three most carbon-polluting sectors, as proxies for industrial decarbonisation accompanied by employment declines in brown sectors, and combined them with micro-level data from the European Social Survey (2018). I find that regions exhibit elevated perceptions of economic and political unfairness only when they experience both relative CO2 emissions and employment decline in these sectors. As perceived unfairness underpins some of the political discontent observed today, this finding highlights the need for Green Transition policies that minimise labour market disruptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines institutional change in father‐specific leave ‐ a centre‐piece of the EU's work‐life balance directive (WLBD) ‐ from the perspective of gradual institutional change. The WLBD, a highly contentious directive, represents a litmus test for the possible impact of the European pillar of social rights (EPSR), on welfare state institutions, which are responsible for the organisation, financing and delivery of social rights in member states. The analysis comprises in‐depth case studies in Denmark, Germany, France and Poland, with different combinations of family and parental leave policies prior to the WLBD. The findings reveal that the EU's directive is leading to convergence in paternity leave, but to divergence in parental leave. Our study is important because it shows that even if EU directives in social policy in principle can lead to upwards social convergence across the EU, when they are relatively weak in terms of precise constraint, for instance, for the level of remuneration for leave, this leads to differentiated integration. This could undermine the very purpose of the EPSR, which seeks to improve social rights for all citizens across the EU. Similar dynamics are likely to be present in other areas at the welfare state‐labor market nexus, such as minimum wages or platform work, where the EU is also developing regulation under the auspices of the EPSR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The impact of individuals' fairness predispositions on public support for the welfare state receives less attention than the effect of economic self-interest on this support. Amid growing income differences even in previously egalitarian Nordic countries, predispositions about what is fair in society are rapidly becoming more politically salient. We examine how fairness predispositions towards the rich and the poor are linked to the support for three dimensions regarding how redistribution ought to be organised: access, conditionality and contribution. We then disaggregate these links for different income brackets and between elites who hold leadership positions and the rest of society (citizens). Using data pertaining to Finnish citizens and elites in 2018 and 2020, respectively, we show that the two fairness predispositions are related in various ways to the support for these three dimensions, with differences across income brackets and tentative differences between elites and citizens. These findings underline the importance of considering fairness predispositions even in welfare states emphasising economic equality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policy access biases worry social policy scholars because they generate Matthew effects that exacerbate socioeconomic divides. Yet, access biases in many social investment policies, like training during unemployment, remain under-researched. Such access biases may be detrimental to a critical objective of social investment: to improve and uplift workers with precarious economic prospects. We focus here on access bias in training provided by public employment services against lower-educated workers. They are vulnerable to unemployment and fractured employment and should thus be targeted for training. While there is burgeoning attention on access biases in training against disadvantaged youths and non-citizens, fewer studies have focused on similar access bias against lower-educated workers. We highlight that access bias against such workers may stem from their lower willingness and demand for training, as well as policy design, informal eligibility criteria and caseworkers' creaming practices. We suggest, however, that greater availability of training opportunities may ease this access bias against lower-educated workers. Using the Finnish Income Distribution survey data (2007–2012), we find evidence of training access bias: primary-educated workers are significantly less likely to participate in training than upper secondary and vocationally educated workers. Concurrently, our results show that availability of training is not significantly associated with the extent of training access bias against primary-educated workers. With a Nordic welfare model that prioritizes training to remedy labour market vulnerability and stresses that access to benefits and services is based on need, Finland represents a least likely case to find such access bias in training. We therefore consider these results worrying: if it is found here, it may be prevalent in countries with other welfare models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Automation has permeated workplaces and threatens labour in the production process. Concurrently, European governments have expanded workfare which imposes stringent conditions and sanctions on unemployed workers after the onset of austerity. We explore how automation risk affects workfare support. Recent research finds that most routine workers 'survive' in their routine jobs. Despite avoiding unemployment, routine workers may face the threat of status decline as automation erodes the value of routine work. They may respond by differentiating themselves from lower-ranked social groups such as unemployed workers. Such boundary drawing may manifest views that the unemployed are less deserving of welfare. We thus posit that routine workers may support workfare to assuage their fears of status decline. We further explore if worsening economic hardship, proxied as rising unemployment rates over time, increases their support for workfare. We conducted pooled and multilevel analyses using data from the European Social Survey. We find that routine workers significantly support workfare. We also find that routine workers support workfare when economic hardship worsens, but oppose it when conditions ameliorate. Findings suggest that status threat is an important channel by which automation risk may affect workfare support, but its impact depends on social context, hence yielding country-differences. Worsening economic hardship may exacerbate routine workers' status decline fears, and intensify their harsh views against unemployed workers. Automation risk may thus have a greater impact on workfare support under such conditions. Policymakers can use these findings to assess how workfare may be publicly received and under various economic conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU aims for net carbon neutrality by 2050. Since industry contributes substantially to carbon emissions, reforms to decarbonise industry are necessary to achieve this goal. However, these reforms may entail labour market costs in the form of unemployment, which may necessitate social policies to mitigate them. Our article provides a novel contribution to the existing literature by developing a framework to classify how these policy responses may vary across EU Member States and it also suggests sources for these variations. We analyse the planned social policy responses of four countries – Denmark, Germany, Spain and Poland – by comparing the emphasis on social investment relative to compensation; the emphasis on social relative to industrial policy; and the extent to which social policy is targeted. Our findings suggest that Danish plans will rely primarily on social investment, whereas Poland will rely on compensation. In Germany, there is a greater emphasis on industrial policy, and Spain’s planned responses differ between policies targeted at coal miners and policies for other workers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]